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AUTHOR: 


MERRINGTON,  ERNEST 

NORTHCROFT 


TITLE: 


PROBLEM  OF 

PERSONALITY 

PLACE: 

LONDON 

DA  TE : 

1916 


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BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICIlOmEMXARGEI 


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Ill 

M552 


Merrin^ton,  Ernest  Nortlicroft. 

I'lu*  problem  of  i)orsonality  :  a  critieal  iK'  const  mctive 

^tluly   iti  the  l^lit  of   reeeiit   tlinuixht,   by   i^jria^sl   Xttflh- 
ei'nft  Merriiigtoii  ...     Loiuiuii,  }vlaciiiiilaii  and  cu.^  iiiiiitijiij 

X,  229  p      19"*. 


1     rr>r=:o!ia1ity      2.  Ontology. 


Lji;rarv  of   Congress 


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MACMILLAN   AND  CO.,   Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE   MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •   BOSTON   •   CHICAGO 
DALLAS    •   SAN    FRANCISCO 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Lra 

TORONTO 


THE  PROBLEM  OF 
PERSONALITY 

A  CRITICAL    y  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY 
IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  RECENT  THOUGHT 


BY 


ERNEST  NORTHCROFT  MERRINGTON 

M.A.  (Sydney),  Ph. D.  (Harvard) 

RESEARCH  STUI^NT,  ,IJN1,VBRSITV  O^  p'.DJNBU^ftK,    i90j'-4, 

LECTURER  IN   PHrLOSOFHV,   1^}%eA$V^Y  OF  SYDNEY,    l^>7^ 

AUTHOR  OF   'the   POSSIBILITY  OF  A  SCIENCE  OF  CASUISTRY* 


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MACMILLAN    AND    CO.,    LIMITED 
ST   MARTIN'S  STREET,   LONDON 

1916 


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BY  ROBERT  MACLKHOSK  AKD  CO.  LTD. 


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FOKEWORD. 


The  present  work  represents  an  effort  to  state 
the  problem  of  Personality  in  relation  to  some 
of  the  fundamental  truths  of  philosophy  and 
theology.  The  kingdom  of  truth  is  to  be  found, 
if  an3rwhere,  *  within  you ' ;  and  it  is  worth 
while  to  seek  to  clarify  our  ideas  regarding  the 
somewhat  vague  concept  of  Personality  in  order 
that  the  constructive  spirit  which  is  manifest 
everywhere  to-day  may  have  some  materials  with 
which  to  work.  This  is  but  a  partial  attempt  to 
express  certain  opinions,  which,  whatever  their 
defects  may  be,  have  at  least  passed  through 
the  fires  of  criticism  in  three  universities,  and 
have  proved  to  the  author  and  others  with 
whom  he  has  discussed  them  that,  in  an  age  of 
much  questioning,  they  have  a  helpful  influence 
upon  the  truths  by  which  we  live,  and  upon  the 
life  itself  which  is  '  more  than  they.' 


VI 


FOREWORD 


The  substance  of  this  work  is  a  Thesis  which 
is  hereby  published  with  the  authority  of  the 
Division  of  Philosophy  of  Harvard  University, 
by  whom  it  was  accepted  as  part  of  the  work 
for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  on  the 
recommendation  of  the  Examining  Committee, 
Professors  J.  Royce,  G.  H.  Palmer  and  R.  B. 
Perry.  To  these  and  other  Harvard  teachers 
and  friends,  especially  the  late  William  James 
and  Professor  H.  Miinsterberg,  I  have  to  make 
acknowledgments.  Also  I  am  grateful  to  Pro- 
fessors Andrew  Seth  Pringle-Pattison  and  James 
Seth  (of  Edinburgh),  and  to  Professor  Francis 
Anderson  and  Principal  Andrew  Harper  (both  of 
Sydney)  for  their  earlier  help. 

As  the  first  part  of  the  book  is  occupied  with 
an  examination  of  certain  views  of  the  Self  held 
by  recent  philosophers  in  Britain  and  America, 
and  is  somewhat  technical  to  a  certain  class  of 
readers,  some  may  prefer  to  begin  with  the 
Second  Part  in  which  the  subject  is  more  con- 
structively treated. 

The  following  characteristic  note  from  the  late 
Professor  WiUiam  James  upon  the  views  set 
forth  in  this  work  should  be  of  interest  to  those 
who  knew  him,  and  who  admire  his  brilliant 


FOREWORD 


vu 


work  as  philosopher  and  teacher.  It  expresses 
a  certain  facet  of  his  theory  of  the  Self,  which 
supplements  what  is  given  in  Chapter  I  by  way 
of  estimating  the  place  of  Personahty  in  his 
thought : — 

'  The  part  of  your  thesis  that  hits  me  hardest 
is  the  remarks  on  ''  Experience  " — ^with  the  rest 
I  am  in  sympathy  of  tolerance  if  not  of  active 
echo.  I  have  worked  for  so  many  years  with 
the  "  passing  thought "  formula  which  prag- 
matically does  all  the  work  of  a  Self,  that  the 
inability  to  define  the  Self  except  by  its  work 
makes  me  perhaps  unduly  hostile,  not  to  the 
word,  of  course,  but  to  the  use  of  it  as  a  funda- 
mental term  in  philosophy.  The  ''  train  of 
experience  "  kind  of  self  gets  its  imity  after  the 
facts  only;  but  the  '*unanalyzable  principle" 
kind  is  anterior  to  the  facts  and  seems  to 
warrant  their  having  unity.  But  if  one  makes 
of  each  stage  of  unity  already  achieved  in  fact, 
an  active  worker  for  more  unity,  with  efficacy 
too,  doesn't  the  warrant  also  seem  to  exist  ? ' 

In  reply,  I  must  say  here  simply,  it  all  depends 
upon  the  point  of  view,  and  leave  the  reader 
to  form  his  own  opinion  in  the  sequel.  But 
may  I  acknowledge  my  debt  in  heart  and  mind 


VIU 


FOREWORD 


to  this  knight-errant  of  Truth,  the  greatest  of  the 
century,  and  most  beloved  by  aU  who  were 
honoured  with  his  friendship  ?  To  the  memory 
of  WiUiam  James  I  dedicafe  anything  of  worth 

in  this  book.  ^ 

While  the  manuscript  was  in  the  pubUsher  s 
hands.  Professor  Henri  Bergson  announced  as 
the  subject  of  his  Gifford  Lectures  the  title  which 
had  been  given  to  this  work.    This  is  a  coinci- 
dence ;  but  here  is  another  evidence  of  the  recog- 
nition in  our  time  of  the  great  importance  of  this 
subject.    All  students  of  philosophy  and  theology 
will  eagerly  await  the  fuller  pronoimcement  by 
Bergson  of  his  views  upon  Personality,  which 
will  doubtless  be  made  available  in  book  form 
at  no  distant  date.    Meanwhile  there  is  room 
for  study  and  treatment  of  the  problem  of  the 
inner  life  by  those  who  are  occupied  with  the 
theme  in  their  own  way,  and  are  keenly  alive 
to  the  privilege  of  being  admirers,  and  perhaps 
disciples,  of  the  great  thinkers  of  our  time. 


E.  N.  M. 


Emmanuel  Collboe, 

University  of  Queensland, 

March  1914. 


CONTENTS. 


PACK 


Introduction  - 


PART  I. 
EXPOSITORY  AND  CRITICAL. 


CHAPTER  I. 
William  James ^ 

CHAPTER   11. 
Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley 26 

CHAPTER  III. 
Professor  Josiah  Royce 55 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Professor  G.  H.  Howison 77 

CHAPTER  V. 
Mr.  F.  C.  S.  Schiller 88 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Dr.  Hastings  Rashdall 122 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Professor  Andrew  Seth  Pringle-Pattibon 


PAOB 

130 


t- 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


Later  Tendencies 


140 


FART  11. 
CONSTRUCTIVE. 

CHAPTER  !• 

Experience  as  a  Metaphysical  Concept 


151 


CHAPTER  II. 
The  Meaning  of  Personality  and  Related  Concepts      160 


CHAPTER  III. 


The  Reality  of  Self 


170 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Metaphysic  of  Existence     - 


181 


CHAPTER  V. 


Metaphysic  of  Values 


200 


CHAPTER  VI. 
Metaphysic  of  Reality 


Index 


210 


221 


1\ 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  concept  of  Personality  is  so  vague  and 
undefined,  and  the  possible  problems  connected 
with  it  are  so  numerous  and  far-reaching,  that 
it  is  advisable  to  state  as  briefly  as  possible 
my  main  thesis.  I  am  not  concerned  primarily 
to  discuss  the  relations  of  Personality  to  Logic, 
Psychology,  Ethics,  Sociology,  Cosmogony,  Theo- 
logy, and  the  Uke,  except  in  so  far  as  the  Une  of 
thought  passes  through  these  regions.  And  even 
in  Metaphysics  I  have  allowed  myself  but  Uttle 
space  for  the  problems  of  Epistemology,  In- 
dividuality and  Immortality.  The  reason  is  two- 
fold. In  the  first  place,  the  treatment  of  this 
subject  is  essentially  an  exercise  in  the  much- 
needed  discipline  of  self-limitation ;  for  one  could 
easily  lose  oneself  in  seeking  metaphysically  to 
find  '  the  Self ' !  Further,  it  is  plain  that  these 
problems  are  insoluble  apart  from  a  general  theory 
of  ReaUty.    Instead  of  seeking  to  defend  any 


it 


2       THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

special  theory  represented  by  these  terms  directly, 
we  do  better,  perhaps,  to  get  an  adequate  meta- 
physical view  of  the  Self ;  and  then  these  pro- 
blems will  precipitate  a  solution  in  the  theoretical 
medium  that  has  been  provided.  This  is  especi- 
ally trae  of  ImmortaUty  ;  on  which,  accordingly, 
there  is  not  much  said  directly  ;  but  the  answer 
to  this  great  question  emerges  positively  with  a 
PersonaUstic  Theory  of  the  Universe. 

Our  thesis  then  is  to  examine  the  main  pro- 
blems of  PersonaUty,  with  especial  reference 
to  recent  works  in  metaphysics.  Accordingly, 
the  First  Part  of  the  work  is  devoted  to  the 
exposition  and  criticism  of  the  leading  doctrines 
of  PersonaUty  as  maintained  by  some  of  the  prin- 
cipal present-day  philosophers,  who  have  dealt 
fully  with  the  subject.  We  are  concerned  with 
them  only  to  the  extent  required  for  an  under- 
standing of  their  views  upon  our  Problem  ;  and 
so  we  are  not  called  upon  to  investigate  their 
systems  in  other  respects,  however  important 
they  may  be  from  a  different  standpoint.  And 
as  the  '  reaction '  is  constructively  given  in  the 
Second  Part,  the  criticisms  in  the  First  Part  are 
very  brief  and  pointed.  The  Second  Part  will 
carry  on  the  alignment  negatively  shown  in  the 


INTRODUCTION  3 

eariier  criticisms,  to  a  positive  view  of  the 
answers  to  our  main  problems. 

What  then  is  the  Problem  of  PersonaUty  ?  It 
is  primarily  the  Problem  of  the  ReaUty  of  the 
Self,  and  the  meaning,  and  the  place  of  this  and 
kindred  Concepts  in  a  metaphysical  theory. 
FoUowing  upon  that  are  the  questions  concerning 
the  PersonaUty  of  God,  and  of  the  Absolute ; 
the  demands  of  our  moral  and  reUgious  nature ; 
and  the  relation  between  Spirits  ;  the  questions 
of  Monism  and  Pluralism  ;  the  metaphysical 
importance  of  our  Ideals  and  Values ;  the  im- 
pUcations  of  Freedom  and  Duty,  and  beUef  in 
ImmortaUty. 

The  First  Part  of  the  book  does  not  aim  at 
giving  an  epitome  of  aU  recent  thought  upon  the 
subject  before  us.  That  would  require  more 
years  of  research  and  preparation  than  I  have 
been  able  to  give,  and  a  large  volume  as  the  result. 
The  aim  is  to  treat  the  views  of  those  whose 
work  upon  the  Concept  has  been  central  to  their 
thinking.  I  confine  myself  for  the  most  part  to 
the  thinkers  of  Britain  and  America  who  have 
been  fairly  influential.  Accordingly  I  shaU  treat 
of  constructive  philosophers  chiefly,  such  as 
James,  Bradley,  Royce,  Howison,  RashdaJl,  and 


4        THE   PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Schiller.  For  his  valuable  works  of  criticism 
Andrew  Seth  Pringle-Pattison  is  included. 

The  subject  is  one  that  spreads  so  naturally 
that  a  rigid  conciseness  of  matter  and  treatment 
is  essential.  The  study  of  the  Self  easily  leads 
one  into  relations  with  almost  any  and  every 
conceivable  concept;  and  this  is  for  the  very 
good  reason  that  it  fulfils  the  claims  of  centrality 
and  supremacy  made  here  on  its  behalf. 

It  may  be  remarked  that  there  is  need  of  a 
Synthetic  Psychology  or  empirical  side  of  meta- 
physics which  shall  study  the  Self,  and  such 
concepts  as  Organism  and  Life  in  their  wholeness. 
And  this  must  be  done  not  in  an  unsympathetic 
spirit,  but  as  seeking  for  Ught  upon  the  totahty  of 
conduct  and  behaviour,  and  the  deeper  facts  and 
principles  which  are  most  important  and  signifi- 
cant in  psychology,  ethics,  and  philosophy,  as  well 
as  in  life,  and  which  the  analytic  methods  of  the 
present  day,  and  merely  methodological  ideals  of 
truth,  are  absolutely  incompetent  to  furnish.^ 

1  Misa  Calkins  has  recognized  this  by  her  provision  for  Psy- 
chology as  Science  of  Related  Selves  in  A  First  Book  in  Psychology 
(MacmiUan,  1910).  p.  273  Q.  Professor  W.  R.  Boyce  Gibson  has 
made  a  plea  for  the  recognition  of  the  limitations  of  Pheno- 
menalistic  Psychology  in  his  Philosophical  Introduction  to  Ethics, 
p.  193  ff. 


INTRODUCTION  6 

It  is  part  of  the  Thesis  that  not  only  is  the  Self 
the  true  starting-point  for  a  Metaphysic  of 
Existence,  but,  as  Personality,  it  forms  the 
groundwork  of  a  Metaphysic  of  Values  also, 
while  it  proves  to  be  the  supreme  category  of 
explanation,  the  goal  and  the  consummation  of 
a  Metaphysic  of  Reality. 


PART  I. 
EXPOSITORY  AND  CRITICAL. 


CHAPTER  I. 


WILLIAM   JAMES. 

The  metaphysical  study  of  the  Self  is  distinct 
from,  but  not  wholly  independent  of  the  psycho- 
logical treatment  of  the  various  problems  con- 
nected therewith.  The  late  William  James  has 
given  a  valuable  psychological  analysis  of  these 
problems/  and  he  has  also  passed  beyond  this 
stage  into  the  region  of  metaphysics,  in  which 
his  view  of  the  Self  is  naturally  important.  His 
system  of  Radical  Empiricism  is  partially  worked- 
out  in  his  later  books  and  in  various  articles 
which  we  shall  refer  to  as  occasion  requires.^ 

*  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  by  Prof.  William  James.  Two 
volumes.    New  York,  1890.    Especially  chapters  ix,  x. 

*The  more  recent  books  of  James  expomid  the  main  ideas 
indicated  in  this  chapter,  so  far  as  our  topic  is  concerned.  His 
chief  works  are  Prcujmatism,  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  and  A 
Pluralistic  Universe.  In  the  last-named  book — perhaps  his 
greatest — James  works  over  the  Problem  of  the  Self  once  more, 
arrives  at  the  same  conclusions  as  previously  adopted ;  but, 
at  least  as  it  seems  to  the  author,  with  certain  qualms  of  his 
philosophic  conscience. 


10  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Accordingly  we  shall  pass  rapidly  along  the  track 
of  his  thought  until  the  bridge  between  psycho- 
logy and  metaphysics  is  crossed,  and  we  are  intro- 
duced to  the  region  where  lie  our  mam  problems. 


I. 

The  distinct  starting-point  is  his  conception  of 
consciousness  as  '  the  Stream  of  Thought'  ^  Our 
psychical  hfe  is  essentially  characterized  by 
change.  Mental  life  is  ever  flowing.  Never  does 
the  same  sensation  recur.  As  Shadworth  Hodg- 
son has  said,  '  the  chain  of  consciousness  is  a 
sequence  of  differents.'  *  Here  is  the  point  of 
divergence  from  Locke,  Hume  and  Herbart, 
although  in  their  insistence  upon  succession  they 
approximate  to  this  view.  But  they  wrongly 
held  to  atomistic  xmits  of  consciousness,  sensa- 
tions and  ideas,  supposed  to  remain  unchanged 
except  for  the  different  combinations  by  which 
the  mental  processes  were  built  up.  It  is  im- 
possible to  think  of  the  brain  as  unmodified  by 
the  constant  change.  The  same  *  object '  may 
recur,  but  that  is  quite  distinct  from  the  same 
bodily  sensation,  which  cannot  repeat  itself. 

*  The  Principles  of  Psychology ^  vol.  i.  ch.  ix. 
2  The  Philosophy  of  Reflection^  i.  p.  290. 


WILLIAM  JAMES 


11 


But,  further,  this  sequence  of  changes  is 
characterized  by  felt  continuity.  Even  after 
breaks,  as  on  awakening  from  sleep,  the  personal 
consciousness  manifests  gregarious  tendencies  in 
regard  to  preceding  thoughts,  and  accepts  what 
it  regards  as  its  own  past  experiences.  What  is 
its  criterion  in  this  unifying  process  ?  James 
repUes  that  certain  quaUties  of  '  warmth,  inti- 
macy, and  immediacy '  ^  are  possessed  by  those 
past  feeUngs  which  are  welcomed  as  personal 
property.  Later  ^  he  inchnes  to  the  opinion  that 
these  characteristics  which  constitute  our  sense 
of  Selfhood  are  chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  physical. 
But,  leaving  that  for  the  present,  we  have  seen 
reason  to  prefer  the  conception  of  consciousness 
as  essentially  changing  and  continuous  to  the 
notion  of  it  as  something  static.  This  smooth- 
ness and  flow  are  represented  by  the  *  Stream  of 
Thought.' 

Now  we  are  ready  to  ask — ^How  is  the  personal 
character  of  mental  life  provided  for  in  this 
procession  ?  How  can  the  train  of  thought 
explain  the  Self  which  seems  to  own  all  its 

*  Principles  of  Psychology ^  vol.  i.  p.  239. 

» Ibid.  vol.  i.  pp.  241,  242,  299,  300.  See  also  his  article  '  Does 
Consciousness  Exist,'  Journal  of  Philosophy^  Psychology,  and 
Scientific  Methods y  vol.  i.  No.  18. 


12  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

thoughts,  and  to  be  the  centre  of  its  feeUngs  and 
desires,  and  the  agent  in  its  voUtions  ?  James 
admits  the  existence  of  the  personal  element. 
No  psychology  can  question  it.  But  when  it 
comes  to  definition  of  it,  divergence  seems 
inevitable.  Common-sense  and  spirituahstic 
philosophy  stand  for  a  Soul,  an  identical 
being  throughout  the  psychical  change,  while 
the  scientific  interests  require  a  more  workable 
hypothesis. 

James  tries  to  meet  these  claims  by  his  view 
of  the  Self  as  the  '  Passing  Thought.'  If  the 
feehngs  of  Selfhood  be  regarded  as  themselves 
parts  of  the  '  stream,'  the  difficulty  of  reconciHng 
common-sense  and  science  seems  to  be  met.  For 
whatever  those  thoughts  and  feelings  of  Self  may 
be,  they  are  formed  in  the  present,  and  projected 
from  this  '  section '  of  the  stream.  This  is  a 
pragmatic  account  of  the  Self,  and  it  seeks  to 
express  its  '  face-value.'  It  regards  the  field  of 
consciousness  as  given  all  at  once  in  every 
instant,  with  feehngs  of  relation  and  tendency, 
thus  doing  away  with  the  need  for  an  Ego  to 
unify  a  manifold  of  ideas.^    Consciousness,   in 

*  Cf.  Critique  written  by  the  late  Professor  James  upon  the 
views  given  in  this  work,  printed  in  the  Foreword. 


WILLIAM  JAMES 


13 


fact,  is  fundamentally  a  selection  within  this 
field,  some  ideas  being  emphasized  and  others 
being  ignored.    Elsewhere  he  has  described  it 
as  a  '  fighter  for  ends.'  ^     The  greatest  division 
due  to  this  emphasis  is  that  which  we  find 
between  the  '  Me  '  and  the  '  Not-Me,'  which  are 
thus  viewed  as  expressions  of  relation.    By  the 
'  Me  '  we  understand  the  Empirical  Self,  the  so- 
called    '  contents    of    consciousness,'    and    the 
various  relationships  in  which  the  '  I '  stands, 
and   which   constitute   Personahty.    So   James 
speaks   of  the   Material,   the   Social,   and   the 
Spiritual  Self,  reserving  the  Pure  Ego  for  later 
consideration.    The  Material  and  Social  Selves 
may   be   readily   conceived,    but   what   is   the 
Spiritual    Self  ?     It    represents    the    psychical 
faculties  and  processes ;  and  it  may  turn  out  to 
be  either  the  '  Stream  '  as  a  whole,  or  the  present 
*  section.'     Examining    these    in    turn,    as    the 
abstract  and   concrete   views   of  the   Spiritual 
Self,   James  admits  that  the  former  gives  an 
account  of  the  intimate  and  incessant  nature  of 
the    Self,    which    accords    best    with    ordinary 
feehng  and  opinion.^     But,  again,  definitions  will 
cause  divergence  between  the  advocates  of  the 

*  Principles  of  Psychology,  i.  p.  141.  *  Ibid.  i.  p.  297. 


14  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Soul  and  those  who  attribute  the  self-feeling  to 
a  fiction  denoted  by  the  personal  pronoun,  '  L' 
An  examination  of  the  actual  feelings  is  what 
concerns  James,  and  for  his  part,  introspection 
seems  to  reveal  nothing  but  intra-cephahc  move- 
ments and  sensations  between  the  head  and 
throat.  Our  feeling  of  activity  in  the  *  nuclear ' 
Self  is  viewed  as  due  to  these  bodily  sensations 
of  movement.^ 

Accordingly  the  concrete  method  is  adopted, 
and  the  Thinker  is  regarded  as  a  postulate  of  the 
present  Thought.  The  Self  is  identical,  in  fact, 
with  the  Thought,  which  judges  the  past,  knows 
the  preceding  thought,  and  '  finding  it  warm,' 
that  is,  possessing  the  qualities  previously  de- 
scribed, adopts  it.2  As  every  thought  passes 
away  it  is  taken  up  by  a  present  one,  which 
knows  it,  and  transmits  itself  in  turn  to  a  suc- 
cessor. This  '  trick  '  of  the  present  Thought  in 
appropriating  the  past  constitutes  the  Self.    This 

*  Cf.  Stout,  Anali/tic  Psychology,  vol.  i.  chapter  on  '  Mental 
Activity '  for  a  criticism  of  this  view.  See  also  James'  article  on 
*  The  Experience  of  Activity,  in  the  Psychological  Review,  vol. 
xii.  No.  1  footnote,  pp.  7-9.  In  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  378- 
380,  James  replies  to  Stout's  criticisms,  and  again  endorses  his 
view  of  the  '  I '  as  essentially  a  bodily  term,  expressive  mainly 
of  the  relation  of  position. 

*  Prificiples  of  Psychology,  i.  p.  339. 


WILLIAM  JAMES 


16 


also  explains  the  sense  of  Personal  Identity  with- 
out invoking  any  metaphysical  principle.  The 
judgment  of  my  Identity  is  Hke  any  other  judg- 
ment of  sameness,  a  matter  of  thought ;  no 
direct  spiritual  feelings  are  required,  the  mere 
*  warmth  '  of  bodily  quality  which  gives  all  such 
thoughts  a  generic  unity  is  sufficient. 

A  criticism  of  the  three  leading  metaphysical 
theories  of  the  Inner  Principle  of  Personal 
Unity,  or  Pure  Ego,  is  given,i  viz.  the  Spiritual- 
istic, Associationist,  and  the  Transcendentalist. 
As  to  the  j&rst,  James  regards  the  Soul  as  a 
superfluity.  The  Associationists  missed  the  mark 
by  failure  to  describe  Self-consciousness.  The 
Kantian  Transcendental  Unity  of  Apperception 
and  the  Self-distinguishing  consciousness  of  the 
Neo-Kantians — Edward  Caird  and  T.  H.  Green — 
are  dismissed  as  cumbrous  and  erroneous,  through 
the  effort  to  explain  relations  by  the  knower 
rather  than  by  the  known.  James  provides  for 
relations  in  the  world  of  objects  rather  than  on 
the  subjective  side.  The  Subject  submits  to 
'  feelings  of  relation '  as  naturally  as  any  other 
experience.  While  James  has  been  largely  in- 
fluenced by  Locke,  Hume,  and  MiU,  he  disagrees 

1  Hid.  i.  p.  342. 


°^^ 


16  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

here  with  his  authorities.  So  he  stands  out  of 
all  three  schools.  He  leaves  the  reader  free  to 
supplement  his  view  of  '  the  Passing  Thought  * 
by  the  theory  of  the  Soul  as  an  actual  being  or 
substantial  Ego,  if  he  chooses  ;  but  for  himself 
he  finds  no  need  for  such  hypothesis.  He  accord- 
ingly speaks  of  the  empirical  person  as  '  Me,'  and 
the  judging  Thought  a,  ■  I.'  '  There  need  never 
have  been  a  quarrel  between  associationism  and 
its  rivals,  if  the  former  had  admitted  the  inde- 
composable  unity  of  every  pulse  of  thought,  and 
the  latter  been  wilUng  to  allow  that  **  perishing  " 
pulses  of  thought  might  recollect  and  know.'  ^ 

In  addition,  it  should  be  remarked  that 
James  discussed  some  of  the  psychological  diffi- 
culties  attendant  upon  the  belief  in  the  Self  as 
commonly  held,  especially  the  phenomena  of 
changes  of  personaUty,  of  hypnotism,  and  of  the 
possession  of  many  selves.  Such  abnormalities 
seem  to  indicate  the  transitive  and  unsubstantial 
nature  of  what  we  esteem  as  Selfhood,  and  suffi- 
cient evidence  is  forthcoming  to  estabhsh  the 
genuineness  of  these  facts. 

Turning  now  to  the  later  developments  of  his 
doctrine  in  his  metaphysical  system,  we  find  that 

'  Principles  of  Psychology,  p.  371. 


WILLIAM  JAMES 


17 


the  Self  approaches  the  vanishing  point  in 
Radical  Empiricism.  The  negative  side  of  his 
earher  doctrine  of  the  Self  becomes  more  and 
more  prominent,  till  the  Person  is  scarcely  dis- 
tinguishable among  the  multitude  of  'experi- 
ences '  which  compose  our  psychic  life.  Con- 
sciousness itself  is  mistrusted  and  even  discarded  !^ 
The  function  of  consciousness  is  performed  by 
thoughts ;  and  '  that  function  is  knowing.'  2 
There  is  a  common  medium  of  knower  and 
known  which  James  calls  '  pure  experience.'  He 
boldly  denies  the  inner  duplicity  of  consciousness 
and  content.  Both  are  alike,  and  may  be  desig- 
nated '  experiences.'  In  perception  or  thought 
what  happens  is  this — certain  experiences  get 
themselves  presented  twice  at  least,  once  in  a 
context  of  relations  which  concern  a  field  of 
objects  or  ideas,  and  again  in  a  context  which  is 
made  up  of  relations  of  'personal  history.' 
These  relations  are  themselves  felt  experiences, 
according  to  the  view  which  we  have  found  in 
his  Psychology.  He  illustrates  the  process  of 
the  dual  context  by  the  point  at  the  intersection 
of  two  lines,  in  both  of  which  it  may  be  counted. 

^Jourmd  of  Philosophy,  etc,,  i.  No.  18,  p.  478. 
•  Ibid,  p.  478. 

B 


18  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

I  think  this  may  be  made  clearer  by  considering 
the  instance  of  the  bright  circle  thrown  by  a 
search-Ught  upon  the  sea.  The  bright  circle  is 
counted  in  the  stream  of  Ught  and  also  in  the 
surface-plane  of  the  sea,— two  different  contexts ; 
the  former  may  be  compared  to  the  person,  the 
latter  to  the  '  thing.'  But  the  analogy  fails  in 
so  far  as  it  does  not  indicate  the  oneness  of  nature 
which  is  claimed  in  James'  Theory  for  both  con- 
texts, as  parts  of  '  pure  experience,'  instead  of 
regarding  them  duaUstically  as  matter  and  mind, 
subject  and  object,  and  so  forth. 

Self  and  its  activities  are  regarded  as  belonging 
to  the  content  of  experience.  In  a  later  article  ^ 
James  speaks  of  Personality  as  the  experienced 
relation  between  terms  that  are  conscious  of  con- 
tinuing each  other.  This  '  relation  '  by  which  the 
Self  is  organized  as  a  system  of  memories,  pur- 
poses, strivings,  and  so  on,  is  admittedly  the 
most  difficult  to  explain.  But  this  is  just  the 
strategic  point  of  Radical  Empiricism,  directed 
against  all  the  fictions  of  rationaUstic  metaphysics. 
As  to  what  this  *  withness  '  which  constitutes  our 

» •  The  World  of  Pure  Experience,*  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc,, 
vol.  i.  No.  20,  p.  3.  Also  vol.  ii.  No.  2,  *  The  Thing  and  its 
Relations.' 


WILLIAM  JAMES 


19 


personal  Ufe  is,  we  can  only  describe  it  as  experi- 
ence of  conjunctive  relations,  continuity  or 
absence  of  break.  The  schools  in  the  past  have 
recognized  disjunctive  relations,  the  disconnected- 
ness of  experience,  but  they  have  not  accepted 
conjunctive  relations,  as  equally  '  given  ' ;  had 
they  done  so,  they  would  not  have  needed  to 
employ  transcendental  principles  to  explain  dif- 
ferences,  and  to  unify  the  discrepant  subject  and 
object  which  their  one-sided  abstract  method 
provided.  Even  our  minds  are  not  so  absolutely 
separate  as  is  supposed ;  they  may  and  do 
become  conterminous  in  our  common  world,^  and 
perhaps  even  confluence  will  be  possible  at  some 
future  time.  James  admits  his  affinity  here  with 
Natural  Realism  rather  than  with  views  similar 
to  those  of  Berkeley  and  Mill.  He  maintains  a 
pluralistic,  as  opposed  to  monistic,  view  of  the 
world,  and  rejects  infinity. 

Self-activity  and  efficient  causation  are  de- 
fended by  James,^  although  he  regards  the  body 
as  the  centre  of  such  feeUngs,  as  opposed  to 
theories  hke  Wundt's  Innervationsgefilhle  which 


^Journal  of  Philosophy^  etc.,  vol.  i.  No.  21,  p.  15  ff. 

*  *  The  Experience  of  Activity,*  Psychological  Review,  vol.  xii. 
No.  1. 


20      THE  PROBLEM  OF  lERSONALITY 

James  had  attacked  in  his  Psychology,  and 
had  reduced  to  associated  and  present  muscular 
feehngs.i  jje  champions  the  cause  of  free- 
will ^  as  against  determinism  of  every  sort, 
not,  however,  as  an  ethical  principle,  but  as  a 
natural  manifestation  of  novelty  and  chance 
in  our  '  activity-situations.'  His  pluraUsm  is 
radical,  and  is  hostile  to  absolutism  in  every 

form. 

In  his  treatment  of  the  reUgious  consciousness, 
he  follows  his  characteristic  '  Method '  of  Prag- 
matism. Instead  of  the  scholastic  arguments,  he 
asks  for  the  practical  effects,  the  individual  re- 
actions upon  our  attitudes  towards  the  unseen. 
From  a  long  and  valuable  survey  ^  of  such 
reUgious  experiences,  he  concludes  that  there  is 
a  wider  spiritual  universe,  personal  communion 
with  which  has  recreative  value  and  moral 
worth.  There  may  be  many  Gods  rather  than 
one  ;  but  Personahty,  presumably  as  conceived 
by  James  himself,  both  of  man  and  of  Gods, 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  ii.  pp.  493-518.  Cf.  Munster- 
borg's  Die  WilUnsharuUnng,  pp.  73,  82. 

«  The  Will  to  Believe,  and  other  Essays  in  Popular  Philosophy, 
Longmans,  1897. 

»  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  Gifford  Lectures,  Edin. 
1901-1902,  Longmans,  pp.  444-485  ff. 


WILLIAM  JAMES 


21 


'I 


must  be  regarded  as  Reahty  in  the  completest 
sense  of  the  term.^ 

II. 

As  stated  in  the  Introduction,  my  critical 
reaction  upon  the  expositions  of  the  different 
systems  will  be  brief,  as  the  latter  part  of  this 
work  will  permit  a  fuller  commentary  and  a 
constructive  statement.  In  regard  to  James' 
views,  I  will  merely  make  a  few  critical  remarks. 

1 .  There  seems  to  be  a  lack  of  homogeneity  in 
the  various  presentations  of  Personahty  at  differ- 
ent stages  in  his  thought.  Two  warring  tenden- 
cies are  seen  at  work,  and  the  terms  of  peace  have 
never  been  made  public,  so  far  as  I  am  aware. 
One  Une  fights  for  a  sort  of  simpHcity,  and  what 
looks  hke  a  monistic  empiricism,  while  the  other 
contends  for  fulness  of  life,  individuahsm  and 
plurahsm.  The  key  to  the  struggle  is  given,  I 
beUeve,  in  the  Psychology,  where  the  person  is 
admitted  as  uniquely  real,  and  yet  is  pushed  into 
the  whirling  '  stream  of  thought.'  I  beheve 
Interactionism  to  be  a  thoroughly  defensible 
doctrine  of  mind  and  body,  but  it  is  not  clear  in 
James'  system  what  distinguishes  the  psychical 

^  For  his  treatment  of  the  Soul,  Ibid.  pp.  195-6,  498-9. 


22  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

from  the  physical.  Especially  is  this  true  in 
Radical  Empiricism,  where  the  Self  is  dismissed, 
and  Experience  is  called  upon  to  play  the  leading 
role.  James'  eariy  dualistic  tendencies  ^  are  con- 
tradicted by  his  later  philosophy  of  Pure 
Experience. 

2.  There  is  a  similar  inconsistency  involved  in 
the  attack  on  Consciousness,  which  was  a  *  fighter 
for  ends'  at  first,  but  which  is  subsequently 
reduced  to  pathological  feelings,  especially  in  its 
higher  forms !  The  bodily  feehngs  brought  to 
hght  by  James'  introspection  do  not  seem  to  me 
in  any  way  to  disprove  consciousness  or  the 
reality  of  the  Self,  but  rather  to  confirm  it.  What 
we  want  is  the  Introspector,  not  the  results  of  his 
analysis.  Those  results  seem  to  me  to  concern 
a  psychology  of  vital  feeling.  What  is  described 
is  the  bodily  background  or  object  to  the  Subject 
in  its  quiescent  contemplation. 

3.  The  Self  is  the  spiritual  factor  manifested 
in  our  highest  psychical  experiences,  where  bodily 
terms  are  absolutely  unmeaning.  As  a  matter  of 
facty  which  should  surely  concern  psychology,  and 
quite  apart  from  logical  and  metaphysical  theo- 
ries, consciousness  is  given  as  the  presupposition 

»  Psych,  i.  p.  218  if. 


WILLLAM  JAMES 


23 


and  active  participant  in  all  experience.  In 
comparison,  judgment,  selection,  love,  aspiration, 
and  voUtion,  the  Subject  preponderates  over  the 
field  of  objects,  which  do  not  seem  to  be  given  in 
that  *  hyphenated  '  condition  which  James  repre- 
sents ^  as  being  the  characteristic  of  the  field  of 
consciousness.  If  the  active  and  synthetic  char- 
acter of  subjectivity  be  admitted,  no  account  of 
*  experiences  reporting  themselves  to  one  another,' 
in  the  epistemology  of  Radical  Empiricism,  will 
suffice  to  account  for  the  apparent  dualism. 

4.  Side  by  side  with  the  impersonal  character 
of  James'  descriptions,  his  remarks  upon  the 
'  judgment '  of  Personal  Identity  also  call  for 
criticism.  The  judgment  itself  implies  a  syn- 
thetic activity  of  Self.  Further,  it  is  as  difficult 
to  explain  metaphysically  the  identity  of  two 
instants  as  of  a  life-time.  This  difficulty  is  hardly 
overcome  by  endowing  experience  with  the  innate 
relational  quality  usually  attributed  to  the  mind. 
As  to  abnormalities,  they  should  be  the  most 
common  of  psychical  phenomena,  if  the  personal 
life  merely  consisted  in  *  next-to-nextness,'  where- 
as, in  point  of  fact,  they  are  so  rare  as  to  be 
regarded  as  curiosities. 

1  Ibid,  i.  p.  278  ff. 


24  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

5.  The  '  Passing  Thought '  is  inadequate  to  do 
justice  to  the  Self.  Have  not  the  conjunctive 
relations  been  ignored  here  in  favour  of  the  dis- 
junctive ?  If  so,  James  has  committed  the  error 
which  he  charges  against  the  schools.  Metaphysi- 
cally, some  sameness  is  required  to  constitute  even 
a  *  sequence  of  differents.'  No  explanation  of  the 
'  trick  '  of  thought  in  appropriating  the  preceding 
thought  need  be  looked  for.  If  it  be  demurred 
that  these  are  merely  psychological  accounts,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  most  of  them  are 
reproduced  in  the  metaphysical  system  of  Radical 
Empiricism. 

6.  Opposed  to  the  disintegration  represented 
by  the  *  Passing  Thought '  is  his  preference  for 
an  anima  mundi  thinking  in  all  of  us,  to  a  number 
of  individual  Souls  !  i  Instead  of  seeing  in  this 
startUng  confession  an  inclination  to  Absolutism, 
we  should  rather  look  upon  it  as  a  premonition 
of  his  later  attraction  to  the  tendency  of  the 
'Pure  Experience'  philosophy  of  Avenarius, 
Mach,  Petzoldt  and  others,  whose  general  position 
will  concern  us  later.^ 

*  Psych,  i.  p.  346. 

«  Chapter  L  of  the  Second  Part  will  deal  with  the  important 
relation  of  Experience  to  the  Self. 


WILLIAM  JAMES 


25 


i! 


§ 


i 


I 


7.  The  strong  argument  of  Individuality  in 
favour  of  the  Soul  is  not  justly  met  by  James' 
reference  to  present-day  tendencies  towards  spirit- 
transference  and  the  like,^  as  indicating  the 
removal  of  the  middle  wall  of  partition  between 
Self  and  Self.  So  in  his  Kadical  Empiricism  we 
find  no  explication  of  this  fundamental  difficulty, 
except  the  conterminousness  of  minds  in  objects, 
and  the  hope  of  confluence.  Karl  Pearson's  ^ 
singular  expectation  of  the  time  when  we  shall 
know  the  thoughts  of  other  persons  by  observa- 
tion of  their  brains  seems  to  be  along  the  same 
Une.  Altogether,  I  feel  that  the  examination  of 
the  efforts  of  Professor  James  to  provide  for  a 
theory  of  experience  without  a  Self  confirms  the 
opinion  that  such  a  theory,  no  matter  how 
ingeniously  worked  out,  is  wholly  unsatisfactory 
and  in  its  very  nature  liable  to  all  the  objections 
brought  against  Hume's  view  by  psychology  and 
metaphysics. 


Psych,  i,  p.  350. 


Orammar  of  Science. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


27 


I 


i 


CHAPTER  II. 

MR.    F.    H.    BRADLEY. 

Widely  different  thinkers  these,  James  and 
Bradley  !  And  yet  their  systems  resemble  one 
another  in  two  respects  at  least,  both  of  which 
concern  us  here  ;  first,  the  emphasis  upon  Experi- 
ence, and  second,  the  disparagement  of  the  Self. 
I  am  hopeful  that  by  expanding  these  two  texts 
I  may  be  able  to  set  forth  Bradley's  views  at 
sufiicient  length  for  our  purpose.  Brevity,  how- 
ever, is  here  indispensable.^ 


We  need  not  delay  long  over  Experience, 
although  it  is  a  concept  of  prime  importance  in 
Bradley's  theory  of  ReaUty.     It  will  suffice  to 

^Appearance  and  Reality,  a  Metaphysical  Essay,  by  F.  H. 
Bradley ;  Swan,  Sonnenschein   &  Co.,  Second  Edition,  1899. 

The  new  book  by  Mr.  Bradley,  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality 
(Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  1914)  appears  to  exhibit  the  same 
general  standpoint  as  that  given  in  the  former  work. 


ii 


get  two  purposes  fulfilled  in  this  part  of  our 
treatment,  viz.  to  obtain  a  general  conception  of 
Bradley's  system,  and  the  part  played  by  Experi- 
ence therein  ;  and  in  the  second  place,  to  notice 
the  relation— or  lack  of  relation— between  this 
concept  and  that  of  the  Self.  We  are  enabled  to 
state  Bradley's  general  position  under  this  head 
of  Experience,  because  that  concept  provides  him 
with  a  starting-point  and  also  a  goal,  in  his  search 
for  reaUty.  It  does  not  become  prominent, 
however,  till  the  beginning  of  the  Second  Book, 
entitled  Reality.  The  First  Book,  as  is  well 
known,  is  designated  Appearame,  and  is  utterly 
negative  in  character.  Nothing  can  withstand 
the  onslaught  of  Bradley's  logic.  Primary  and 
Secondary  QuaUties,  Substantive  and  Adjective, 
Relation  and  Quality,  Space  and  Time,  Motion 
and  Change,  the  Perception  of  Change,  Causation, 
Activity,  Things,  the  Self,  and  Things-in-them- 
selves,  disappear  in  rout  and  utter  confusion 
Reality  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  these. 

Bradley's  three  chief  arguments  are:  (a) 
incompleteness  ;  (b)  relativity  (which  follows  from 
the  former) ;  and  (c)  the  discrepancy  of  identity 
and  diversity,  of  the  One  and  the  Many,  which  is 
manifested  in  them  all.    Such  contradictoriness 


ill 


28  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

disposes  of  any  claim  to  be  considered  as  real. 
And  non-contradiction  is  Bradley's  criterion  of 
Reality.  '  Ultimate  Reality  is  such  that  it  does 
not  contradict  itself;  here  is  an  absolute  cri- 
terion.' 1  Tested  by  this  touchstone  of  logic,  our 
seeming  real  world  is  proved  to  be  alloy,  '  mere 
appearance  '  and  *  illusion.'  But  this  criterion 
is  also  positive;  it  directs  us  to  an  Absolute 
ReaUty,  One  and  Individual,  in  which  the  world 
of  appearance  is  somehow  transmuted,  and  har- 
monized within  the  Whole,  which  is  also  a 
System.  But  Bradley  says  that  the  concrete 
nature,  the  matter  of  this  Absolute  must  be 
Experience,  which  *  means  something  much  the 
same  as  given  and  present  fact  .  .  .  Sentient 
experience  is  reaUty,  and  what  is  not  this  is  not 
real'  ^ 

This  point  of  view  is  maintained  to  the  close, 
although  it  appears  that  the  Absolute  ReaUty  is 
beyond  Truth,  and  therefore,  in  a  sense,  tran- 
scends experience  as  actual.  But  this  agnostic 
and  even  sceptical  attitude  is  not  final  in  the 
exphcit  presentation  of  Bradley's  doctrine,  al- 
though comparisons  with  Spinoza's  Substance 
and  even  Spencer's  Unknowable  suggest  them- 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


29 


4 

t4 


selves  to  the  reader.  Yet,  against  such  an 
*  empty  transcendence  '  and  *  shallow  Pantheism,' 
Bradley  intends  his  work  to  be  one  sustained 
polemic.!  He  follows  Hegel's  lead  of  seeking  the 
Absolute  in  experience,  and  in  his  doctrine  of 
Degrees  of  Truth  and  Reality  he  acknowledges 
his  debt  to  the  German  philosopher.  According 
to  this  doctrine,  the  '  appearances '  find  their 
places  in  hierarchical  rank  in  the  Absolute  System. 
The  standard  is  in  one  sense  Reality  itself,  and 
it  may  be  appUed  as  a  test  under  the  forms  of  all- 
inclusiveness  and  harmony  within  the  System  as 
a  Whole.  So  judged,  '  pure  spirit  would  mark 
the  extreme  most  removed  from  lifeless  Nature.'  ^ 
So,  in  spite  of  seeming  contradiction,  ReaUty  is 
revealed  only  in  the  world  of  '  appearance,'  and 
in  the  higher  more  than  in  the  lower.^ 

ReaUty  is  Experience.  The  Absolute  must  be 
sentience.  No  ReaUty  can  be  supposed  that  is  not 
felt  or  experienced.  ReaUty  satisfies  our  whole 
being,  and  the  Absolute  is  more  than  thought  and 
voUtion,  it  possesses  the  direct  nature  of  feeling. 
And  yet  it  would  be  incorrect  to  say  that  the 
Absolute  is  personal.     It  is  supra-personal.* 


*  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  136. 


*  Ibid.  p.  144. 


1  Ibid.  p.  651. 
» Ibid.  p.  550. 


« Ibid.  p.  498. 
« Ibid.  p.  533. 


30   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Further  details  will  come  to  light  as  we  pro- 
ceed. Let  us  now  face  the  difficult  task  of 
stating  what  is  the  relation  of  the  Self  to 
Experience.  That  will  prepare  the  way  for  the 
minute  examination  of  his  sceptical  treatment  of 
the  Self. 

When  Bradley  contends  that  Experience  is 
Reahty,  he  denies  what  he  regards  as  a  funda- 
mental error,  the  position,  namely,  that  the  Self 
can  make  any  vahd  claim  to  be  real.  It  is  true, 
he  holds,  that  all  being  and  fact  fall  within 
sentience.  No  other  content  than  is  supplied  by 
feeUng,  thought,  and  volition  is  even  possible. 

Bradley  purposely  chooses  these  impersonal 
terms  as  free  from  the  erroneous  reflection  of 
subjectivity.  He  does  not '  divide  the  percipient 
subject  from  the  universe  :  and  then,  resting  on 
that  subject,  as  on  a  thing  actually  by  itself— 
urge  that  it  cannot  transcend  its  own  states/  ^ 
Such  a  vicious  abstraction  leads  to  impossible 
results.  What  we  find  is  a  unity  in  which  dis- 
tinction, but  not  divisions,  may  be  made.  This 
is  the  unity  of  the  sentient  experience. 

The  private  and  immediate  character  of  the 
'  whole  '  of  sentience  in  which  subject  and  object 

*  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  145. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


31 


appear  together  is  an  obvious  difficulty  in  the 
system.  This  Bradley  discusses  in  the  chapter 
on  '  The  This  and  the  Mine.'  ^  He  admits  that 
particularity  and  even  uniqueness  characterize 
*  an  experience.'  ^  He  assumes  that  there  are  an 
infinite  number  of '  this-mines.' »  By  this  unusual 
term  he  means  the  immediate  character  of  feeling, 
which  appears  in  '  a  finite  centre.'  The  question 
is_are  these  '  finite  centres  of  experience '  in- 
compatible with  his  Absolute  ?  He  has  to  confess 
that  this  plurality  and  particularity  are  in  the 
end  inexpUcable.*  Yet  ReaUty  may  be  enriched 
thereby,  and  feelings  may  surely  be  fused  together 
in  the  Absolute.  The  '  this  '  seems  exclusive,  but 
when  examined,  it  is  found  to  have  no  content 
which  does  not  go  beyond  itself.  And  it  is  so, 
too,  in  the  case  of  the  '  mine.'  It  has  no  content 
but  what  is  left  over  by  our  impotence. ^  Even 
the  positive  special  feeling  of  Self  is  referable  to 
an  ideal  Whole,  in  which  somehow  the  rough 
places  must  be  made  plain.  There  is  nothing 
which,  to  speak  properly,  is  individual,  except 
only  the  Absolute.* 


1  Ibid.  p.  223. 
» Ihid,  p.  223. 
6  Ibid.  p.  239. 


*  Ibid,  p.  223.     Italics  mine. 

*  Ibid.  p.  226. 

*  Ibid,  p.  246. 


\ 


32   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

In  the  course  of  the  examination  of  the  im- 
possible theory  of  SoHpsism,  he  divides  experience 
into  direct  and  indirect.  Direct  experience  means 
what  is  '  confined  to  the  given  simply,  to  the 
merely  felt  or  presented.'  Indirect  experience 
includes  all  fact  that  is  constructed  from  the 
basis  of  the  '  this  '  and  the  '  mine.'  ^ 

Direct  experience  gives  us  the  '  this-mine,'  not 
the  reahty  of  my  self  and  its  states.  We  must 
go  on  to  the  indirect  experience,  postulating 
existence  beyond  our  momentary  feehngs.  The 
*  this '  and  the  *  mine '  must  be  transcended. 
And  yet  this  result  must  itself  be  '  felt !  '  Bradley 
admits  this,  but  denies  that  the  *  felt  reahty  is 
shut  up  and  confined  within  my  feehng.'  ^  What 
then  is  this  '  more  ?  '  Bradley  falls  back  upon 
his  statement  of  the  Reahty  as  a  direct,  all- 
embracing  experience,  and  claims  that  it  is 
present  in  '  my  '  feeUng.  *  My  "  mine  "  becomes 
a  feature  in  the  great  "  mine,"  which  includes 
all  "  mines  !  "  '  ^  I  consider  this  a  crucial  point 
in  the  development  of  the  relations  of  the 
concepts  we  are  considering.  We  reach  our 
own  past  and  future  by  a  process  of  inference 


*  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  248. 
»  Ibid,  p.  253. 


» Ibid.  pp.  252-253. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


33 


similar  to  that  by  which  we  reach  the  beUef  in 
other  selves. 

And  yet  it  is  true  that  '  all  I  experience  is  my 
state — so  far  as  I  experience  it.  Even  the  Abso- 
lute, as  my  reality  is  my  state  of  mind.'  ^  But 
we  cannot  limit  it  to  that  one  aspect.  '  The 
import  and  content  of  these  processes  does  not 
consist  in  their  appearance  in  the  psychical 
series.'  ^  In  short,  because  experience  is  my 
experience,  it  does  not  follow  that  what  I  experi- 
ence is  no  more  than  my  state. 

In  concluding  this  chapter,  however,  Bradley 
is  ready  to  admit  that  '  in  the  end  to  know  the 
Universe,  we  must  fall  back  upon  our  personal 
experience  and  sensations.'  ^ 

To  sum  up,  then ;  Bradley  puts  the  Self  in 
the  realm  of  indirect  experience,  with  other 
'  intellectual  constructions,'  and  with  the  '  import 
and  content  of  my  states.' 

All  reahty  burns  in  the  focus  of  my  state  of 
mind.*  So  Bradley  speaks  constantly  of  '  finite 
centres  of  experience.'  But  we  should  err  if  we 
supposed  that  he  means  that  Experience  requires 
an  equally  real  Experiencer  or  Self.    And  he  says 


1  Ibid.  p.  258. 
» Ibid.  p.  260. 


« Ibid.  p.  259. 
*  Ibid.  p.  260. 


34  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

in  his  chapter  on  Ultimate  Doubts  that  '  a  self 
is  not  the  same  as  such  a  centre  of  experience. 
.  .  .  From  immediate  experience  the  self  emerges, 
and  is  set  apart  by  a  distinction.'  ^  Experience 
transcends  the  Self,  and  is  itself  ReaUty.  He 
traces  the  development  of  Self,  other  selves,  the 
world  and  God,  from  undifferentiated  experience. 
*  For  certain  purposes  what  I  experience  can  be 
considered  as  the  state  of  my  self,  or  again,  of  my 
soul  .  .  .  because  in  one  aspect  it  actually  is  so. 
But  this  aspect  may  be  an  infinitesimal  fragment 
of  its  being.'  * 

Having  settled  this  question  for  the  present, 
we  must  now  take  up  Bradley's  negative  treat- 
ment of  the  Self,  which  begins  early  in  the  book, 
although,  like  the  best  wine,  we  have  kept  it  till 
the  last.  In  two  Chapters  on  the  Meanings  of 
Self,  and  the  ReaHty  of  Self,  the  most  glaring 
inconsistencies  in  this  concept  are  brought  to  light. 
It  is  certain  that  if  pure  logic  had  guided  us,  we 
could  never  have  beheved  in  it.  But  as  men  have 
forsaken  this  '  dry  Ught,'  Bradley  has  to  convince 
them  by  means  of  argument.  In  the  first  of 
these  Chapters,^  it  is  shown  that  we  do  nU  know 

*  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  524.  «  Ibid.  p.  526. 

*  Ibid,  p.  75  ff. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


35 


what  we  mean  by  the  Self.  And  that  is  itself 
sufficient  condemnation  for  metaphysic,  since 
only  by  defiinitions  can  truth  be  attained.  But 
Bradley  goes  into  psychology  to  bring  to  Ught 
the  diverse  meanings  of  Self.  A  mpre  statement 
of  these  results  must  suffice. 

Leaving  aside  the  body,  by  the  Self  may  be 
meant : — 

(1)  The  present  contents  of  experience  —  a 
'  cross-section  '  at  any  moment. 

(2)  The  constant  average  mass,  habits,  char- 
acter, behaviour,  dispositions. 

(3)  The  essential  Self,  the  inner  core  of  feeling 
called  Coenesthesia.  This  leads  to  the  problem 
of  Personal  Identity,  which  Bradley  regards  as 
insoluble,  owing  chiefly  to  the  difficulty  of  fixing 
the  meanings  of  '  person,'  and  of  ^  continuity.' 
Memory  is  equally  powerless  to  explain  the 
supposed  sameness. 

(4)  The  Self  as  a  kind  of  Monad  or  simple 
being. 

(5)  That  in  which  I  take  an  interest. 

(6)  The  distinction  of  Subject  and  Object, 
which  has  two  main  forms — ^as  theoretical,  involv- 
ing perception  and  intelligence,  and  as  practical, 
involving  desire  and  will.    In  each  case,  the  Self 


36      THE   PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

as  related  to  a  Not-Self  is  found  on  introspection 
to  be  some  concrete  form  of  unity  of  psychical 
existence.  And  probably  every  detail  of  the  Self 
can  be  presented  in  turn  as  Not-Self  in  the  theo- 
retical relation.  And  in  the  practical  relation,  any 
feature  in  the  Self  may  be  felt  as  a  hmit  against 
which  it  could  react.  And  taking  the  Not-Self, 
most  of  its  elements  can  be  regarded  as  passing 
into  the  background  of  feeling,  and  so  becoming 
Self.  Bradley  admits  that  there  is  a  margin,  as 
it  were,  which  cannot  be  crossed,  but  he  affirms 
that  it  is  unreasonable  to  make  this  margin  ulti- 
mate. So  Self  may  mean  either  the  feeling  of 
the  psychical  contents,  or  a  distinction  within 
the  whole  mass  of  certain  contents  as  a  back- 
ground, against  which  as  a  Not-Self,  the  Self  is 
reaUzed  as  existing ;  or  finally  in  the  practical 
relation  as  an  end  to  be  achieved,  with  which, 
as  is  said,  one  actively  identifies  himself.  This 
leads  to  a  psychological  discussion  of  the  per- 
ception of  activity  in  relation  to  the  Self,  and 
it  is  shown  to  involve  an  idea  of  the  change 
desired. 

(7)  The  '  mere  self '  or  the  *  simply  subjective,' 
which  is  not  relevant  to  a  definite  psychical 
function  :    it  is  the  unessential  in  any  mental 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


37 


process.  This  is  a  merely  'chance  self,'  the 
residue,  not  used,  but  only  felt ;  and  the  meaning 
is  both  too  wide  and  too  narrow  for  our  purpose. 
Bradley  now  passes  on  to  discuss  definitely  the 
Reality  of  the  Self.^  He  repeats  once  more  his 
admission  that  one's  own  existence  in  some  sense 
is  an  indubitable  fact,^  but  the  question  is  whether 
the  claim  of  the  Self  to  possess  reaUty  and  even  to 
guarantee  the  reality  of  appearances,  can  be 
maintained.  We  are  not  long  left  in  doubt  as  to 
the  weapons  or  the  result  of  the  encounter.  '  It 
is  the  old  puzzle,'  Bradley  says,  '  as  to  the  con- 
nection of  diversity  with  unity.'  ^  The  assurance 
of  personal  identity  is  irrelevant  to  the  issue.  It 
is  a  question  of  inteUigibihty.  Does  the  Self 
give  an  experience  which  will  enable  us  to  under- 
stand the  way  in  which  diversity  is  harmonized  ? 
Bradley  answers,  '  No.'  His  reason  is  that, 
whether  taken  as  mere  feehng,  or  some  form  of 
self-consciousness  or  self-identity,  the  analysis  is 
made  either  in  the  plane  of  relations  with  their 
inconsistencies,  or  else  in  the  deeper  region  of 
immediate  experience,   without  distinction  be- 

^  Appearance  and  Reality,  Chapter  IX. 
«  Ibid.  p.  103  ;  cf.  pp.  76,  119,  357. 
» Ibid.  p.  103. 


38   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

tween  subject  and  object.  *  Feeling  is  an  appre- 
hension too  defective  to  lay  hold  on  reality.'  ^ 
Feeling  cannot  deal  with  terms  and  relations 
which,  '  as  it  commonly  appears/  constitute 
Reahty.2  Neither  can  self-consciousness  satisfy 
the  claims  of  intellect.  *  It  is  a  mere  experience.'  ^ 
It  cannot  give  a  consistent  account  of  itself  or  of 
ReaUty.  Self-consciousness  has  too  much  the 
form  of  feeling.  The  subject  can  never  wholly 
become  object  to  itself,  and  so  cannot  become 
matter  of  *  perception.'  *  As  to  personal  identity, 
Bradley  confesses  that  the  self  is  *  the  same 
within  limits  and  to  a  certain  extent,'  but  denies 
that  any  metaphysical  conclusions  follow,  until 
the  understanding  of  how  the  Self  is  the  same, 
is  forthcoming,  and  is  presented  for  criticism. 
Neither  will  he  accept  any  view  of  the  Self  as 
timeless,  supposed  to  be  furnished  from  the 
function  of  comparison  in  mental  Ufe. 

Bradley  then  treats  of  the  Self  as  Will  or 
activity,  and  denies  that  intellectually  it  is  better 
off  than  those  meanings  previously  discussed. 
The  ghosts  of  change,  of  unity  and  diversity,  of 
relation,  will  not  be  laid  to  rest.    Psychologically, 


*  Appearance  and  RpxUity.  p.  106, 

*  Ibid.  p.  109. 


"  Ibid.  p.  107. 
*/6wi.  p.  111. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


39 


the  experience  of  activity  is  illusion.  The  same 
result  follows  the  discussion  of  Monads.  The 
same  arguments  recur  with  fatal  regularity. 

The  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter  is  that  the 
Self,  whatever  meaning  be  attached  to  it,  is 
*  appearance  '  merely.  It  bears  the  burden  of 
external  relations,  the  stigma  of  unintelligibiUty, 
the  brand  of  inexpUcable  diversity  and  unity. 
No  doubt  it  is  '  the  highest  form  of  experience 
which  we  have,  but,  for  all  that,  it  is  not  a  true 
form.  It  does  not  give  us  the  facts  as  they  are 
in  reality  ;  and  as  it  gives  them,  they  are  appear- 
ance, appearance  and  error.'^  The  principle 
which  metaphysics  requires  in  order  to  resolve 
the  contradiction  of  diversity  and  unity,  the  Self 
cannot  supply.  On  the  contrary,  '  when  not 
hiding  itself  in  obscurity,'  the  Self  '  seems  a  mere 
bundle  of  discrepancies.' 

In  the  Chapter  on  *  Body  and  Soul '  ^  similar 
results  are  obtained.  The  Self  is  distinguishable 
from  the  Soul.  The  latter  is  defined  as  '  a  finite 
centre  of  immediate  experience,'  '  possessed  of  a 
certain  temporal  continuity  of  existence  and  again 
of  a  certain  identity  of  character.'  * 

The  Soul  is  a  personal  centre,  not  taken  at  an 

1  Ibid.  p.  119.  « Ibid.  p.  295.  » Ibid.  p.  298. 


40  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

instant,  but  considered  as  a  '  thing.'  ^  Accord- 
ingly, it  is  an  ideal  construction  and  not  a 
presented  fact.  It  is  a  result  of  a  process  of 
idealization  of  '  experience,'  bringing  out  the 
oneness  of  past  with  present.  So  it  is  endowed 
with  an  ideal  and  eternal  character,  which  raises 
it  out  of  the  time-series,  although  it  is  reaUzed 
in  that  series.  So  it  is  inconsistent,  and  *  rooted 
in  an  artifice  ! '  It  has  the  unfaiUng  mark  of 
*  appearance '  given,  in  the  separation  of  the 
'  that '  and  the  '  what.'  The  same  conclusion  is 
reached  also  from  the  Absolute  side — no  pluraUty 
of  such  existences  can  be  ReaUty. 

Bradley  discusses  objections  to  this  view,  based 
on  the  independence  of  Souls,  especially  in  relation 
to  bodies  ;  the  claim  for  a  transcendent  Soul  or 
Ego  ;  and,  lastly,  the  psychical  warrant  alleged 
to  be  given  for  a  Soul  as  being  beyond  mere 
phenomena.  Bradley  dechnes  to  be  a  party  to 
the  identification  of  soul  with  body .2  Even  if 
psychologically  tenable,  it  would  yet  involve  a 
vicious  circle.  The  Ego  only  serves  to  increase 
our  difficulties  and  is  dismissed.  As  for  the 
psychical  evidence  for  a  Soul,  it  is  either  mani- 
fested in  events  in  the  time-series,  or  not  at  all. 

*  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  302.  *  Ihid.  p.  308. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


41 


I 


\ 


If  in  events,  we  cannot  claim  as  evidence  the 
intellectual  constructions  which  are  built  upon 
them,  since  the  self-transcendence,  the  import,  of 
experience  cannot  be  classed  in  this  way.  If  in 
more  than  mere  events,  they  must  take  their 
chance  in  intellectual  criticism,  and,  as  we  have 
seen,  their  '  chance '  is  not  worth  much  in  a 
System  of  ReaUty. 

Both  Soul  and  Body  consist  of  phenomenal 
series,  and  come  together  in  Absolute  Reality, 
and  their  special  characters  must  there  be  '  lost ' 
and  '  dissolved  in  what  transcends  them.'  ^ 

As  to  the  relation  between  Souls,  experiences 
are  certainly  separate  from  each  other,  and  are 
capable  of  influencing  each  other,  so  far  as  we 
know,  only  through  the  body.  We  have  a 
*  common  understanding  '  in  regard  to  the  world 
of  discourse,  and  further  we  behave  as  if  our 
internal  worlds  were  the  same.  There  is  an 
ideal  identity  between  Souls.  In  the  individual's 
life,  both  bodily  and  psychical,  an  active  function 
of  identity  is  required.  And  the  Soul  is  '  less 
unreal '  than  the  physical  world ;  for  it  shows 
more  clearly  the  self-dependence  and  harmony 
which  are  the  marks  of  Absolute  Reahty,  to 

»  Ihid.  p.  342. 


42  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

which  we  are  driven,  as  the  explanation  of  all 
'  appearance,'  and  the  resolution  of  all  discords. 

n. 

With  the  main  outUnes  of  Bradley's  formidable 
system  before  us,  I  may  now  briefly  express  some 
of  the  respects  in  which  it  seems  to  me  to  come 
short  of,  or  to  transgress,  the  requirements  of  a 
metaphysic,  from  the  standpoint  of  our  special 
problem.  It  is  abundantly  evident  how  promi- 
nent the  Self  is  in  his  polemic.  Indeed  it  is  no 
exaggeration  to  say  that  it  affords  him  his  chief 
difficulty,  increased  doubtless  by  his  apparent 
hostihty  to  the  concept  throughout.  It  is  hard  to 
resist  the  feehng  that  he  means  to  keep  the  Self 
in  the  background,  and  so  to  preserve  an  im- 
personal  character  for  his  Absolute  IdeaHsm. 

(1)  The  first  criticism  is  directed  against  Brad- 
ley's use  of  the  Concept  of  Experience  as  over 
against  that  of  the  Self.  Sentience,  Experience, 
and  the  like  are  abstractions  when  taken  out  of 
relation  to  a  conscious  Subject.  The  use  of  these 
impersonal  concepts  is  at  the  basis  of  his  grand 
mistake  in  setting  up  Experience  as  ReaHty, 
while  the  Subject  involved  in  all  experience  is 
shut  into  the  outer  darkness  of  *  appearance.' 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


43 


As  this  objection  will  appear  again  in  different 
aspects  of  the  subsequent  criticism,  and  will  be 
more  fully  discussed  in  the  opening  chapter  of 
the  Second  Part  of  this  book,  I  leave  it  for  the 

present. 

(2)  The  foregoing  difficulty  is  obscured  by  the 
use  of  such  phrases  as  *  this-mines,'  'finite 
centres  of  experience,' '  experiences,' '  souls,' '  im- 
mediate feeling,' '  felt  wholes,'  and  so  on.  Bradley 
is  forced  to  admit  again  and  again  that  the  Self  is 
real  in  some  sense.  But  while  he  complains  that 
nobody  tells  him  how  it  is  able  to  transcend  these 
logical  difficulties,  he  never  submits  '  Experience  ' 
to  the  same  test.  Experience  is  a  vague  and 
ambiguous  term  which  is  supposed  to  include  the 
Self,  and  yet  escapes  all  its  difficulties  by  ignoring 
them.  It  must  surely  consist  of  '  appearances  ' 
in  the  wildest  confusion,  from  a  logical  point  of 
view,  since  it  includes  all  the  contradictions  and 
inconsistencies  of  the  Subject,  plus  those  of  the 
Object.  And  in  itself  it  has  no  remedy  for  these 
difficulties.  It  is  only  when  adjectived  by  Abso- 
lute, and  spelt  with  a  capital,  that  it  can  solve 
them.  If  time  permitted,  a  minute  examination 
of  the  relations  of  the  concepts  of  Experience  and 
Appearance  would  reveal  the  double  part  which 


44  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

the  former  plays  in  Bradley's  system.  I  am 
satisfied  that  just  here  the  opening  wedge  must 
be  appUed,  and  when  it  is  driven  home,  Bradley's 
*  block  imi verse,'  which  seems  so  compact,  will 
appear  streaked  with  gaping  inconsistencies. 

(3)  What  are  we  to  say  of  the  argument,  upon 
which  so  much  depends,  that  the  power  to 
transcend  direct  experience  introduces  us  to  a 
world  of  ReaUty  from  which  the  psychical  fact  of 
Self  has  disappeared  ?  Our  answer  is  simply 
to  point  to  Bradley's  own  confessions  that  the 
dual  relationship  of  Subject  and  Object  is  never 
really  sundered.  *  Even  the  Absolute  is  my 
state,'  ^  he  says.  Therefore  the  import  of  experi- 
ence does  not  do  away  with  its  relationship  to 
a  Self,  as  essentially  part  of  the  experience.  And 
in  his  endeavour  to  transcend  the  '  this-mine/ 
Bradley  faces  this  question.  At  the  critical  point 
he  fails.  He  admits  that  the  *  more  '  must  be 
Mi?  '  It  is  somebody's  experience  then,'  we 
say, — *  Whose  is  it  ? '  Bradley  falters,  and  then 
falls  back  on  his  a  priori  position  !  It  is  mine, 
but  *  what  I  feel  is  the  all-inclusive  universe,' 
that  is,  it  belongs  to  the  Absolute  Experience  ! 
I  contend  that  at  any  rate  it  imphes  the  Self,  by 

1  Appearance  and  ReaUty,  p.  260.  « Ibid.  pp.  252-253. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


45 


r 


his  own  admission.  It  would  alter  the  whole 
character  of  his  impersonal  System,  if  Bradley 
were  to  take  fully  into  account  this  impUcation 
of  the  subject  in  '  indirect  experience.' 

(4)  Bradley  fails  to  make  the  all-important 
distinction  between  the  Self  as  an  intellectual 
construction  and  as  an  essential  element  in  all 
experience.^  This  is  the  only  serious  ground  he 
suggests  for  the  superior  reality  of  experience 
over  the  Self.  This  is  an  instance  of  the  '  psycho- 
logist's fallacy.'  The  '  hmited  aperture  '  where 
reahty  burns  as  in  a  focus  may  be  called  '  an 
experience,'  but  by  his  own  confession  it  is  '  our 
sole  means  of  getting  at  Reality,'  and,  as  such, 
it  involves  subjective  awareness,  that  is,  essential 
selfhood,  apart  from  all  construction.  Merely 
psychological  and  genetic  problems  must  not  be 
confused  with  the  metaphysical  issue. 

(5)  No  grade,  no  totality  of  experience  can 
possibly  be  more  real  than  that  which  is  its  con- 
dition, viz.  the  experience  of  it  by  a  Subject  or 
Self.  If  the  Subject  can  be  excluded  from  the 
Reality  which  is  granted  to  experience,  then 
knowledge  is  for  ever  beyond  us.    If  we  cannot 

^  Of.  Prof.  James  Ward's  Article  '  Psychology,'  Ency,  BritL 
Ninth  Edition,  vol.  xx.  p.  83. 


44  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

the  former  plays  in  Bradley's  system.  I  am 
satisfied  that  just  here  the  opening  wedge  must 
be  applied,  and  when  it  is  driven  home,  Bradley's 
*  block  universe,'  which  seems  so  compact,  will 
appear  streaked  with  gaping  inconsistencies. 

(3)  What  are  we  to  say  of  the  argument,  upon 
which  so  much  depends,  that  the  power  to 
transcend  direct  experience  introduces  us  to  a 
world  of  Reality  from  which  the  psychical  fact  of 
Self  has  disappeared  ?  Our  answer  is  simply 
to  point  to  Bradley's  own  confessions  that  the 
dual  relationship  of  Subject  and  Object  is  never 
really  sundered.  *  Even  the  Absolute  is  my 
state,'  ^  he  says.  Therefore  the  import  of  experi- 
ence does  not  do  away  with  its  relationship  to 
a  Self,  as  essentially  part  of  the  experience.  And 
in  his  endeavour  to  transcend  the  '  this-mine,' 
Bradley  faces  this  question.  At  the  critical  point 
he  fails.  He  admits  that  the  '  more  '  must  be 
felt.^  '  It  is  somebody's  experience  then,'  we 
say, — *  Whose  is  it  ?  '  Bradley  falters,  and  then 
falls  back  on  his  a  priori  position  !  It  is  mine, 
but  '  what  I  feel  is  the  all-inclusive  universe/ 
that  is,  it  belongs  to  the  Absolute  Experience  ! 
I  contend  that  at  any  rate  it  impUes  the  Self,  by 

*  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  260.  « Ibid.  pp.  252-253. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


45 


i 


his  own  admission.  It  would  alter  the  whole 
character  of  his  impersonal  System,  if  Bradley 
were  to  take  fully  into  account  this  imphcation 
of  the  subject  in  '  indirect  experience.' 

(4)  Bradley  fails  to  make  the  all-important 
distinction  between  the  Self  as  an  intellectual 
construction  and  as  an  essential  element  in  all 
experience.^  This  is  the  only  serious  ground  he 
suggests  for  the  superior  reality  of  experience 
over  the  Self.  This  is  an  instance  of  the  '  psycho- 
logist's fallacy.'  The  '  Hmited  aperture  '  where 
reality  burns  as  in  a  focus  may  be  called  '  an 
experience,'  but  by  his  own  confession  it  is  *  our 
sole  means  of  getting  at  Reality,'  and,  as  such, 
it  involves  subjective  awareness,  that  is,  essential 
selfhood,  apart  from  all  construction.  Merely 
psychological  and  genetic  problems  must  not  be 
confused  with  the  metaphysical  issue. 

(5)  No  grade,  no  totality  of  experience  can 
possibly  be  more  real  than  that  which  is  its  con- 
dition, viz.  the  experience  of  it  by  a  Subject  or 
Self.  If  the  Subject  can  be  excluded  from  the 
ReaUty  which  is  granted  to  experience,  then 
knowledge  is  for  ever  beyond  us.    If  we  cannot 

^Cf.  Prof.  James  Ward's  Article  *  Psychology,'  Ency.  BritL 
Ninth  Edition,  vol.  xx.  p.  83. 


46  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

rely  upon  our  own  reality,  if  our  existence  is  not 
as  real  as  any  matter  of  human  experience,  then 
is  our  philosophic  and  scientific  faith  vain.  This 
is  our  ultimate  nerve  of  truth.  This  is  the 
rationale  for  our  existence  as  seekers  after  reality. 
If  there  be  no  point  of  absolutely  real  contact 
with  fulness  of  ReaUty,  then  scepticism  is  the 
logical  result.  And  impersonal  Absolutism  is  not 
far  from  its  kingdom  either. 

(6)  Bradley  practically  admits  this  frequently, 
but  by  his  complexity  of  phrases,  the  admissions 
which  he  makes  regarding  the  Self's  place  in 
Reality  are  quite  overshadowed  by  the  assertions 
of  its  place  in  the  world  of  '  mere  appearance.' 
I  refer  not  only  to  his  confessions  of  the  Self's 
supreme  place  in  existence,  but  to  his  express 
conviction  that  '  even  the  Absolute  is  my  state,' 
and  all  Reality  exists  only  in  centres  of  sentient 
experience.^  What  then  can  withhold  him  from 
recognizing  the  reality  of  PersonaUty  as  above 
every  other  form  of  finite  experience  ?  He  grants 
this  too,— but '  experience  '  has  been  replaced  by 
the  sinister  word  *  appearance.' 

(7)  The  method  of  Bradley  is  surely  somewhat 
sUghting  to  the  universe.    He  appUes  our  '  logi- 

*  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  260. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


47 


cal '  paradoxes  and  abstract  puzzles, — which 
might  stand  with  Buridan's  Ass  in  the  road  until 
they  should  perish — ^to  the  full,  rich,  growing 
universe.^  The  negative  results  are  a  reflection 
upon  his  methods,  and  upon  logic  itself ;  but  not 
upon  the  revelation  of  Reality  which  experience, 
in  the  true  sense,  is  every  day  presenting  to  us. 
If  we  want  an  explanation  of  unity  and  diversity, 
instead  of  throwing  away  everything  that  mani- 
fests it,  we  ought  rather  to  free  our  minds  from 
the  burden  of  scholasticism  which  is  so  powerless 
to  cope  with  actually  existing  facts  and  principles. 
Life  is  more  than  concepts.  Reality  sets  us  the 
task  of  following  her  lead.  The  '  Owl  of  Minerva  ' 
which,  as  Hegel  tells  us,  '  does  not  start  on  her 
flight  until  the  shades  of  evening  have  begun  to 
fall,'  cannot  imitate  the  lark  which  heralds  the 
day  with  prophetic  song.  Life  makes  the  way 
for  Thought. 

(8)  But,  more  in  detail,  the  solution  of  incom- 
pleteness, relations,  unity  and  diversity  is  to  be 
found  '  within  us.'    Professor  Royce  has  shown 

^  Such  works  as  Bergson's  U  Evolution  CrMrice  and  James'  A 
Pluralistic  Universe,  represent  a  very  proper  as  well  as  popular 
revolt  from  the  dry  scholasticism  which  lurks  in  many  systems 
of  Absolute  Idealism.  The  present  tendency  is  wholly  towards 
a  '  concrete  '  and  Uving  Idealism. 


48  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

that  Thought  gives  a  concrete  solution  of  the 
puzzle  of  the  One  and  the  Many.^  The  answer 
to  the  difficulty  is  solvitur  amhulando.  The  Self 
is  the  key  to  these  mysteries  of  logic,  and  it 
affords  an  actual  hint  and  illustration  of  the  way 
in  which  fragmentariness  is  overcome,  relations 
subsist  in  a  whole  which  embraces  them,  unity 
and  diversity  are  positively  experienced.  This 
key  Bradley  deUberately  throws  away.  The 
somehow  must  be  cleared  up. 

(9)  But  even  in  the  case  of  the  Absolute,  the 
somehow  is  never  changed  into  an  account  of 
how.     If  we  are  excused  for  crying  '  mystery ' 
now,  why  were  we  birched  for  doing  so  in  the 
case  of  our  immediate  experience  ?    This  act  of 
faith  on  Bradley's  part  results  from  his  method, 
because  only  in  our  experience  can  the  conceptual 
difficulty  be  overcome.     The  paradox  therefore 
recurs,  and  creates  discord  even  in  the  Absolute. 
The  logical  discord  grates  upon  the  ear  until  the 
noise  is  drowned  by  the  mystical  chorus  hymning 
the  supra-relational,  all-absorbing  and  reconciling 
Absolute  Experience  which  enjoys  a  balance  of 
pleasure  over  pain  !    Here  sameness  and  diversity 

^The    World    and    the    Individual,    vol.    i.    Supplementary 
Essay,  p.  490  ff. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


49 


i 


simply  mmt  be  real.  Theremin  the  case  of  the 
Self— they  were  real  but  were  disowned  ! 

(10)  In  regard  to  the  ambiguities  in  the  term 
Self,  Bradley's  contention  must  be  admitted.  He 
has  performed  indirectly  a  great  service  by  calling 
attention  so  acutely  to  these  various  meanings. 
In  a  humble  way,  I  shall  endeavour  to  fix  some 
meanings  elsewhere  in  this  work.^ 

But  from  this  bundle  of  meanings  some  stand 
out  as  proof  against  Bradley's  attacks,  although 
he  is  reluctant  to  admit  his  failure  to  demoUsh 
them.  For  example,  in  his  third  case  of  Essential 
Self,  Coenesthesia,  the  Self  is  twitted  about  the 
problem  of  change,  about  its  own  undefined  limits, 
and  its  character  as  'a  wretched  fraction  and 
poor  atom,'  if  it  be  merely  the  identical  element 
through  change.  Then  he  proceeds  to  the  prob- 
lems of  personal  identity,  continuity,  and  memory. 
This  view  of  the  Self  is  really  scouted  because  of 
our  inabiHty  to  define  what  we  feel.  But  I  am 
not  aware  that  the  slightest  feeling  has  ever 
been  any  better  off  in  this  respect.  We  are  not 
clever  enough  to  turn  ourselves  inside  out,  and 
then  take  a  snapshot  photograph.  But  are  we 
therefore  unreal  ? 

1  Part  IL,  Chapter  11. 
D 


50  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

No,  the  feeling  and  consciousness  of  Self  cannot 
possibly  be  treated  as  objects  on  our  horizon,  and 
no  one  but  an  intellectualist  would  desire  it.  But 
Bradley  himself  does  not  chaUenge  feeUng  so  long 
as  it  is  not  feeling  of  Self  the  most  mtimate 
experience,  and  the  most  difficult  to  describe,— 
and  then  he  objects !  In  his  system,  feeling  is 
given  a  clear  course  to  the  highest  peak  of 
Reahty,  and  luxuriates  in  state  as  Absolute 
Experience,  while  the  Self  is  refused  admittance 
except  in  the  guise  of  a  beggar,  and  on  condition 
of  forfeiture  of  character. 

Bradley's  criticism  of  Subject  and  Object  is 
also  most  inconclusive,  and  quite  unconvincing. 
The  fluctuating  margin  of  Self  and  Not-Self  is 
a  psychological  characteristic  devoid  of  meta- 
physical interest,  since  both  subject  and  object 
are  still  essentially  present  in  all  experience. 
These  two  important  meanings  of  Self  therefore 

remain  intact. 

(11)  As  to  the  criticism  of  the  Self's  Reahty, 
we  have  already  examined  Bradley's  method  and 
aim,  and  httle  further  need  be  said.  It  is  evident 
that  any  existing  object  of  attack  might  be  proved 
unreal  in  Bradley's  way,  for  it  consists  in  showing 
its  entanglement  with  the  aforesaid  contradic- 


' 


)i 


t   i 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


51 


tions.    Even  the  Absolute  would  succumb  but 
for  the  special  consideration  shown.    But  in  the 
main,  the  reahty  of  the  Self  is  attacked  because 
of  our  failure  to  intellectuaUze  it,  which  has 
just  been  adverted  to.    It  may  be  added  that, 
whether  we  will  or  not,  we  must  accept  experience 
as  our  portion.    And  by  this  term  I  mean  the 
concrete  personal  kind  of  experience  which  we 
actually  have,  and  not  something  which  can  set 
itself  over  against  the  Hfe  of  the  Self,  and  call  our 
contents  of  consciousness  hard  names,  from  its 
vaunted  eminence  as  being  '  somehow  '  Absolute. 
After  all  we  must  own  the  '  I '  that  makes  a 
judgment,  that  feels  a  pain,  that  resolves,  strives, 
and  wills,  as  having  a  reahty  which  will  not  be 
decried,  and  which  we  assert  even  in  denying  and 
in  doubting.    When  the  Self  is  intellectuahzed, 
as  far  as  that  is  possible,  Bradley  calls  it  a  '  cod- 
struction,'  and  mocks  at  its  lateness  in  appearing 
on  the  scene  of  experience  !    When  it  is  imme- 
diate, it  is  blind  feehng.    What  is  the  poor  thing 
to  do  ?     The  confusion  in  the  issue  is  brought 
out  by  his  dissatisfaction  with  the  Self  when 
analysed    below    relations    without    distinction 
between  Subject  and  Object,  because  it  cannot 
deal  with  terms  and  relations  of  which,  '  as  it 


52   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEESONALITY 

commonly  appears,'  Reality  consists  !  ^  And 
yet  when  it  is  taken  '  higher  up,'  it  is  infected 
with  relations,  and  with  diversity  and  unity, 
and  is  an  intellectual  construction !  Significant 
is  his  remark  on  self-consciousness  :  *  It  is 
a  mere  experience ! '  How  it  bears  out  the 
contention  in  regard  to  the  mistaken  use  of 
Experience  in  this  wide,  vague  sense  so  prevalent 

to-day  ! 

Surely  the  truth  is  that  the  SeK  and  Experience 
stand  or  fall  together  in  this  matter.  Neither 
are  accurately  definable.  Both  must  be  accepted. 
The  Absolute  ReaUty  must  be  revealed  in  Experi- 
ence as  embodying  Subjects  of  experience.  Brad- 
ley's frequent  admissions  that  the  Self  is  '  less 
unreal '  than  any  other  finite  thing  are  forced 
out  in  spite  of  his  dialectic.  If  the  Self  were  not 
associated  with  a  world  long  before  designated 
as  '  mere  appearance,'  it  would  be  able  to  come 
unto  its  own.  It  would  manifestly  range  on  the 
supreme  levels  of  experience  as  essentially  real, 
in  subordination  to  a  transcendental  Absolute, 
which  really  gives  an  entirely  new  point  of  view. 
But  even  so.  Self  and  Experience  should  appear 
as  in  essential  relation. 

^  Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  106-7. 


MR.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 


53 


» 


I 


(12)  The  denial  of  Selfhood  to  the  Absolute 
in  any  real  sense  is  the  outcome  of  the  position 
so  frequently  admitted  before.  As  has  been  well 
pointed  out  by  Professor  A.  Seth  Pringle-Patti- 
son  ^  and  Professor  Royce,^ — ^from  different  points 
of  view — Bradley's  Absolute  Experience  really 
involves  the  attribution  of  what  is  indistinguish- 
able from  Perfect  PersonaUty.  The  unwiUingness 
to  characterize  his  Absolute  as  Self  is  not  con- 
sistent with  the  Idealistic  position.^  His  accom- 
modation of  '  personality '  within  the  Absolute 
beside  moral  and  aesthetic  and  other  *  appear- 
ances '  is  open  to  the  objection  that  it  Hmits 
ReaUty  while  seeking  to  guard  it  from  determina- 
tion. Further,  the  Self,  for  which  moral  purposes 
are,  is  on  a  higher  plane  than  moral  relationships. 
Instead  of  being  supra-personal  this  type  of 
Absolute  tends  to  fall  to  the  level  of  infra-human 
or  impersonal,  or  else  becomes  a  mere  Unknow- 
able, hardly  distinguishable  from  a  monstrous 
Thing-in-itself  except  for  the  immeaning  desig- 
nation of  Experience.     The  inconsistency  in  the 

*  Man's  Place  in  the  Cosmos^  Essay  on  *A  New  Theory  of  the 
Absolute/  p.  218  ff. 

*  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  i  Supplementary  Essay, 
pp.  550-554. 

*  Appearance  and  Reality ,  pp.  558-9  (Appendix). 


4 


54  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

use  of  that  concept  which  we  have  traced  through- 
out is  so  obviously  magnified  in  the  final  result, 
that  further  criticism  here  is  unnecessary.  The 
prominence  of  feehng  in  the  final  ReaUty,  and 
the  discussion  of  the  Absolute's  enjoyment,  com- 
ing after  the  denial  of  personality  ^  strike  one  as 
incongruous,  and  form  their  own  commentary  on 
the  position. 

*  Appearance  and  ReaUty,  pp.  632-5. 


•  4/ 


CHAPTER  IIL 

PROFESSOR   JOSIAH   ROYCE. 

To  the  student  of  Professor  Royce's  more  recent 
works,!  [^  is  evident  that  the  concept  of  the  Self 
occupies  a  central  position  in  his  System.  In  his 
earUer  philosophical  writings  ^  the  palpably  ethical 
interpretation  of  the  Self  and  the  Universe  was 
conspicuous — an  influence  which  continues  to  be 
prominent,  but  now  more  in  relation  to  the 
interpretation  he  gives  of  the  Self.  In  the  two 
later  works  we  find  sufficient  material  for  the 
problem  of  our  Thesis.^    Royce  approaches  the 

*  The  Conception  of  Ood,  by  Profs.  Royce,  Howison,  Mezes, 
and  Le  Conte ;  New  York,  Macmillan  Co.,  1897.  The  World  and 
the  Individual  GifEord  Lectures,  University  of  Aberdeen,  by  Prof. 
Royce  ;  N.Y.,  Macmillan  Co.,  1st  and  2nd  Series,  1901. 

«  The  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy,  1885 ;  The  Spirit  of 
Modern  Philosophy,  1892 ;  both  of  the  Riverside  Press,  Cam- 
bridge. 

»  Since  these  words  were  written.  Professor  Royce  has  given 
us  The  Philosophy  of  Loyalty,  William  James,  and  Other  Essays 
an  the  Philosophy  of  Life,  and  The  Problem  of  Christianity, 
2  vols,  (all  Macmillan).     These  works  express  in  fresh  relations 


66     THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Self  through  his  IdeaHstic  Theory  of  Being.  But 
he  does  not  regard  his  system  as  a  jyriori.  Accord- 
ingly we  are  at  perfect  hberty  to  expound  first 
his  view  of  the  Self,  and  then  the  place  of  the 
Self  in  his  Theory  of  ReaUty. 

I. 

What,  then,  is  the  Self?  Royce's  answer  is 
partly  negative,  but  finally  positive.  He  criti- 
cizes certain  current  conceptions  of  the  Self,  and 
then  gives  what  he  beheves  to  be  the  ideahstic 
and  the  true  view.  Let  us  state  in  turn  these  two 
aspects  of  his  answer. 

He  begins  his  discussion  of  the  Self  with  a 
psychological  account.  Viewing  the  merely  brute 
facts  of  self-consciousness,  one  must  see  that 
there  is  no  stabiUty,  no  verifiable  identity  to  be 
found.  The  Empirical  Ego  is  the  product  of 
growth,  and  the  outcome  of  experience,  having 
a  genesis  in  time,  and  a  connection  with  the  body. 
In  the  aspect  of  mere  fact,  a  passing  mood  can 

the  view  of  the  Self  given  in  The  World  and  the  Individtud, 
which  is  discussed  in  the  Chapter,  but  do  not  greatly  modify 
the  definition  of  the  Self  given  by  Royce,  in  terms  of  its  relation 
to  the  commimity  and  the  past  and  present  values  of  the  indi- 
vidual experience.  In  other  words,  the  Self  remains  for  Royce 
an  interpretation,  a  logical,  ethical  and  social  conception,  rather 
than  a  basic  fact  correlative  with  experience. 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


57 


\] 


alter  spiritual  stability,  while  the  idea  of  the  Self 
is  largely  made  up  of  bodily  sensations,  especially 
muscular  and  visceral.  These  form  a  nucleus  to 
which  are  added  habits  and  social  experiences. 
These  latter  elements  are  most  important  in  pro- 
ducing that  contrast-effect,  in  which  the  idea  of 
Self  mainly  consists.  The  child's  natural  depen- 
dence on  others  becomes  consciously  weakened, 
and  gradually  the  discovery  is  made  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  himself  and  all  other  selves. 
Stages  in  this  process  are  indicated  by  quarrels, 
loves,  the  sense  of  rivalry,  the  conflict  of  desires, 
and  especially  by  conscious  imitation  and  dociUty 
to  another's  will.  Then  comes  the  sensitiveness 
to  the  approval  and  disapproval  of  others.  But 
it  is  not  till  the  formation  and  growth  of  an  Ideal 
that  true  selfhood  begins,  bringing  order,  con- 
nectedness, and  permanence  into  the  inner  world. 
This  important  factor  is  essentially  social  in 
character,  and  of  the  nature  of  a  contrast.  When 
an  inward  comparison  of  ideals  takes  place,  how- 
ever, then  the  progress  to  selfhood  only  lacks  the 
fulfilled  purpose  in  order  to  reach  completion. 
The  meaning  or  value  of  a  Ufe  as  expressed  in  an 
Ideal,  gives  Self  its  unity  and  reaUty.  By  atten- 
tion— the  essence  of  Will — ^to  the  life-plan  which 


68     THE  PROBLEM  OP  PERSONALITY 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


59 


is  selected  as  the  Ideal,  the  seeking  Self  partly 
reaUzes  his  selfhood,  which  is  only  to  be  perfectly 
fulfilled,  however,  in  the  Absolute. 

Thus  we  have  passed  from  the  negative  to  the 
positive  point  of  view,  or — as  it  comes  to  mean 
— from  the  psychological  to  the  metaphysical. 
In  other  words,  we  have  found  that  the  reaHty  of 
the  Self  can  only  be  reached  by  regarding  the 
significance  or  value  of  certain  elements  of  inner 
experience,  which,  as  merely  empirical  facts,  are 
incompetent  to  furnish  a  doctrine  of  the  Self. 
*  The  real  Self  is  the  totality  of  our  empirical 
consciousness  when  viewed  as  having  unity  of 
meaning,  and  as  exemplifying,  or  in  its  totality 
fulfilling  an  idea.'  ^  So  instead  of  vainly  seeking 
for  an  Ego  among  the  empirical  facts  of  con- 
sciousness  where  all  is  variable  and  fragmentary, 
we  realize  that  the  only  real  and  permanent  Ego 
is  to  be  found  in  the  consciously  selected  and 
adopted  plan  of  life,  which  pervades  such  ele- 
ments and  gives  them  unity  and  meaning.  By 
such  an  Ided  a  Self  is  constituted,  and  ^thout 
some  such  purpose  no  Self  can  exist.  Nay,  does 
not  paycJo^show  that,  apart  fro-n  .his  staa. 
dard,  we  may  be  said  to  possess  many  selves 

*  The  Conception  of  Oodt  p.  288. 


rather  than  one  ?  So  our  Self  must  be  viewed 
metaphysically  and  even  morally,  if  it  is  to  be 
seriously  reckoned  with  at  all. 

Before  we  finally  pass  over  into  this  meta- 
physical region,  however,  let  us  supplement  what 
has  been  said  by  a  further  survey.  In  the  Second 
Series  of  The  World  and  the  Individual  the  sub- 
ject is  more  fully  treated.  After  speaking  of  the 
ambiguities  in  the  meaning  of  Self — shown,  for 
example,  in  our  contrary  ethical  maxims — '  forget 
yourself ' — '  find  yourself ' — ^Royce  maintains  that 
the  usage  of  Self  in  the  higher  ethical  sense  is  the 
only  defensible  mode  of  employing  the  concept. 
Then  he  proceeds  to  discuss  three  different  con- 
ceptions of  the  individual  Self. 

The  first  conception  is  an  empirical  view  of  the 
Self,  as  a  certain  unity  of  facts,  contrasted  with 
all  else,  partly  physical  and  partly  psychical  as 
including  the  conscious  states.  That  there  is  a 
variable  character  about  the  common-sense  dis- 
tinction of  Self  from  Not-Self  must  be  admitted. 
Royce  claims  that  the  psychological  unity 
observable  in  this  series  is  due  to  the  principle 
that  the  distinction  between  the  Self  and  Not- 
Self  is  essentially  social,  and  depends  upon  a 
succession    of    contrast-effects,    together    with 


l| 


i 


60  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

the  psychical  processes  of  habit,  memory,  and 
imagination. 

The  second  conception  consists  in  the  view  of 
the  Self  as  a  real  and  independent  being,  in  some 
metaphysical  sense.  The  Self  is  one,  and  is  called 
the  Soul,  and  is  regarded  as  a  Substance.  It  is 
not  to  be  confounded  with  the  mere  states  of 
consciousness.  It  gives  unity  and  order  to  mental 
life.  But  Royce  contends  that  this  doctrine  is 
condemned  already  as  ReaHstic  ;  and  the  refuta- 
tion of  Realism  has  been  given  previously  in  his 
pages.  In  short,  both  this  and  the  first  con- 
ception of  the  Self  are  inadequate  since  they  are 
incompatible  with  the  only  tenable  Theory  of 
Being,  namely  the  Ideahstic.  To  this  view  Royce 
addresses  himself  as  the  third  conception  of  the 
Self,  which  shall  provide  all  that  is  worth  con- 
tending for  in  the  others.  The  following  out  of 
this  conception  will  lead  us  into  the  realm  of 
metaphysics  and  into  as  much  of  Royce's  System 
as  it  will  concern  us  here  to  explore. 

This  third  type  escapes  the  two  great  diffi- 
culties of  the  former  conceptions.  It  is  not 
burdened  by  the  ethical  contradictions  which  a 
criticism  of  the  common-sense  Self  brings  to 
light ;  nor  yet  is  it  disturbed  by  the  psychological 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


61 


i 


theories  of  the  '  Passing  Thought,'  and  the  like, 
or  the  complexities  of  empirical  processes.    What 
this  third  type  is  we  have  previously  indicated. 
It  consists  in  the  view  of  the  Self  as  a  '  Meaning 
embodied  in  a  conscious  life.'  ^    The  Self  is  not 
an  entity,  not  a  Substance,  not  a  Soul,  nor  yet 
a  series  of  inner  states.    What  the  Self  is  can 
only  be  fully  revealed  by  the  fulfilment  of  the 
Ideal  which  constitutes  its  Selfhood.    That  Mean- 
ing is  relative  to  other  Selves  or  Meanings  and  to 
the  Absolute  Self,  or  Infinite  Meaning.    And  yet 
it  is  distinguished  from  them,  for  the  Whole  is  an 
infinitely  rich  and  complex  unity. 

We  can  no  longer  keep  closed  the  floodgates  of 
Royce's  Idealism,  if  we  would  float  down  the 
river  of  his  thought.  In  the  First  Series  he  has 
discussed  the  Four  Conceptions  of  Being,— the 
theories  of  ReaUsm  ;  Empiricism  and  its  logical 
outcome,  Mysticism  ;  Critical  Rationalism  ;  and 
finally  his  own  IdeaUsm,  that  is,  the  ultimate 
unity  in  the  Absolute  of  the  Internal  and  External 
Meaning.  Now,  the  Self,  as  a  merely  fitful  flush 
of  conscious  purpose,  seems  to  be  just  as  strongly 
contrasted  from  the  wider  Not-Self,  as  the  In- 
ternal from  the  External  Meaning.   But  reflection 

1  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  ii.  p.  269. 


{. 


62  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

shows  the  same  ultimate  transcendence  in  the 
Absolute.  The  outer  world,  the  Not-Self,  the 
External  Meaning,  are  seen  to  be  reducible  to 
the  true  Internal  Meaning,  although  without  loss 
of  individuality.  So  an  'infinite  number'  of 
such  contrasts  of  Self  and  Not-Self  can  be 
made,^  which  in  reaUty  only  express  the  wealth 
of  meaning  in  the  Absolute. 

And  when  in  any  one  instant  I  seem  to  have 
such  a  contrast  between  Self  and  Not-Self,  the 
fact  is  that  I  identify  the  past  and  the  future 
experiences  of  what  I  consider  Myself  with  the 
present,  not  by  any  psychical  entity,  but  by  a 
unity   of  purpose   which  at  least   I   'ought  to 
possess'^  in  contrast  with  all  else.     Personal 
identity  is  not  the  discredited  psychological  type, 
but  that  of  ethical  meaning  and  purpose,  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  constitutes  the  Self.    This  Ideal 
impUes  the  will  to  preserve  one's  own  significance 
in  subordination  to  the  essential  Unity.    In  the 
true  Theory  of  Being,  therefore,  this  ethical  con- 
ception of  Self  will  predominate  ;  and  it  will  be 
vahd  not  for  the  human  individual  alone,  but,  as 
we  shall  see,  for  the  Absolute  also,  and  even  for 
Reality  in  its  essential  structure. 

*  The  World  and  the  Individml,  p.  273.  •  Ibid.  p.  274. 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


63 


For  since  you  cannot  find  out  what  the  Self 
really  is  by  mere  experience  however  prolonged, 
but  must  regard  its  Meaning  in  the  light  of  the 
Absolute  who  is  precisely  this  system  of  values 
consciously  fulfilled  unto  perfection  in  his  own 
infinite  Unity,  you  must  look  to  this  stand- 
point for  a  true  doctrine  of  the  Self.  Ajid  it  is 
for  this  reason  that  Royce  approaches  the  Self 
through  his  Theory  of  Being.  But  this  con- 
ception of  Reality  is  essentially  based  on  the 
ethical  nature  of  Selfhood — ^for  that  is  what  the 
Unity  of  the  Internal  and  External  Meaning 
comes  to  mean.  Hence  the  realm  of  the  Absolute 
is  throughout  conscious  and  the  perfection  of 
Meaning.  That  is,  the  Absolute  is  a  Self,  a 
Person.  And  Reality  is  of  this  structure  also. 
For  it  is  the  completely  organized  life  of  the 
Absolute,  inclusive  of  the  infinite  variety  of 
meanings,  in  fulfilled  Unity,  in  which  our  various 
finite  Selves  have  a  place,  with  all  that  constitutes 
God's  universe. 

Royce's  favourite  argiunent,  however,  for  this 
constructive  view  is  drawn  from  his  doctrine  of 
the  Self-representative  Series,  based  upon  the 
formal  structure  of  the  Self  and  extended  in 
relation  to  the  number  series  of  mathematics. 


64  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

The  Self  is  found  to  be  inclusive  and  included. 
It  is  essentially  dual  and  self-representative  in 
its  structure.    And  Reality  is  found  to  have  the 
same  form,  which  is  shared  by  the  Infinite  of 
the  *  New  '  mathematics.^    Accordingly,  against 
Bradley,  Royce  maintains  the  fundamental  reality 
of  the  Self  as  he  conceives  it,  and  he  defends  as 
an  integral  part  of  his  system  the  PersonaUty  of 
the  Absolute.    This  conception  of  the  Self-repre- 
sentative  System  also   suppUes  him  with  the 
solution  of  Bradley's  great  riddle  of  the  One  and 
the  Many.    For  in  such  a  System,  as  in  the  Self 
also,  variety  is  constituted  by  unity,  and  unity 
by  variety.    The  life's  Meaning  makes  a  Self  out 
of  fragmentary  and  multitudinous  elements,  which 
only  get  their  being  through  relation  to  the  Self, 
although  not  fully  discovered  as  yet.    And,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Series  of  self-inclusive  repre- 
sentations, for  example,  maps  of  maps,  is  such 
that  every  point  is  in  an  infinite  unity,  while  yet 
different  from  every  other.    In  short,  this  formal 
conception  gives  Royce  the  clue  to  the  structure 
of  the  Whole  of  Reality  as  an  Infinite  Collection 
of  the  essential  type  of  a  Self-representative 

1  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  i.  Supplementary  Essay, 
p.  512  ff. 


PROFESSOR  JOSLIH  ROYCE 


65 


System.  Hence  his  definition  of  consciousness, 
and  of  the  Self,  conceived  as  we  have  presented 
it,  as  that  which  can  be  content  to  itself;  for,  so 
viewed,  the  Self  is  the  system  of  unfulfilled  mean- 
ings, unsatisfied  longings,  by  which  it  seeks  to 
express  itself,  and  yet  it  is  included  in  these  as 
the  conscious  Self  with  a  certain  conception  of  its 
meaning  at  any  given  stage  in  the  temporal 
process.  But  this  is  supremely  true  of  the  Abso- 
lute Self  who  includes  within  his  Hfe  the  infinite 
collection  of  Selves.  And  in  this  way  the  appear- 
ance of  new  Selves  is  to  be  interpreted.  A  New 
Self  arises  within  a  more  inclusive  Self. 

The  concept  of  Infinity  is  freely  used  by  Royce, 
and  it  is  interpreted  after  the  pattern  of  the 
'  new  '  infinite  of  Mathematics  as  required  by  the 
Self-representative  Series.  An  infinite  totahty 
is  provided  for  by  the  inclusion  in  the  Absolute 
of  all  actually  fulfilled,  as  opposed  to  all  barely 
possible,  ideas  and  meanings.  This  Self-deter- 
mination on  the  part  of  the  Divine  Will  removes 
the  objection  to  PersonaUty  as  imposing  an 
arbitrary  Hmit  upon  the  Absolute. 

This  leads  to  the  problem  of  the  relation  of 
the  Selves,  as  essentially  moral  beings,  to  the 
Absolute.     Royce  faces  the  difficulty  which  is 


M 


66  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

so  strongly  emphasized  by  Howison.^  How 
are  genuine  moral  autonomy,  ethical  freedom, 
and  personal  immortaUty  compatible  with  such 
Monism  ?  Well,  since  Royce  is  so  insistent  upon 
the  ethical  character  of  Selfhood,  it  is  a  most 
relevant  point  to  raise.  And,  further,  he  seeks 
to  provide  a  distinct  theory  of  IndividuaUty. 

Royce  considers  his  system  compatible  with 
the  highest  claims  for  moral  freedom  and  ethical 
autonomy.  For  it  is  the  essence  of  my  indi- 
viduaUty  to  define  myself  as  distinct  from  all 
else  by  the  unique  hfe-plan  chosen  and  adopted. 
And  my  doing  so  is  God's  will  also.  While 
Royce  conceives  the  universe  as  interpretable 
teleologically,  and  as  a  Divine  Unity,  he  yet 
regards  every  fragment  of  the  world  as  being  in 
its  individuality  an  essential  aspect  of  the  life 
of  the  Whole,  as  the  positive  embodiment  of 
conscious  will  and  purpose.  The  antinomy  be- 
tween human  freedom  and  Divine  Purpose  is 
solved  by  the  category  of  Time.  The  fact  of 
the  dependence  of  the  Self  upon  another  Will  in 
Time  does  not  conflict  with  the  assertion  that 
in  the  aspect  of  Eternity,  the  Self  exists  as  Self- 
defining,  and  yet  as  the  expression  of  the  Divine 

»  The  Conception  of  Ood.    See  also  the  next  Chapter. 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


67 


I 


Will.  The  Divine  Will  expresses  itself  in  the 
Self's  own  purposes,  and  includes  them  in  its  own. 
So  freedom,  individuality  and  immortaUty  are 
provided  for  in  the  System.  The  Self  is  real  as 
an  expression  of  its  own  meaning,  freely  chosen 
and  adopted.  But  that  is  so  because  it  is  the 
Divine  purpose.  The  Absolute  supremely  solves 
the  problem  of  the  One  and  the  Many.  The 
various  Selves  are  many  because  in  God  they  are 
One  ;  and  God  is  Unity  because  of  this  PluraUty, 
and  infinite  variety. 

The  Selves  are  not  independent  beings,  and 
Royce  considers  any  such  Realistic  Theodicy 
beset  with  the  greatest  difficulties.  Evil  he 
regards  as  due  to  inattention  to  the  highest.  It 
is  atoned  for  in  the  Absolute,  and  so  is  reconcilable 
with  the  Perfection  of  Reality.  The  uniqueness 
of  our  individuaUty  is  preserved  in  God,  the 
Supreme  Person  and  Individual,  in  whom  our 
Eternal  Selves  find  fulfilment  and  immortaUty. 
God's  life  includes  the  temporal  process  and  He 
views  it  eternally,  as  in  one  indivisible  instant. 

• 

In  His  totaUty  as  Absolute  He  is  *  conscious  not 
in  time,  but  of  time,  and  of  aU  that  infinite  time 
contains.'  ^    As  sharers  in  that  Divine  Life,  the 

*  Ibid,  vol.  ii.  p.  419. 


R' 


68  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Selves,  from  the  eternal  standpoint,  consciously 
attain  their  perfection  by  the  knowledge  of  their 
temporal  strivings  in  their  wholeness,  and  by 
beholding  their  fragmentary  meanings  as  fulfilled 
in  the  Absolute  and  revealed  in  the  Ught  of 
Eternity. 

Royce's  System  of  Absolute  Idealism  is  logical 
and  impressive.  It  represents  the  results  of  the 
best  thinking  of  one  of  the  foremost  Uving  meta- 
physicians, after  many  years  of  profound  reflec- 
tion upon  philosophical  problems.  It  was  not 
cast  into  the  literary  mould  before  it  was  melted. 
It  has  glowed  in  the  crucible  of  personal  life  and 
conviction  ;  it  has  been  fused  beneath  the  white 
heat  of  honest  criticism. 

This  conviction,  however,  must  not  be  empha- 
sized here  ;  but  rather  we  must  go  on  audaciously 
to  our  work  of  appreciation  and  criticism.  A 
word  or  two  more  of  appreciation  will  suffice. 
I  believe  that  in  the  latter  part  of  this  Thesis, 
it  wiU  be  found  that  the  conclusions  indicated 
will  not  very  widely  diverge  from  the  main  out- 
lines of  Royce's  System,  with  which  I  am  largely 
in  sympathy,  as  the  best  expression  yet  given  of 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


69 


IdeaUsm.  And  now,  in  regard  to  criticism  :  My 
first  and  fundamental  divergence  is  concerning 
Royce's  view  of  the  Self.  I  cannot  accept  the 
doctrine, — ^however  widespread  it  may  be,  and 
however  capable  of  conserving  spiritual  interests, 
that  the  only  real  Self  is  the  idea  of  a  life-purpose, 
the  Meaning  intended,  the  Ideal  sought.  For 
the  resort  to  the  Passive  Voice  here  will  serve  as 
a  hint  of  my  objection,  which  I  may  at  once 
state  bluntly.  What  intends,  means,  seeks  ideals  ? 
To  my  mind  the  only  answer  is  the  Subject  or 
Ego  to  whom  these  thoughts,  purposes,  and 
strivings,  are  Object,  albeit  expressive  of  the 
ethical  nature  of  the  Person.  Now  this  Subject- 
Object  aspect,  so  fundamental  to  an  existential 
account  of  experience,  is  not  expUcitly  prominent 
in  Royce's  treatment.  Yet  it  seems  to  me  to  lie 
right  across  the  track  of  his  thought.  The 
duaUty  in  Selfhood  is  present,  and  figures  occa- 
sionally in  the  *  Self-representative'  and  the  *  Well- 
ordered  Series,'  under  the  old  terms.  Subject  and 
Object,  but  on  examination  it  will  be  found  to  be 
distinct,  and  consisting  of  twofold  Meanings,  or 
objective  content  of  some  kind.  Yet  this  undeniable 
fact  of  'my'  experience,  which  we  have  had 
occasion  to  miss  in  James  and  Bradley,  does  not 


<i 


TA        TTTT?     T^TJATiT  T?Ttr     AT?    I>T?T?GA'M  A  T  TTTV 
7U       1x1±!j    riXKJiJijJitm.    UJb    JrJiiXvoUjMAljll  x 

fuUy  come  to  its  proper  rights  even  in  Royce. 
To  be  sure,  the  Self  is  placed  with  Experience, 
even  in  the  Absolute.  So  far  that  is  well.  But 
the  '  Self '  is  not  the  Subject  of  Experience, 
which  I  contend  is  essential  to  a  true  metaphysic. 
In  other  words,  the  Self  is  pushed  into  the 
conceptual  realm,  where  it  is  very  much  at  home 
with  mathematical  and  other  impersonal  con- 
cepts.  But  thereby  it  loses  its  immediacy,  its 
character  as  directly  felt  and  experienced.  And 
this  is  precisely  the  essential  thing  about  the 
Self  which  must  be  taken  into  account  in  Meta- 
physics.  Royce  charges  such  views  with  being 
Realistic,  and  accordingly  dismisses  them.  But 
surely  this  is  a  hard  saying  to  those  who  beUeve 
anility  to  be  give,  iljrm,  of  e^erience  and 
thought.  It  is  certainly  remote  from  the  Realism 
of  independent  things  in  themselves  or  relations 
apart  from  knowledge.  Of  course,  the  brunt  of 
the  charge  is  against  the  Soul-Substance  Theory, 
which  regards  the  Soul  a,  an  independent  thii 
or  entity.  But  there  are  many  and  diverse  forms 
of  this  theory  ;  and,  in  any  case,  the  reaUty  of 
the  ^  Spiritual  Self,'  even  of  James'  PsycJogy, 
the  Subject  of  our  thinking,  feeling,  willing,  striv- 
ing, yes,  even  of  our  meaning,  imagining,  and 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


71 


' 


vi 


planning,  must  be  given  a  prime  place  in  a  system 

of  Reality. 

As  to   the   disintegrating  facts   of  empirical 
Psychology,   what  do  they  really  teach  ?     A 
genesis  of  the  Self ;   a  process  of  growth  in  the 
idea  of  the  Self ;  the  possibility  of  manifestation 
in  one  individual  of  different  groups  of  habits,  or 
as  we  call  them  in  this  ethical  sense, — selves  or 
personalities,  the  social  character  of  SeKhood ; 
the  flowing  moments  of  consciousness.    I  main- 
tain that  there  is  nothing  really  new,  and  nothing 
of  metaphysical  significance  to  the  problem  of  the 
Subject  of  experience  in  any  of  these  facts.    And 
as  to  the  Personal  Identity  in  regard  to  the  Self 
for  whom  this  stream  of  experiences  is,  I  contend 
that  it  is  no  whit  less  authenticated,  rational,  and 
defensible  than  the  beUef  in  the  identity  of  the 
world.    In  one  case  we  build  up  an  identity  amid 
the  objects  presented  in  the  stream  of  thought 
and  in  the  other  we  beUeve  in  an  identical  Sub- 
ject, which  has  the  great  advantage  over  the 
former  of  being  the  most  intimate  experience,  and 
most  verifiable  identity,   for  it  is  the  pivotal 
spectator  around  which  the  objective  kaleido- 
scope revolves  !    If  we  are  to  disintegrate  experi- 
ence, let  us  treat  both  sides  ahke,  and  then  we 


'■I' 


72   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

can  turn  our  open  books  face  downwards,  and 
confess  ourselves  utter  sceptics  !  As  this  will 
come  up  again  in  the  sequel,  I  pass  on  to  other 
aspects  of  the  same  tendency. 

In  close  connection  with  the  foregoing  Is  the 
criticism  that  the  Self  of  Royce's  doctrine  is 
essentially  ethical,  and  therefore  stands  on  a 
different  plane  from  that  which  is  claimed  for  the 
Self  as  an  entity.  Even  if  Being  is  only  consti- 
tuted by  Meaning  or  Value,  as  Royce  maintains, 
from  our  human  point  of  view,  then  that  Mean- 
ing is  relative  to  some  kind  of  identical  Self  other 
than  the  Meaning,  The  Meaning  requires  a  con- 
scious Self  for  which  different  experiences  are. 
The  same  truth  appUes  to  all  forms  of  Prag- 
matism. Schiller  and  the  Oxford  School  reaUze 
this  important  basis  for  reahty  in  terms  of  value. 
Royce's  Absolute  may  serve  as  the  ultimate 
standard,  but  it  is  hardly  fair  to  fall  back  upon 
it  as  the  ground  of  the  reaUty  of  the  Self  as 
Meaning,  after  discussing  psychological  and  gene- 
tic problems  !  We  must,  and  we  do  recognize 
the  different  standpoints  of  reality  for  man,  and 
final  Reality  for  God. 

Accordingly,  I  maintain  that  the  Ethical  Self 
impUes  a  real  being,  a  Subject,  an  *  I,'  in  relation 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


73 


r 


I 


to  which  all  my  experiences  are,  and  which  my 
meanings,  purposes,  ideals  imply,  as  surely  as 
currency  impUes  some  actual  medium  of  ex- 
change. And,  on  the  other  hand,  if  you  allow 
me  a  Real  Ego,  I  will  have  no  difficulty  in 
seeing  my  way  to  an  Ideal  Ego.  But  without 
such  an  admission,  so  imperatively  demanded  by 
inner  experience,  we  cannot  set  one  against 
the  other,  or  even  conceive  how  an  Ideal  Ego 
can  possibly  be  real  in  the  prime  or  exclusive 
sense. 

Accordingly,  when  Royce  says  that  there  is  no 
real  Ego  or  permanent  being  apart  from  the  hfe- 
plan  which  pervades  our  mental  experiences,  and 
which  alone  makes  what  I  call  '  myself,'  ^  I 
have  to  protest  that  he  is  employing  one  con- 
ception of  the  Self — namely  the  ethical — ^to  the 
exclusion  of  the  existential  Self  or  Subject,  with- 
out drawing  the  distinction  between  them.  Per- 
haps the  criticism  of  Royce  might  be  put  thus  : 
he  identifies  the  '  I '  with  an  ethical  and  intel- 
lectual '  Me,'  to  the  exclusion  of  the  real  Ego 
as  Subject.  He  repeats  Bradley's  mistake  of 
treating  the  Self  as  an  intellectual  and  ethical 
construction,  as  if  there  were  no  other  meaning 

1  Conception  of  God,  pp.  289-290. 


it 

1 1 


« 


74   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

of  Self.    Our  distinction  between  terms  in  the 
Second  Part  will  make  this  clear. 

The  emphasis  upon  the  formal  and  conceptual 
side  of  all  Reality  follows  as  a  corollary  from  the 
subjection  of  the  Self  to  these  relations.  Ethical 
and  Mathematical  concepts  and  judgments  go 
together  here,-an  instance  of  hisiry  repeating 
itself-and  they  accord  weU  with  the  prinlples  of 
Symbohc  Logic  To  some,  no  doubt,  these  purely 
formal  discussions  will  appear  valuable  ;  for  my 
own  part,  conviction  as  to  ReaHty  does  not  follow 
from  such  formal  considerations.^  But,  leaving 
thi,  aside,  fte  duality  in  the  Self-representative 
Series,  which  gives  the  clue  to  the  structure  of 
ReaUty  is  after  aU  confessedly  the  structure  of 
Subject-Object.  Now,  if  this  were  fully  recog- 
nized and  worked  out  in  the  case  of  the  Self, 

'  The  reader  of  Royce*s  latest  books,  especially  his  recent  fine 
work  on  The  Problem  of  Christianity,  will  have  an  opportunity 
of  observing  how  far  he  has  gone  in  following  the  le  Jof  Sym 
bolic  Logic  and  the  New  Mathematics  in  the  elaboration  of  his 
system.  Concepts  are  the  pieces  on  the  metaphysical  chess- 
board, and  the  game  of  thought  is  played  with  them  rather  than 
with  the  facts  of  life  and  experience.  Christianity  is  the  evolu- 
tion of  concepts,  loyalty  is  the  abstract  principle  which  unites 
the  individual  with  the  Divine  Community.  Great  as  may  be 
the  truth  underlying  such  a  conclusion,  one  feels  as  if  the 
philosopher  reaches  it  a  priori.  He  seems  to  be  thinking  in 
one  language,  as  it  were,  and  speaking  in  another. 


I 


PROFESSOR  JOSIAH  ROYCE 


75 


we  should  have  a  system  free  from  the  objection 
which  has  been  previously  urged.  In  such  a 
system  our  hold  would  be  retained  upon  the 
essence  of  empirical  reaUty, — ^namely,  our  own 
existence  as  the  Subjects  of  Experience, — ^while 
at  the  same  time  we  should  be  able  to  seek  for 
the  ultimate  Eeahty  without  forfeiting  our  im- 
mediate feeUng,  our  self-activity,  and  our  sense 

of  life. 

The  claim  of  Royce  that  his  system  is  not  a 
priori  is  scarcely  manifested  by  his  method  of 
reading  his  facts  in  the  Hght  of  his  conclusions 
from  the  start  of  his  constructive  work.  It  is 
true,  his  writings  are  on  ReUgious  Philosophy; 
but,  to  my  thinking,  a  clear  progress  from  start- 
ing-point to  conclusion,  from  finite  to  Absolute 
Reality,  would  avoid  the  abstractness  and  deduc- 
tive character  of  his  reasoning,  shown  for  example 
in  his  dismissal  of  his  Second  Conception  of  the 
Self, — as  a  real  entity — on  the  grounds  of  ReaUsm. 
Akin  to  this  method  is  his  over-emphasis, — ^as  it 
appears — ^upon  the  Social  side  as  constituting 
selfhood.  Again,  we  seem  to  have  relations 
without  any  real  and  experienced  terms,  short 
of  the  Absolute  itself. 

With  his  conception  of  the  Absolute  as  a  Self, 


70  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

I  am  in  accord,  with  reservations,  which  will 
readily  be  perceived  from  what  I  have  said  in 
criticism  of  the  ethical  and  conceptual  character 
of  the  Self.  The  relation  of  God  to  man  as  a 
moral  being  will  come  up  in  the  next  Chapter. 
I  may  state  here  that  I  cannot  regard  either 
Eoyce's  provision  for  the  moral,  or  Howison's 
provision  for  the  metaphysical,  necessities  of  Per- 
sonality as  fully  satisfactory.  Royce's  view  is 
still  too  monistic  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
true  freedom  and  responsibiUty,  while  Howison's 
conception  is  too  pluraUstic. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PROFESSOR   G.   H.   HOWISON. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  expressions  of  the 
present  reaction  of  many  minds  against  the 
recently  prevailing  Monism  is  the  system  of 
*  Personal  Idealism '  as  expounded  by  Professor 
G.  H.  Howison.i  It  is  quite  distinct  from  the 
views  set  forth  by  Eight  Oxford  Graduates  in  a 
recent  volume  bearing  the  title  of  Personal 
Idealism,  to  which  reference  is  made  elsewhere. 


I. 

The  kernel  of  Howison's  thought  is  to  be  found 
in  his  protest  that  Idealistic  Monism  is  irrecon- 
cilable with  Personality,  human  or  divine.    As 

•1  The  Conception  of  God,  by  Professors  J.  Royce,  J.  Le  Conte, 
G.  H.  Howison,  and  S.  E.  Mezes ;  N.Y.,  The  MacmiUan  Co., 
1897.  The  Limits  of  Evolution  and  other  Essays,  illustrating  the 
Metaphysical  Theory  of  Personal  Idealism,  by  Professor  G.  H. 
Howison,  Second  Edition,  revised  and  enlarged;  N.Y.,  The 
MacmiUan  Co.,  1905. 


» 


78  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

we  have  seen,  this  opinion  was  freely  expressed 
at  the  Discussion  with  Professor  Royce,  reported 
in  the  Conception  of  God,  Equally  incompatible 
with  personality  are  the  claims  of  Naturalism  ; 
and  that  the  polemic  against  this  latter  view  is 
no  less  strenuous  is  indicated  by  the  Essay  on 
'  TU  Limits  of  Evolution;  which  gives  to  his  book 
its  title. 

Howison  contends  for  a  Rational  Pluralism  of 
free  spirits  forming  an  eternal  Society,  including 
God,  not  as  the  Efficient  Cause,  but  as  the  Final 
Cause,  or  determining  Ideal  of  aU.    Not  only  the 
moral  claims  of  personality,— infinitely  momen- 
tons  as  they  are,— but  also  the  intellectual  self- 
activity  of  minds,  leads  him  to  the  formulation 
of  Pluralism  as  a  system.    In  fact,  the  theoretical 
activity  is  not  to  be  set  over  against  the  '  Practical 
Reason '  as  separate  or  fundamentally  distinct ; 
he  maintains  that  the  inteUectual  is  ultimately 
reducible  to  the  moral  relation,  that  consciousness 
is  best  interpreted  as  conscience.    In  each  case 
the  act  of  Self-definition  is  at  the  root  of  experi- 
ence ;   and  this  personal  determination  is  neces- 
sary owing  to  the  presence   of   a    system  of 
conscious  Subjects,   other  Selves  and  God,  or 
the  Supreme  Self,  which  together  constitute  the 


PROFESSOR  G.  H.  HOWISON 


79 


world  of  Persons,  the  '  City  of  God.'  ^  This 
Self-defining  and  moral  activity  is  so  essential 
that  the  ultimate  reality  must  be  stated  in  terms 
which  do  justice  to  Personality  above  all.  Monism, 
whether  Idealistic  or  Naturalistic,  fails  in  this 
supreme  task,  and  therefore  is  false  to  the  highest 
truth  of  experience.  Howison  attributes  this 
fundamental  error  to  the  prominence  of  Efficient 
over  Final  Causation  in  such  systems.  The  old 
form  of  Monotheism,  with  its  doctrine  of  Creation 
and  Regeneration,  falls  under  the  like  condem- 
nation,  in  his  opinion. 

If  we  go  to  the  heart  of  the  matter  and  ask — 
*  What  is  a  Person  ?  '  we  shall  bring  out  Howi- 
son's  thought  more  fuUy.  Howison  answers  that 
a  person  is  a  self-active  member  of  a  manifold 
system  of  real  beings.^  The  true  person  is 
possessed  of  independent  origination ;  and  yet 
he  is  essentially  related  to  an  inclusive  society 
of  beings  equally  characterized  by  initiative ; 
and  all  are  attracted  to  the  Ideal  and  Perfect 
Person,  God,  the  Final  Cause  and  bond  of  union 
of  spirits.  '  It  is  the  essence  of  a  person  to  stand 
in  relation  with  beings  having  an  autonomy,  in 

^  The  Limits  of  EvoltUion,  pp.  174-5. 
*  The  Conception  of  God,  p.  91. 


80     THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


PROFESSOR  G.  H.  HOWISON 


81 


whom  he  recognizes  rights,  and  toward  whom 
he  acknowledges  duties.'  ^ 

The  person  is  the  real  creator  of  Nature,  and 
cannot  be  explained  as  derived  from  Nature. 
He  has  no  origin,^  for  he  is  above  time.  Hence 
a  philosophy  of  Evolution  is  incompetent.  The 
elements  of  self-active  consciousness  are  a  priori, 
as  Kant  has  estabUshed,  and  when  this  truth  is 
fully  recognized,  and  consistently  worked  out, 
Howison  claims  that  rational  PluraHsm  will  result 
as  the  true  Idealism,  and  the  only  adequate 
philosophy.  Each  person  is  a  '  focal  point '  of  the 
universe,  receiving  rays  from  other  conscious 
centres  and  reflecting  them  back  with  added 
brightness.  The  universe  is  the  product  of  the 
consciousness  of  this  Society  of  Persons,  who 
constitute  Nature  by  their  self-activity  according 
to  the  laws  of  cognition  summed  up  in  the 
Categories,  as  a  priori  modes  or  conditions  of 
experience.  Accordingly,  the  Person  in  its  whole 
reality  is  the  one  intelligible  creative  unity,  the 
single  synthetic  energy,  '  blending  in  one  ener- 
getic whole  above  the  categories  the  two  activities 
of  absolute  subject  and  absolute  cause.'  ^  Howi- 
son illustrates  his  extension  of  the  Kantian  argu- 


*  lAmiis,  etc.  p.  52. 


■  Ibid,  p.  xiv. 


« Ibid,  p.  174. 


ment  by  treating  Time  ^  as  a  form  of  consciousness 
in  each  of  us,  expressive  of  our  self-activity. 
Time  is  '  a  changeless  principle  of  relation,  by 
which  the  active-conscious  self  connects  the 
items  of  experience  into  the  serial  order  which 
we  call  sequence  or  succession,  and  blends  the 
two  concomitant  series,  physical  and  psychic, 
into  the  single  whole  that  expresses  the  self's 
own  imity.'  ^ 

While  it  is  indubitably  certain,  as  Descartes 
said,  that  the  Self  is  real,  still  that  conviction 
rests,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  upon  the  essentially 
social  relation  with  other  selves,  that  is,  upon  the 
consciousness  of  Self  as  personal.  But  this  funda- 
mental recognition  of  the  Society  of  Minds  leads 
to  emphasis  upon  the  moral  relation  as  the  deepest 
reahty,  and  the  spring  of  the  intellectual  and 
aesthetic.  Yes,  from  the  connection  of  the  idea 
of  self  and  the  idea  of  God,  the  best  proof  of  the 
actical  existence  of  God  is  to  be  found.  God  is 
the  Supreme  Person  in  this  Society,  defining 
himself  from  every  other  as  the  perfect  Self- 
fulfiJment  in  eternity,  the  reahty  of  all  ideal 

1  Ibid.  pp.  299-302. 

*  Ibid.  p.  301.     There  appears  to  be  evidence  of  affinity  of 
thought  with  Bergson  in  this  view  of  time. 


82   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

possibilities.  Human  souls  define  themselves 
from  God,  as  from  other  persons  ;  so  the  reality 
of  each  member  depends  upon  the  reaUty  of  the 
Ideal,  and  the  reahty  of  God  is  involved  in  the 
reality  of  each  member.  This  mutual  self-defini- 
tion ensures  the  '  singular  and  imrepeatable  per- 
sonality '  of  each  soul.  This  moral  relationship 
and  mutual  dependence  of  souls  and  God  is  the 
only  creation  which  Howison  recognizes. 

Howison  seeks  for  a  reconciUation  between 
Freedom  and  Determinism  by  means  of  Self- 
determination  or  purposive  action  as  '  free  causa- 
tion,' together  with  the  attraction  of  those  Ideals 
which  constitute  the  rational  bond  of  Souls,  and 
which  centre  in  the  perfection  of  God.  The 
'  Dilemma  of  Determinism  '  can  only  be  avoided 
by  regarding  freedom  as  rational  choice,  and  by 
adopting  Final  instead  of  Efficient  Causation. 

Each  Self-defining  individual  is  eternal,  and 
yet  gives  rise  to  '  the  phenomenal  world  of  defect ' 
in  defining  himself  from  God,  and  has,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  trait  of  empirical  alternative  ;  and,  on 
the  other,  the  power  to  respond  to  the  vision  of 
Good,  an  influence  eternally  real  throughout  the 
City  of  God,  emanating  from  the  Spirit  who  is 
the  perfection  of  all  Ideals.    Evil  enters  through 


PROFESSOR  G.  H.  HOWISON 


83 


9' 


failure  of  will  on  the  part  of  human  selves. 
Immortality  is  provided  for  on  the  basis  of  the 
reality  and  eternity  of  all  members  of  this 
Society  of  Persons. 

Let  it  be  noted  that  Howison  guards  his  system 
against  the  charge  of  being  merely  Subjective 
IdeaUsm  by  his  provision  for  objectivity.  It  is 
true  that  he  views  Nature  as  the  product  of  the 
individual's  formative  consciousness.  But  as  this 
is  a  part  of  the  soul's  act  of  self-definition,  it  can 
only  be  done  with  reference  to  other  minds  and 
God,  the  Type  of  all  intelligence.  So  the  same 
social  and  ethical  principles  which  constitute  the 
Person  provide  the  unity  of  Nature  as  a  *  com- 
munal system  of  experience.'  Time  and  Space 
exist  because  of  this  correlation  of  minds,  involv- 
ing a  logical  and  moral  order  in  the  self-defining 
consciousness  of  each. 

The  motif  of  Howison's  System  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  conviction  of  the  inalienable  worth  and 
absolute  reality  of  personaUty.  Accordingly  he 
falls  back  upon  a  Pluralism  in  opposition  to 
Monistic  and  Naturahstic  systems  which  seem  to 
sacrifice  the  highest  values  of  morality  and  indi- 
viduahty.  Royce's  provision  in  his  System  for 
both  these  values,  Howison  rejects,  on  the  grounds 


84   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

that  the  distinctness  of  our  minds  cannot  be  pre- 
served in  the  Absohite,  nor  can  the  significance 
of  moral  personality  be  maintained.^  In  such 
Absolutism  he  contends  also  that  the  Personahty 
of  God  is  unrecognizable.  Upon  this  attempt  to 
vindicate  personality  Howison's  system  is  built. 
What  shall  we  say  about  it  ? 


II. 

With  Howison's  motive  I  have  considerable 
sympathy.  I  cannot  but  feel  that  Absolutism  has 
been  half  blind  to  the  intellectual,  moral  and 
emotional  implications  of  Personality,  the  most 
significant  fact  of  which  philosophy  must  take 
account.  But  in  addition  to  what  has  already 
been  said  in  the  criticism  of  Royce,  we  shall  have 
occasion  to  refer  to  this  subject  again,  and  so 
need  not  pursue  it  here. 

In  regard  to  Howison's  Plurahsm,  so  funda- 
mental in  his  system,  we  cannot  rest  in  that  as  a 
final  account  of  ReaUty.  The  problem  of  Rela- 
tions is  certainly  too  strong  to  allow  us  to  accept 
a  divided  universe.  If  it  be  said  the  price  is  less 
than  that  paid  in  the  sacrifice  of  personality,  I 

*  The  Conception  of  Ood,  p.  129. 


PROFESSOR  G.  H.  HOWISON 


85 


agree  ;  but  I  am  hopeful  that  such  an  alternative 
is  not  ultimate. 

Howison  does  not  contribute  to  a  theory  of  the 
Self  in  his  pages,  but  expounds  the  concept  of  the 
Person  in  an  essentially  social  and  ethical  way. 
No  doubt  he  is  thus  emphasizing  a  valuable  truth, 
but,  it  seems  to  me,  a  very  partial  one.  Con- 
sidering how  important  the  concept  is  in  his 
system,  he  might  have  given  less  reiteration  of  a 
few  truths  about  personahty,  and  assisted  in  the 
pressing  work  of  clearing  the  intellectual  atmo- 
sphere that  surrounds  the  concept  of  the  Self. 
He  shows  similar  tendency  to  repetition  in  the 
case  of  Final  Causation,  as  if  it  were  the  '  skeleton 
key  '  for  all  locks.  Change  the  term  to  Teleology 
and  it  ceases  to  be  so  flexible — its  dangers  and 
ambiguities  come  to  light, — while  the  magic  word 
*  cause  '  drops  out  of  sight.  As  far  as  I  can  dis- 
cover he  has  not  given  us  a  definite  account  of 
what  he  means  by  Final  Cause,  nor  of  how  it  is 
sujficient  for  all  these  things.  I  think  that  his 
assertion  of  Efficient  Causation  as  the  unpardon- 
able sin  of  all  Absolutists  and  theologians  is  an 
instance  of  false  emphasis.^  Cause  is  not  a  cate- 
gory to  conjure  with  in  metaphysics,  and  the  less 

1  Limits,  etc,  pp.  343,  384,  396. 


86   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

said  about  it  the  better,  except  as  a  worHng 
hypothesis.  The  inspiration  of  '  the  great  Stagi- 
rite  '  was  hardly  *  verbal '  after  all. 

The  social  analogy  is  pressed  too  closely  and 
made  too  prominent.  In  fact,  such  phrases  as  the 
*  City  of  God,'  *  Eternal  Republic,'  and  so  forth, 
do  not  help  us  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  of 
existence,  but  rather  serve  as  iUustrations  in  the 
ethical  sphere.  The  account  of  Nature  is  meagre. 
The  merely  formal  aspect  of  social  relationship  is 
unable  to  bear  the  weight  of  a  Universe. 

The  place  of  God  in  this  system  seems  to 
me  to  be  unworthy  of  the  name.  That  is  a 
serious  defect  in  a  system  which  professes  to 
rescue  divine  Perso  Jty  ftom  tte  blanlnesa  of 
Monism.  As  Dr.  J.  M.  E.  M'Tagffart  pointed  out 
in  Ms  review.,  the  rMe  of  the  iS^  in'Howison^s 
system  is  inadequate  to  meet  the  requirements 
of  traditional  and  Christian  thought.  Howison 
replies  ^  that  the  moral  quaUties  are  more  impor- 
tant  than  Self-existence.  But,  after  all,  does 
Howison  give  us  concrete  hohness,  love,  and  truth 
in  God?  I  think  not.  God  becomes  the  meeting- 
place  of  mere  abstractions.  He  is  somehow 
perfect,  but  without  Uving  Personahty. 


>  Mind,  July,  1902. 


■  Limits,  etc.  p.  429  (Appendix). 


PROFESSOR  G.  H.  HOWISON  87 

If  this  be  true,  as  I  believe,  then  Howison  has 
faUed  in  his  object,  and  chiefly  through  loss  of 
contact  with  the  maMer  of  experience.  He  seems 
to  save  the  soul ;  but  he  has  merely  preserved 
the  formal  fact  of  relationship  between  souls,  and 
does  not  touch  concrete  experience  anywhere.  In 
consequence,  even  human  personality  becomes  a 
mere  intersection  of  abstractions ;  and  no  one  is 
likely  to  glow  with  enthusiasm  over  his  Personal 
Idealism.  It  is  too  academic,  too  a  priori,  too 
eclectic,  for  a  system  professing  to  deal  justly 
with  living  personahty.  At  the  same  time,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  unsystematic  form  of 
presentation  as  popular  Essays  on  diverse  topics 
may  account  for  some  of  these  defects.^ 

1  Professor  James  Ward  has  given  a  critique  on  Howison^s 
views,  with  special  reference  to  Creation,  in  the  Supplementary 
Notes  to  his  recent  book,  The  Realm  of  Ends,  p.  456  ff. 


i 


CHAPTER  V. 

MR.    F.    a    S.    SCHILLER. 

The  works  of  Mr.  Schiller  which  we  shall  here 
study  are  his  Riddles  of  the  Sphinx,^  his  essay  on 
Axioms  as  Postulates,  in  Personal  IdeaHsmJ^  and 
his  later  contribution  of  Philosophical  Essays 
published  under  the  title  of  Humanism.  ^ 

As  these  writings  extend  over  an  interval  of  a 
dozen  years,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  a  natural 
development  of  his  thought,  and  in  some  instances 
a  change  of  ideas.  Mr.  Schiller's  first  work  was 
the  most  ambitious  in  its  range  of  treatment, 
although  possibly  it  was  not  so  expressive  of  his 
characteristic  courage  as  the  later  essay  on 
Axioms  as  Postulates,  which,  if  accepted  as  vahd, 

^  Riddles  of  the  Sphirix,  A  Study  in  the  Philosophy  of  Evolution, 
by  a  Troglodyte;  LoiidoB,  Swan,  Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  1891. 

*  Peraorud  Idealism,  by  Eight  Members  of  the  University  of 
Oxford.    Edited  by  H.  Sturt.    London,  Macmillan  &  CJo.,  1902. 

>  Humanism,  Philosophical  Essays  by  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  M.A., 
Macmillan,  1903. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


89 


p 


« 


would  revolutionize  our  notions  of  Truth.  But 
this  view  is  still  adopted  generally  in  his  collection 
of  essays  entitled  Humanism,  and,  although  he  has 
not  yet  sought  to  systematically  establish  and 
defend  this  view,  he  holds  out  the  hope  of  so 
doing  in  the  future.  Meanwhile  he  shows  the 
full  scope  of  his  doctrine  to  be  wider  than  an 
epistemological  theory ;  involving  as  it  does 
certain  views  of  experience,  the  world  and  God, 
which  he  seeks  to  embody  under  the  inspiring 
designation  '  Humanism.'  This  he  prefers  to 
such  titles  as  *  Pragmatism,'  which  is  good,  but 
not  the  final  term  of  philosophic  innovation,  and 
'  Radical  Empiricism,'  which  it  interprets  syn- 
thetically, and  '  Personal  IdeaUsm,'  which  is 
perhaps  Uable  to  ambiguity,  and  has  already  been 
adopted  for  the  System  of  G.  H.  Howison  in  his 
Limits  of  Evolution,  Humanism  is  the  watch- 
word of  the  movement  which  sets  up  the  whole 
personaUty  in  philosophy  to  the  place  which  it 
actually  occupies  in  life,  namely  the  supreme 
place ;  and  from  this  vantage-ground  alone  can 
the  problems  of  thought  be  properly  surveyed 
and  correlated  with  the  essential  conditions  of 
will  and  emotion. 


/ 


90  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

I. 

Upon  plunging  into  the  Riddles  of  the  Sphinx, 
wliich,  notwithstanding  Mr.  Schiller's  develop- 
ment of  thought,  still  contains  sufl&cient  per- 
manence of  material,  especially  in  its  relation  to 
personality,  to  preserve  its  value  for  the  student 
of  Humanismy  we  soon  find  something  bearing 
on  our  topic  to  catch  hold  of,  and  upon  which 
we  can  drift  to  *  high  and  dry'  philosophic 
certainty,  secure  from  the  waves  of  Agnosticism, 
Scepticism,  and  Pessimism.  As  it  was  with  the 
yvwOi  aeavTov  of  Socratcs  and  the  Cogito  ergo 
mm  of  Descartes,  so  it  is  with  *  the  one  indis- 
jmtable  fcui  and  basis  of  philosophy  '  of  Schiller  ; 
the  reaUty  of  the  Self  it  is  impossible  to  doubt. 
For  to  deny  it  is  to  resolve  everything,  including 
our  '  only  chance  '  of  knowledge,  into  a  destruc- 
tive whirl  of  '  appearance  '  and  illusion,  from 
which  there  is  no  escape.  It  is  no  idle  coincidence 
then  that  the  historical  representatives  of  Scepti- 
cism and  Agnosticism,  Hume  and  Kant,  have 
been  just  those  who  tried  to  disprove  the  reahty 
of  the  Self.  Their  arguments  Schiller  refutes, 
and  then  fearlessly  proceeds  to  examine  the  cheap 
phrases  and  empty  charges  of  anthropomorphism 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


91 


flung  at  reUgion  and  any  philosophy  that  recog- 
nizes the  uniqueness  of  personaUty  in  our  own 
interpretation  of  experience.  Science  is  itself 
infected  with  the  dreaded  taint  of  anthropo- 
morphism. So  is  philosophy.  It  behoves  thought, 
therefore,  to  be  conscious  of  itself  and  to  construct 
a  system  true  to  the  noblest  part  of  reahty,  the 
conditio  sine  qud  non  of  experience,  namely,  the 
Self,  which  furnishes  the  key  to  all  else,  and 
therefore  makes  necessary  a  teleological  explana- 
tion of  the  universe. 

Before  examining  more  closely  Schiller's  doc- 
trine of  the  Self,  let  us  briefly  state  the  leading 
principles  of  the  system  laid  down  in  the  Riddles 
of  the  Sphinx,  The  '  Riddles '  themselves  are 
the  relation  of  Man  to  the  World,  to  his  Cause, 
and  to  his  Future,  The  first  is  to  be  solved  by 
the  doctrine  of  the  Plurahty  of  ultimate  reals ; 
the  second  requires  God,  non-phenomenal  and 
personal,  but  also  finite ;  and  the  third  is  met 
by  a  theory  of  ImmortaUty,  qualified  by  the 
degree  of  consciousness  reached  by  the  soul  in 
its  past.  Prominent  in  Schiller's  system  is  the 
process  of  Becoming,  a  real  process  with  a  begin- 
ning and  an  end  in  time.  Time  comes  into  being 
with  the  World-Process,  through  a  determination 


92  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

of  the  Divine  Spirit  to  form  the  ultimate  spiritual 
entities  into  a  harmonious  cosmos.  Between  the 
individual  selves  and  God  there  is  interaction. 
Evil  enters  through  non-adaptation  of  the  Ego 
to  the  interaction  with  God.  Hence  Evil  tends 
to  become  less  as  Evolution  goes  on.  Error  is  in 
the  same  case  as  Evil.  The  material  world  is 
due  to  the  Divine  side  of  the  '  stress/  while  on 
its  own  side  the  Ego  produces  the  phenomenal 
SeE  The  process  of  Evolution  means  the  per- 
fecting  of  the  interaction,  so  that  the  development 
of  the  world  will  reveal  more  and  more  the  nature 
of  God,  until  at  the  completion,  the  perfected 
spirits  would  behold  the  countenance  of  God. 
The  perfection  of  the  individuals  and  their  group- 
ins  into  societies  must  go  together,  and  this  is 
the  true  End  of  the  Process.  The  Ideal  is  to  be 
conceived  as  the  perfection  of  activity  (as  in 
Aristotle). 

Beginning,  then,  with  the  reaUty  of  the  Self, 
Schiller  examines  the  question  whether  our  con- 
sciousness of  our  own  existence  can  be  made  the 
basis  of  theoretical  inferences.^  Kant  denied  this 
principle  put  forward  by  Descartes  in  his  famous 
formula.    But  Schiller  shows  that  this  is  based 

^  Middles,  p.  51. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


93 


on  a  misunderstanding  of  the  Cartesian  formula, 
due  to  its  necessary  presentation  in  an  intellectual 
form  in  a  philosophical  argument.  But  its  force 
does  not  lie  in  '  I  think;  but  in  the  '  I '  whose 
reality  is  intuitively  assured  in  all  experience. 
So  viewed,  the  supposed  objections  are  seen  to  be 
in  the  form  of  an  ignoratio  elenchi.  Schiller  goes 
on,  however,  to  refute  Kant  from  his  own  words. 
Because  thought  cannot  adequately  think  the 
Self,  the  latter  is  a  conception  only,  and— that 
is  to  say— no  reality.  But  the  true  reason  for 
thought's  inability  to  think  the  subject,  Kant  has 
previously  imphed,  namely,  because  it  is  the 
subject  for  every  conception,  and  for  every 
experience  besides ! 

Having  passed  through  the  extremes  of  Agnos- 
ticism, Scepticism,  Pessimism,  and  being  on  the 
brink  of  despair,  Schiller  revives  this  conviction 
of  the  Self's  reality  as  the  one  truth  which  is  left 
and  which  may  be  plucked  like  a  brand  from  the 
burning— though  it  merely  serve  to  hght  the 
funereal  pyre  of  Knowledge  !  But  no,  it  serves 
a  purpose  far  more  useful  than  that,  even  to 
kindle  one  by  one  the  torches  of  reaUty  in  this 
otherwise  dark  and  unintelligible  world.  Its 
light  is  intelligence  !    Schiller  exposes  the  futiUty 


* 


94   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

of  Hume's  objection  to  personal  identity.  Hume 
declared  that  he  could  not  find  the  Soul  without 
stumbHng  upon  some  impression  or  idea.  If 
absolute  blankness  of  all  content  was  the  con- 
dition of  the  *  self '  for  which  he  was  seeking, 
and  to  which  he  was  willing  to  grant  reaUty,  then 
indeed  he  was  on  a  vain  quest,  for  it  would  be  a 
most  uncanny  ghost  of  a  soul  that  would  satisfy 
him. 

And  so  Schiller  finds  a  basis  for  his  Reconstruc- 
tion of  Reality.!  The  Self  is  the  most  certain  of 
all  things  ;  it  is  the  Alpha,  and  it  would  not  be 
surprising  if  it  turned  out  also  to  be  the  Omega, 
the  goal  of  philosophy. 

As  the  unity  of  thought  and  feeUng,  the  con- 
scious Self  is  a  better  guide  now  than  either 
(abstract)  thought  or  (phenomenal)  perceptions. 
Schiller  has  not  yet  grasped  fully  the  Pragmatic 
theory  of  knowledge,  for  he  speaks  of  '  the  use 
of  the  categories  and  first  principles  of  our 
thought.'  2  And  yet  he  had  previously  given 
evidence  of  having  the  germ  of  the  later  develop- 
ment, when,  as  a  test  concerning  certain  prin- 
ciples of  knowledge,  he  had  asked  of  one  '  does 
it  work  ? '  3     But  there  he  concluded  that  this 

'  RiddUa,  p.  141  ff.        *  Ibid.  p.  142.        •  Ibid.  pp.  91-92. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


96 


is  not  enough  ;  for  the  principle  is  not  completely 
disproved  because  it  does  not  work  ;  logical  con- 
siderations must  be  taken  into  account.  And 
further,  the  pessimist  admits  that  knowledge 
appears  to  work.  Schiller's  development  of  the 
teleological  principle  of  explanation  approxi- 
mates to  the  later  '  Humanistic '  view,i  in  some 
of  its  statements.  These  signs  are  not  only 
interesting ;  they  are  relevant  to  our  inquiry ; 
for  between  the  acceptance  of  the  reUabiUty  of 
the  Self  and  such  theories  of  knowledge  as  are 
represented  by  the  designation  of  '  Humanism,' 
there  is  close  connection. 

Schiller  finds  use  for  the  distinction,  famihar 
in  philosophy,  between  the  phenomenal  Self  and 
the  Transcendental  Ego,  that  is,  between  the  Self 
as  it  appears  to  itself  in  its  interaction  with  the 
Deity,  and  the  Self  as  the  ultimate  reahty.  He 
seeks  to  avoid  the  dualism,  however,  which  proves 
so  dangerous  in  Kant's  theory.  There  is  needed 
something  in  consciousness  to  connect  the  mo- 
ments of  experience.  The  Transcendental  Ego 
serves  to  do  this,  as  a  permanent  being,  and  as 
the  form,  which  contains  the  whole  of  our  psychic 
life  as  its  content.   The  error  of  Kant  in  separating 

1  See  also  Ibid.  pp.  167-168,  260  (footnote). 


96   THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


the  form  from  the  matter  is  avoided  by  maintain- 
ing that  the  two  selves  are  in  some  way  one,  an 
empirical  truth  corresponding  to  om*  conviction 
that  the  Self  changes  and  yet  is  the  same.  The 
Transcendental  Ego  is  defined  as  the  '  I '  with 
all  its  powers  and  latent  capacities  of  develop- 
ment, the  ultimate  reahty  which  we  have  not  yet 
reached.^  In  the  progress  of  development  the 
approximation  of  the  two  goes  on,  until  at  last 
coincidence  and  perfection  shall  be  reached.  This 
is  supported  by  the  testimony  of  Psychology  to 
the  phenomena  of  multiplex  personahty  and 
*  secondary '  selves.  Our  whole  Selves  are  deeper 
and  more  real  than  our  ordinary  selves. 

The  existence  of  other  selves  and  of  their 
worlds  of  objectivity  is  explained  after  the  analogy 
of  hypnotism.  As  '  several  subjects  may  be  made 
to  share  in  the  same  hallucinations,'  so  may  *  an 
operator  of  vastly  greater  knowledge  and  power  ' 
create  subjective  worlds  vaUd  for  several  persons.^ 
Between  the  Ego  and  the  Deity  interaction  is 
going  on,  and  the  material  world  is  the  resultant, 
from  the  Divine  force,  and  our  phenomenal  con- 
sciousness is  due  to  our  imperfect  adaptation  to 
the  '  stress.' 

1  Riddks,  p.  281.  •  Ibid,  p.  286. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


97 


Schiller  makes  the  sensible  distinction  ^  of  a  good 
and  bad  (including  false  and  confused)  anthro- 
pomorphism. The  false  kind  consists  in  the 
ascription  to  beings  other  than  ourselves  of 
quaUties  which  we  know  that  they  cannot  possess. 
The  confused  sort  is  due  to  a  contradiction  enter- 
ing in  between  the  points  of  analogy  with  which 
we  start,  and  the  principles  with  which  we  con- 
clude. Good  anthropomorphism  (seeing  that  non- 
anthropomorphic  truth  is  a  fiction)  will  seek  to 
parallel  all  things  to  the  principles  of  explanation 
furnished  by  the  human  mind,  and  ultimately  the 
universe  must  be  stated  in  these  terms  (the  highest) 
if  it  is  to  be  explained.  And  so  Teleology  comes 
in.  Action  for  the  sake  of  rational  ends  is  imphed 
in  our  natures,  and  we  cannot  avoid  this,  the  best 
explanation  of  change,  in  regard  to  natural  pro- 
cesses. A  historical  method  will  not  suffice,  for 
no  description,  no  mere  regress  of  causes,  can 
satisfy  our  rational  nature.  To  discover  the 
significance  of  things  is  the  task  of  metaphysics, 
and  therefore  it  is  necessary  that  we  explain  the 
lower  by  the  higher,  and  not  the  reverse,  as  the 
extreme  physicists  and  biologists  urge.  The  final 
cause  will  be  found  to  be  the  true  ground  of 

1  Ibid,  p.  145  ff. 
G 


98  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

existence,  and  this  is  possible  only  through  the 
Deity  transcendent  above  the  evolutionary  pro- 
cess. Evolution,  '  which  was  to  have  abolished 
teleology,  turns  out  itself  to  require  the  most 
boldly  teleological  treatment/  But  to  be  free 
from  objection,  the  teleological  explanation  must 
not  be  narrowly  anthropocentric.  The  universal 
end  of  the  world-process  is  being  subserved  by 
the  lesser  ends.  If  teleology  be  kept  from  con- 
flict with  scientific  mechanism,  both  philosophy 
and  science  will  gain.  It  is  only  by  a  knowledge 
of  what  has  been,  that  we  can  venture  a  prediction 
of  what  is  to  be,  and  that  an  adequate  explana- 
tion can  be  given  of  the  natural  Process  as  a 
whole  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  teleological 
formula  of  metaphysics  should  eventually  be  of 
benefit  to  the  sciences  of  ethics,  sociology,  bio- 
logy, and,  lastly,— the  order  being  one  of  time  as 
well  as  of  logic— physics  and  mechanics.  Such 
is   Schiller's   contribution   to   the   Problem   of 

Teleology. 

Bearing  in  mind  his  general  Theory  of  Inter- 
action, previously  indicated,  the  following 
supplementary  ideas  ^  on  the  nature  of  God 
are    given.     God   is   the   Creator,    'the   non- 

1  Riddles,  p.  310. 


MR.  p.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


99 


phenomenal  and  unbecome  Cause ' ;  the  Sus- 
tainer,  as  interacting  with  the  Ego  ;  it  follows 
also  that  he  is  personal  and  intelHgent  Spirit. 
The  reasons  given  for  PersonaUty  are  to  the 
point : — 

(a)  Cause  is  a  category  which  is  valid  only  if 
used  by  persons  and  of  persons. 

(b)  PersonaHty  is  the  conception  expressive  of 
the  highest  we  know. 

(c)  Not  only  as  Cause,  but  also  as  Perfector  of 
the  world-process,  God  must  be  regarded  as 
possessing  Personality. 

{d)  Since  purpose  belongs  only  to  intelligent 
beings,  and  Evolution  is  meaningless  if  not  teleo- 
logical, therefore  we  acknowledge  the  divine  Per- 
sonaUty, rather  than  contradict  our  principle  of 
not  multiplying  entities  needlessly  to  invent 
gratuitous  fictions  hke  an  unconscious  or  an 
impersonal  inteUigence.  In  a  footnote^  he  ex- 
presses his  wiUingness  to  accept  the  terms  *  supra- 
personal  '  or  '  ultra-personal '  as  appUcable  to 
God ;  for  doubtless  the  PersonaUty  of  God 
transcends  that  of  man  as  far  as  man  transcends 
the  atom.  But  he  adds  a  proviso  which  is  needed 
in  the  Ught  of  F.  H.  Bradley's  doctrine  of  the 

» Ibid,  p.  310. 


100    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Absolute  as  '  supra-personal  but  not  personal'  ^ 
Schiller  is  wise  therefore  in  clearing  himself  from 
such  a  meaningless  position  (which  really  asserts 
the  Unknowable  in  a  new  dress  !)  by  the  stipula- 
tion that  by  supra-personal  we  mean  something 
including  and  transcending,  rather  than  excluding 
personality. 

But  there  is  a  fourth  attribute  of  God,  insisted 
on  throughout  Schiller's  writings,  viz.  that  God 
is  finite,  or  rather,  that  to  God  as  to  all  reaUties, 
*  infinite  '  has  no  meaning.  For  firstly,  Kant's 
rebuttal  of  the  so-called  Teleological  (or  '  physico- 
theological ')  '  Proof '  of  God's  existence  turned 
upon  the  conclusion  to  an  infinite  God  from 
inadequate  finite  premises.  All  that  could  be 
inferred  was  a  cause  adequate  to  the  pro- 
duction of  the  world.  To  go  beyond  this  is  to 
argue  for  the  unknowable  from  the  known,  to 
seek  the  infinite  from  finite  data.  Again  God  is 
finite  as  Force,  for  resistance  is  impUed  in  Force  ; 
and  God  cannot  be  all  if  He  is  to  enforce  His  will 
upon  the  world — '  unless  He  is  by  some  inexplicable 
chance  divided  against  Himself'  ^ 

^  Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  173,  531-33.    See  awpra.  Chapter 
I. ;  also  see  Part  II.,  Chapter  VI. 

*  Riddles^  p.  311.    Italics  mina 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


101 


From  his  previous  account^  of  the  universe 
the  same  result  follows.  Regarding  infinity  as 
negative  and  conceptual,  he  had  denied  that 
Space  and  Time  possess  it ;  and  he  had  refused 
to  acknowledge  an  infinite  process  of  Becoming, 
or  the  conception  of  '  the  world  as  a  whole '  as 
infinite.  '  An  infinite  whole  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms.'  ^  The  beUef  in  infinity  contradicts  the 
important  conception  of  causation,  to  which 
Schiller  holds  under  the  form  of  a  First  Cause,  as 
against  the  unprofitable  notion  of  an  endless 
regress.  While  he  is  influenced  by  the  Cosmo- 
logical  and  Teleological  Proofs,  it  is  evident  that 
he  has  departed  from  them  considerably,  inas- 
much as  he  argues  to  a  finite  Being. 

But  the  grand  indictment  is  not  yet  complete. 
The  philosopher  must  be  told  that  he  has  false 
grounds  for  the  assumption  of  infinite  existence, 
and  the  theologian  that  the  doctrine  is  not 
only  illogical  but  irreUgious,  and  detrimental  to 
piety,  to  faith,  and  to  good  works.  Infinity 
in  God  would  make  Him  the  Author  of  Evil 
would  neutralize  His  PersonaUty,  and  would 
deprive  the  worshipper  of  his  true  heritage  of 
religious  emotion.     Personality  and  Infinity  are 


Riddles,  Chapter  IX. 


2  Ibid,  p.  253. 


102    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

incompatible,  for  Personality  rests  on  the  dis- 
tinction  of  Self  from  Not-Self.  With  this  highest 
attribute  sacrificed  at  the  altar  of  an  abstraction, 
there  would  disappear  also  power,  inteUigence, 
wisdom  and  goodness,  from  an  Infinite  Being. 

The  religious  and  philosophical  doctrines  of 
infinity  meet  in  Pantheism,  which  leads  into  the 
general  discussion  of  Monism  and  PluraUsm.  The 
pantheistic  tendency  is  in  every  way  a  mistake, 
emotionaUy,  scientificaUy,  logically.  The  result 
is  practically  indistinguishable  from  Atheism. 
Change  and  Becoming  are  impossible  on  strict 
absolutistic  grounds,  as  the  Eleatics  consistently 
maintained.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  finite, 
God  comes  to  mean  nothing,  and  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  Infinite,  the  world  is  nothing— a  prac- 
tical and  theoretical  faUure  is  really  the  resl. 

Examining  Monism,  Dualism,  and  Plurahsm. 
Schiller  at  once  discards  Duahsm.  Between  the 
other  two  systems  he  proceeds  to  a  defence  of 
Plurahsm.  The  unity  claimed  by  Monism  might 
indeed  have  the  advantage  if  it  were  not  neces- 
sarily  abstract,  and  devoid  of  aU  practical  value. 
It  does  not  simplify  the  understanding  of  the 
world.  This  merely  abstract  unity  cannot  explain 
the  phenomenal  manifold.    Pluralism  escapes  the 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


103 


lIPi.         \r 


difficult  problem  of  origins.    But  it  is  prone  to 
faU  into  another  danger  quite  as  great  as  that 
which  seems  fatal  to  Monism.   A  relation  between 
the  Reals  seems  required,  and  this  relation  seema 
to  imply  a  Unity.    In  such  a  manner,  then,  does 
PluraUsm  imply  the  Unity  of  the  world.    This 
difficulty  is  to  be  avoided  by  a  rational  assump- 
tion that  "  the  possibiMty  of  the  interaction  of 
the  many  is  impUed  in  their  very  existence,  and 
does  not  require  any  special  proof.'  ^    In  a  sense, 
therefore.  Pluralism  seems  to  be  based  on  Monism, 
but  the  One  is  without  reality,  being  merely  an 
ideal  factor  in  a  real  plurality.    PluraUsm  seeks  a 
better  unity,  the  actual  result  to  be  arrived  at  by 
the  process  of  interaction,  the  perfection  and 
harmony  of  a  real  universe,  evolved  in  the  course 
of  Time.    In  this  conception  Pantheism  and  Indi- 
viduaUsm  are  transcended.    The  Many  and  the 
One  are  recognized,  but  the  primacy  and  reaUty 
of  the  Many  are  more  vaUd  than  the  abstractions 
of  the  One.    The  influence  of  the  Divine  factor 
in  the  interaction  provides  the  element  of  good 
in  the  moral  world  of  our  experience.    In  this 
sense  God  is  immanent  in  all  things.    But  He  is 
also  transcendent  in  Himself,  though  finite. 

1  Riddles,  p.  355. 


104    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Leaving  the  Riddles  of  the  Sphinx,  the  exposi- 
tion of  which  has  ran  into  some  length — but  into 
no  greater  than  it  deserves — I  turn  to  the  essay 
on  *  Axioms  as  Postulates  '  in  Personal  Idealism. 
Here  there  is  the  same  emphasis,  even  in  the 
opening  words,  upon  the  Self  as  real  and  vaUd, 
upon  the  part  played  by  the  *  whole  personality ' 
in  the  formation  of  a  metaphysic  as  in  every  other 
human  enterprise.    Schiller  sets  forward  a  two- 
fold ground  of  agreement  among  philosophers. 
The  first  is  that  the  world  is  experience,  and  the 
second  is  that  for  the  organization  of  this  experi- 
ence into  a  reaUty  for  philosophy  certain  con- 
necting principles  are  needed.    Then  he  asks  that 
pointed  question,  which  causes  such  heart-burn- 
ings   among    the    *  Experience '-Philosophers— 
'Whose  experience  ? '  and  secondly, '  Of  what  is  it 
the  experience  ? '    In  reply  to  the  first  question, 
it  is  vain  to  say  that  it  is  the  experience  of  the 
Absolute.    Schiller's  answer  is,  '  our  experience,' 
or  if  that  is  assuming  too  much,  '  my  experience.' 
*  Here  again,'  he  says,  *  I  must  be  prepared  to 
be  assailed  by  a  furious  band  of  objectors  intent 
on  asking  me— Who  are  you  ?     How  dare  you 
take  yourself  for  granted  ?    Have  you  not  heard 
how  the  self  is  a  complex  psychological  product, 


1 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


105 


' 


I 


A 


which  may  be  divided  and  analysed  away  in  a 
dozen  different  ways  ?  And  do  you  actually 
propose  to  build  your  philosophy  upon  so  dis- 
credited a  foimdation  ? '  ^  In  reply,  certain  obser- 
vations are  made  : — 

(a)  There  is  a  divergence  among  the  analyses 
of  the  Self. 

(6)  A  Self  conducts  the  analysis  in  every  case. 

(c)  These  analyses  must  serve  some  purpose, 
which  is  relative  to  selfhood. 

(d)  For  the  acceptance  of  an  analysis  choice  is 
involved,  and  '  if  I  choose  to  analyse  differently  or 
not  at  all,  if  I  find  it  convenient  to  operate  with 
the  whole  organism  as  the  standard  unit  in  my 
explications,  what  right  have  Scribes  and  Phari- 
sees to  complain  ? '  ^  Now  comes  the  Prag- 
matism, which  is  to  be  so  prominent  in  Schiller's 
subsequent  work.  Since  consequences  must  jus- 
tify the  choice  made,  it  is  damaging  to  the  afore- 
said analyses  that  nothing  valuable  or  workable 
has  resulted.  He  is  therefore  hopeful  that  the 
assumption  of  his  own  existence  may  perhaps 
prove  more  valuable  than  any  of  the  denials  of 
the  Self  that  are  propounded  by  '  psychologies 

*  Humanism,  p.  62. 

*  Ibid.  p.  53.    Italics  after  *  w?u)le '  are  mine. 


T   ,s  I 


106    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

which  neglect  their  proper  problem  in  their 
anxiety  to  be  ranked  among  the  natural  sciences.'^ 
Schiller  interprets  the  Self  as  not  yet  com- 
pletely known,  but  as  revealed  in  its  true  reaUty 
with  the  process  of  experience.  The  World,  too, 
is  only  imperfectly  known  as  yet.  This  leads 
him  into  an  exposition  of  his  Pragmatic  Theory 
of  Knowledge.  Briefly  put,  it  is  that  our  know- 
ledge is  gradually  evolved  by  a  series  of  experi- 
mental guesses  or  *  postulates.'  There  is  a  large 
element  of  indeterminateness  manifested  in  the 
World.  The  same  characteristics  of  plasticity  and 
growth  are  present  in  the  intellectual  cosmos. 
Logic  is  essentially  dependent  upon  psychological 
needs.  This,  too,  must  be  the  method  of  super- 
human inteUigence,  if  there  be  one  at  work  in 
the  forming  of  the  cosmos.  '  Its  nature  must  be 
the  same  as  ours  ;  it  also  proceeds  by  experiment, 
and  adapts  means  to  ends,  and  learns  from 
experience.'  ^  Matter  is  the  raw  material  and  is 
conceived  after  the  AristoteUan  view  of  poten- 
tiality. Bearing  this  in  mind,  Schiller  criticizes 
ordinary  Empiricism,  in  which  the  activity  of  the 
Self  is  ignored  in  the  presence  of  *  impressions 
and  ideas  ' ;  and  Apriorism,  which  in  its  intellec- 

*  Humanism,  p.  53.  *  Ibid,  p.  68. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


107 


< 


A 


tuaUstic  bias  has  maintained  certain  *  necessities 
of  thought.'  This  '  necessity,'  this  '  universaUty  ' 
claimed  for  a  priori  truths,  the  Postulates  of 
Pragmatism  are  quite  capable  of  yielding.  So 
Schiller  boldly  sets  out  to  compel  the  Axioms,  and 
even  the  Laws  of  Thought  to  own  their  true 
nature  as  Postulates,  justified  in  experience  by 
their  working,  and  by  the  satisfaction  they  bring 
to  the  whole  nature  of  man.  These  Postulates 
depend  upon  psychical  temperament,  and '  radiate 
from  human  personahty  as  their  centre.'  ^  This 
is  a  confession  of  the  indissoluble  relation  which 
exists  between  a  Pragmatic  doctrine  of  knowledge 
and  a  conviction  that  the  Self  is  real.  This  is  the 
pragmatic  motif  for  Schiller's  insistence  upon  the 
fact  of  the  Self,  at  a  period  when  it  is  very  un- 
fashionable to  do  so. 

He  assumes  also  the  characteristic  features  of 
consciousness,  e.g.  its  continuity,  coherence,  cona- 
tiveness,  and  purposiveness.  Consciousness  can- 
not be  defined,  and  is  the  iroO  arw  of  this,  and 
every  such  inquiry.  But  more  than  all  the 
features  above  named  is  the  consciousness  of  an 
iderUical  Self.    The  psychological  theories  do  not 

*  Ibid.  p.  94.  For  other  assertions  of  this  aspect  of  Pragmatism, 
see  pp.  95-6. 


108    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

affect  more  than  the  scientific  aspect  of  the 
matter.    Upon  this  Self-identity  of  consciousness, 
which  is  a  psychical  fact,  he  raises  his  theory  of 
the  postulation  of  logical  Identity,  the  greatest 
principle  of  thought.   This  has  come  to  be  through 
our  demand  for  identity,  based  upon  our  con- 
sciousness of  identity,  and  ratified  by  its  working 
in  the  world  of  objects.    So,  too,  the  conscious- 
ness of  Self  and  of  Not-Self  (as  equivalent  to  the 
external  world)  has  grown  up  through  successful 
postulation  to  account  for  the  felt  unsatisfactori- 
ness  of  experience.     This  gives  the  clue  to  his 
explanation  of  the  rise  of  other  Postulates — Con- 
tradiction,  and   Excluded   Middle,   Hypothesis, 
Causation,    Sufficient    Reason,    Uniformity    of 
Nature,  Space,  and  Time.    One  postulate  is  not 
yet  fully  axiomatic,  that  is.  Teleology.    Schiller 
again  argues  in  favour  of  Teleology,  and  the 
necessity  for  anthropomorphism.^     The  bias  of 
Natural  Science  against  these  postulates,  and 
the  crude  treatment  of  them  in  the  past  by  their 
advocates  account  for  the  fact  that  Teleology  is 
still  a  postulate  and  not  an  axiom. 

The  Personality  of  God  is  again  briefly  vindi- 
cated/ as  also  is  His  Goodness,  as  a  methodologi- 

*  Humanism,  p.  118  ff.  •  Ibid,  p.  122. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


109 


cal  postulate.  Infinity  is  again  denied.^  And 
Schiller  concludes  his  powerful  Essay  with  a 
polemic  against  intellectualism,  and  a  plea  for 
the  Pragmatic  Theory  of  Knowledge.  The  Will- 
to-believe  must  be  regarded,  and  philosophy  must 
be  reconstructed  on  a  voluntaristic  basis. 

Passing  now  to  the  consideration  of  Humanism 
we  may  reserve  the  examination  of  the  Preface 
to  the  last.  For  it  is  Schiller's  latest  contribution 
in  the  book,  and  also  his  most  pronounced  expres- 
sion of  opinion  on  our  general  problem. 

In  the  first  Essay  on  the  Ethical  Basis  of  Meta- 
physics, the  developm.ent  of  his  theory  of  know- 
ledge is  made  clear.  Schiller  distinguishes  be- 
tween Irrationalism  as  a  doctrine  and  the  view 
that  our  cognitive  activities  are  pervaded  by  the 
purposive  character  of  mental  life  generally.  The 
question  of  value  must  be  raised  ;  purpose  and 
end  are,  in  fact,  fimdamental  to  the  right  under- 
standing of  experience.  This  is  further  expounded 
in  the  '  Discourse  Concerning  Pragmatism,'  en- 
titled Useless  Knowledge,  in  which  the  position  is 
maintained  that  action  is  primary,  and  knowledge 
only  secondary— that  the  Good  is  the  Source  of 
the  True.    This  is  completed  by  the  third  Essay 

»  Jbid.  p.  130. 


4 


\ 


110    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

on  Trvih,  in  which  the  various  definitions  of 
truth  are  examined  and  shown  to  be  open  to 
serious  objection.  Truth  is  not  individual  either  ; 
it  must  win  recognition  from  society.  Prag- 
matism  can  show  how  this  is  possible,  viz.  by 
efficiency  and  usefulness  being  taken  as  the 
criteria  of  truth  in  our  intellectual  activity.  The 
usefulness  is  relative  to  any  human  end,  but 
ultimately  to  the  perfection  of  our  whole  life. 

In  the  Essay  on  Lotze's  Monism,  that  philo- 
sopher's *  proof  of  the  underlying  imity  is 
subjected  to  attack.  Schiller  enlarges  upon  his 
previous  view  that  Pluralism  may  *  beg '  inter- 
action.^ 

In  regard  to  the  argument  from  Change,  appeal 
must  be  made  to  our  inner  experience,  and  there 
we  find  the  consciousness  of  change  based  on  a 
feeling  of  our  identity.  But  this  does  not  apply 
to  the  Absolute,  for  we  can  have  no  such  feeling 
of  its  identity.  Lotze's  re-creation  of  spiritual 
beings  by  their  stepping  out  of  the  Absolute,  at 
the  close  of  his  argument  is  an  effort  to  save  his 
theory  from  abstractness. 

Schiller  agrees  with  Lotze's  arguments  to  prove 
that  God  must  be  conceived  as  personal  and 

*  Humanismt  P*  66. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


111 


spiritual.    But  he  differs  from  him  in  the  attempt 
to  connect  this  view  with  the  doctrine  of  God  as 
the  Unity  of  things.     Even  religion  does  not 
require  this  identification.     The  Unity  of  the 
Absolute  could  have  no  religious  value.    Lotze's 
admission  of  free-will  affords  a  ground  for  the 
conception  of  a  Divine  guidance  and  Providence, 
but  it  creates  an  inherent  instability  in  the 
Absolute.      The    mysterious   problem    of   Evil 
thwarts  the  Unity  of  things,  and  destroys  the 
argument.     Lotze's  identification  of  God  with 
the  Absolute  leads  him,  according  to  Schiller, 
into  a  kind  of  Pantheism.    The  a  priori  proofs 
share,  in  common  with  Lotze's  proof  from  inter- 
action, the  weakness  of  being  too  abstract.   This 
kind  of  reasoning  would  hold  in  any  kind  of 

world. 

In  the  Essay  on  Reality  and  Idealism,  Schiller 
clearly  indicates  the  connection  between  Prag- 
matism and  the  conviction  of  the  Self's  reality. 
•The  only  certain  and  ultimate  test  of  reality 
is  the  absence  of  internal  friction,  is  its  undis- 
puted occupation  of  the  field  of  consciousness, 
in  a  word,  its  self-sufficiency.' ^  Upon  this 
criterion  the  distinction  between  real  and  unreal, 

1  lUd.  pp.  118, 119. 


112  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

and  even  that  between  the  Self  and  the  World, 
is  based.  The  emotional  consequences  of  presen- 
tations in  experience  are  various  ;  so  the  subject 
must,  of  necessity,  distinguish  himself  from  the 
object,  the  world,  which  does  not  '  feel ' ;  and 
he  must  seek  to  control  this  realm.  Hence  the 
attention  to  phenomena  which  are  followed  by 
pains  or  other  consequences  which  are  practically 
important. 

The  chief  remaining  essay  for  our  purposes — 
since  I  am  compelled  to  exclude  the  arguments 
concerning  Immortality — is  that  which  contro- 
verts the  main  tenets  set  forth  in  Bradley's 
Appearance  and  Reality,  in  the  interests  of 
Schiller's  pragmatistic  theory.  The  title,  '  On 
Preserving  Appearances,'  indicates  its  polemical 
aim.  Schiller  is  opposed  to  the  whole  method 
of  the  dialectic  of  Bradley,  by  which  everything 
is  first  convicted  of  unreality  and  then  '  some- 
how '  reconstituted  by  the  Absolute.  Such  a 
negative  procedure  is  itself  a  verdict  of  con- 
demnation upon  the  arguments  employed,  and, 
perhaps,  upon  Logic  itself,  for  '  nothing  which 
exists  in  however  despicable  a  sense  can  reaUy 
be  contradictory.'  ^    The  contradictions  can  only 

^  Humanism,  p.  187. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


113 


be  in  our  thought,  for  the  reahty  is  there  in  spite 
of  them  !  Therefore,  Bradley's  criterion  that  the 
real  is  that  which  is  not  seLf-contradictory  is  only 
partial,  the  complete  criterion  being,  according 
to  Schiller,  the  principle  of  Harmony.  The 
Absolute,  furthermore,  is  '  quite  as  unknowable 
as  Spencer's  monstrosity.'  i  And  then  once  again 
Schiller  lays  it  down^  that  the  only  reahty  we 
can  start  with  is  our  own  immediate,  personal 
experience,  and  that  apart  from  this  basis  no 
ultimate  reahty  can  be  reached.  The  distinction 
of  '  appearance  and  reality  '  remains  always  rela- 
tive to  our  knowledge  of  our  world,  or,  if  preferred, 
Schiller  is  willing  to  say  *  that  for  me  it  remains 
relative  to  my  world.'  ^ 

In  the  Preface,  the  chief  topic  is  the  advent  of 
'  Humanism,'  in  place  of  the  terms  '  Pragmatism  ' 
and  '  Personal  Idealism.'  It  represents  an  atti- 
tude of  thought  which  is  sympathetic  towards 
the  full  life  of  PersonaUty .  It  signifies  an  attempt 
to  put  forward  a  philosophic  theory  of  a  '  re- 
anthropomorphized  '  or,  as  Schiller  prefers,  a 
'  re-humanized  '  universe.  He  is  ready  to  stand 
by  Protagoras,  and  maintain  that  Man  is  the 
measure  of  all  things.    Instead  of  illusory  hopes 

1  Ibid.  p.  191.         ^  Ibid,  p.  192.        ^  m^^  p.  192,  footnote. 


114  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

of  a  philosopliy  without  assumptions,  Humanism 
candidly  confesses  that  its  starting-point  is  our 
immediate  experience  and  experienced  self,  from 
which  it  can  proceed  in  any  direction.  Even  the 
a  priori  philosophers  really  take  this  for  granted, 
and  cannot  give  us  any  superhuman  system. 

u. 

With  much  of  Schiller's  philosophy  of  per- 
sonality I  find  myself  in  hearty  agreement.  With- 
out committing  myself  to  his  theory  of  knowledge, 
it  seems  plain  to  me  that  such  a  Pragmatism  or 
Humanism  depends  for  its  very  Ufe  upon  the 
conviction  of  the  reality  of  the  Self.  This  is  the 
starting-point,  actual  no  less  than  theoretical,  for 
a  philosophy  of  postulation.    If  the  fashionable 

*  Experience  '  philosophy  will  hide  a  multitude  of 
distinctions  in  other  realms,  both  of  Absolutism 
and  of  Empiricism,  here  in  Humanism  it  has  to 
own  its  twofold  aspect  of  subject  and  object. 
Schiller  is  ready  to  ask  the  simple  question 

*  Whose  experience  ? '  which  causes  such  a  com- 
motion among  the  'Pure  Experience'  philo- 
sophers. And  with  the  problem  of  the  Self  thus 
raised  philosophy  must  deal.  The  task  of  Meta- 
physics  is   to   explain   the   distinctions   which 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


115 


palpably  he  within  experience,  involving  the 
problems  of  the  relation  of  the  Self  to  Nature, 
of  Self  to  Self,  and  of  Self  to  God. 

Let  us  briefly  consider  now  the  more  detailed 
view  of  the  Self  given  by  Schiller.  It  seems  to  me 
that  he  does  not  improve  his  system  by  his  dis- 
tinction between  the  Empirical  Self  and  the 
Transcendental  Ego.  For  the  latter  is  confessedly 
an  ideal.  The  diflSiculties  of  the  Kantian  duahsm 
concerning  the  Ego  can  hardly  be  avoided  by 
cUpping  off  the  epistemological  function  of  the 
Transcendental  Ego,  or  by  saying — ^with  surely 
a  Bradleian  reminiscence — ^that  the  two  are  some- 
how one.  Nor  can  the  difficulty  of  knitting  up  the 
moments  of  our  experience  with  an  identical  Ego, 
which  we  know  as  ourself,  be  overcome  by  making 
an  Ideal  Ego  do  it.  Of  course,  there  is  this  Inter- 
action Theory  to  support,  and  both  the  Ego  and 
the  Self  are  needed  for  the  '  stress  '  of  the  Divine 
and  the  human  sides.  But  neither  this  nor  the 
hypnotistic  analogy  will  carry  our  sympathies 
any  further  in  this  direction. 

Briefly  then,  Schiller's  view  of  the  Self  as  real 
and  the  centre  of  experience  and  philosophy 
accords  entirely  with  that  adopted  in  the  present 
work.    Humanism  insists  on  Personality  through- 


116    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

out.  With  the  interdion  of  Schiller  in  giving  a 
place  to  the  Transcendental  Ego  as  opposed  to 
the  Self  as  existing  at  any  one  moment,  I  am  in 
sympathy,  but  I  cannot  endorse  his  use  of  the 
term  so  redolent  with  historical  associations,  nor 
can  I  approve  of  his  method  of  seeking  the  Ego  as 
distinct  from  the  Self,  in  the  future,  as  an  Ideal. 
I  agree  with  his  maintenance  of  self-identity 
(worked  out  in  '  Axioms  as  Postulates ')  as  the 
basis  of  all  postulation  of  identity  and  of  the 
Law  of  Identity.  His  emphasis  upon  the  whole 
Personahty  throughout  his  works,  as  opposed 
to  a  shallow  empiricism,  or  an  abstract  intel- 
lectualism  is  also  valuable.  His  recognition  of 
purpose  and  practical  needs,  of  individual  and 
social  satisfaction  when  experimentation  is  found 
to  work  is  also  true  to  a  certain  extent,  and 
may  be  true  in  the  sense  that  Pragmatism  or 
Humanism  claims. 

With  Schiller's  views  on  Anthropomorphism 
and  Teleology  I  am  in  accord,  and  so  I  may  pass 
them  over.  It  is  the  outcome  of  the  Humanistic 
view  of  things  to  see  that  the  significant  thing 
in  thought,  as  in  all  else,  is  to  be  aware  of  the 
active  personality  which  reclaims  an  imknown 
void,  and  is  rewarded  by  reahty  and  enrichment 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


117 


\ 


'< 


of  experience.  And  so  the  highest  explanation  of 
the  Universe  must  be  in  the  highest  terms,  along 
the  lines  of  purpose,  meaning,  and  development 
towards  an  Ideal,  as  we  know  it  in  ourselves. 

A  discussion  of  Schiller's  views  of  the  Deity 
would  strictly  involve  an  estimate  of  his  Inter- 
action Theory.  But  this  is  not  possible  here.  And 
we  are  concerned  more  with  those  doctrines  which 
have  been  emphasized  in  his  recent  writings.  As 
to  the  Personahty  of  God,  I  consider  Schiller's 
views  well-founded.  At  the  same  time  some  of 
his  conclusions  appear  to  be  uncritically  anthro- 
pomorphic, not  only  in  his  early  work,  but  also  in 
his  later  Essays,  as  when  he  says  that  the  nature 
of  a  superhuman  inteUigence  must  be  the  same  as 
ours,  proceeding  by  experiment,  adapting  means 
to  ends  and  learning  from  experience  !  ^  This 
surely  deserves  the  charge  which  Professor  Howi- 
son  brings  against  Schiller's  '  God,'  of  being 
*  finite  and  pathological.'  ^ 

But  there  is  another  serious  question  to  which 
my  answers  would  scarcely  coincide  with  his. 
I  refer  to  the  view  of  the  finite  nature  of  God. 
This  is,  of  course,  a  part  of  the  general  discussion 

*  Personal  Idealism,  p.  58. 

*  Limits  of  Evolution,  p.  xii. 


118    THE   PROBLEM   OF  PERSONALITY 

of  Infinity,  against  which  Schiller  is  strenuous 
in  season  and  out  of  season.  But  strictly  the 
question  arises  in  this  paper  merely  as  bearing 
on  our  prime  subject. 

Now  I  am  unwilling  to  dogmatize  in  regard  to 
the  Infinite,  and  for  this  reason  especially,  viz. 
that  mathematical  usage  has  so  put  its  stamp 
upon  the  term,  as  to  invaUdate  any  outside  claim 
for  it.  Accordingly  I  consider  that  a  different  con- 
cept should  be  employed  in  philosophy.  Again, 
I  would  not  maintain  that  this  metaphysical  con- 
cept will  meet  the  reqmrements  of  the  definition 
of  *  Infinity.'  Hence  it  is  of  no  avail  to  try  and 
refute  such  a  metaphysical  Absolute  or  Perfect, 
with  the  objection  that  it  does  not  answer  to 
Kant's  definition  of  Infinity,  viz.  'that  which 
cannot  be  completed  by  successive  syntheses.' 
If  the  conception  *  Absolute '  be  granted  in  a 
relative  sense,  relative  like  all  else  to  our  capabili- 
ties (surely  a  Humanistic  position),  there  is  no 
contradiction  in  regarding  such  a  conception  as 
preserving  all  that  was  valuable  in  the  conception 
of  the  Infinite,  without  incurring  the  charges  of 
falsity  and  abstractness  which  are  hurled  at  us 
for  using  it  in  a  '  philosophical '  sense.  The 
proper  distance  between  the  science  of  mathe- 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


119 


matics  and  constructive  metaphysics  is  thereby 
preserved.    If  this,  then,  be  what  Schiller  means 
when  he  says,  '  to  God,  as  to  all  reahties,  infinite 
has  no  meaning,'  I  should  agree  with  him.    But 
it  is  not.    He  will  not  allow  one  uninterrupted 
gaze  towards  reality  as  a  whole.    He  denies  that 
the  universe  may  be  conceived  under  such  ideas. 
His  plurahsm  is  vital  and  fundamental.     Not 
only  is  there  no  Absolute,  no  Unity  of  all ;  there 
is  division  and  discord  at  the  heart  of  things. 
We  may  hope  for  a  unity  as  the  world  learns 
to  swing  together  better,  as  Evolution  does  its 
work  in  nature,  society,   and  the   individual; 
but  there    is   no    underlying    unity   or   world- 
ground.     The  whole  process  is  one  of  approxi- 
mation toward  unity,  never  before  realized  in 
thought  or  existence  ;  the  Becoming  is  essential 
to  the  true  conception  of  things,  and  it  is  in 

Time. 

The  idea  of  God  as  being  but  a  part  of  the 
universe  does  not  satisfy  '  the  craving  for  unity  ' 
which,  abuse  it  as  one  will,  has  at  least  a  prag- 
matic bearing.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  require 
a  Personal  Ground  of  aU  things,  the  Supreme 
Unity.    But  I  leave  this  for  the  present. 

God  is  not  limited  by  some  cuicident  or  '  cUme' 


120  THE  PEOBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

as  Schiller  implies  as  a  possible  view/ — '  dividing 
Him  against  Himself.'  It  is  not  reasonable  to 
introduce  chance  in  such  a  connection,  but  it  is 
rational  to  endow  the  Perfect  Personahty  with 
the  power  of  Self -determination.  I  have  previously 
indicated  my  objections  to  Pluralism.  It  lacks 
the  definiteness  at  least  which  belongs  to  the  One. 
The  possibihty  of  ultimate  interaction  between 
plurahstic  entities  is  opposed  surely  to  our 
notions  of  rationality.  And  why  the  unity,  which 
even  Schiller  has  to  admit  to  account  for  this 
ultimate  possibihty  of  interaction,  should  be 
merely  abstract,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  conceive. 

Schiller  is  willing  to  hold  to  Teleology  as  a 
postulate  on  its  way  to  becoming  an  axiom. 
And  yet  against  an  '  infinite  '  unity  he  is  em- 
phatic. May  not  a  similar  verdure  of  faith 
rationalize  the  universe,  and  so  justify  itself? 
May  not  Perfect  Personahty  be  the  ground  of 
all,  even  of  the  independence  of  the  world  of 
Egos  ?  May  not  God  be  more  than  a  strenuous 
Pilot  wresthng  with  a  refractory  fleet  in  an 
unfortunate  storm,  and  seeking  to  make  a 
possible  port  ?  May  He  not  be  what  unbounded 
worship    wills,    what   faith    beheves,    goodness 

^  RiddXea,  p.  311. 


MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER 


121 


implies,  reason  justifies,  and  love  demands,  when 
it  uses  the  controversial  terms  '  Infinite '  and 
*  Unity '  ?  In  the  hght  of  the  views  which 
are  set  forth  later,  I  think  that  the  *  venture 
of  faith '  is  reasonable  and  even  necessary. 


» 


\ 


CHAPTER  VI. 

DR.    HASTINGS   RASHDALL. 

Among  the  contributors  to  the  discussion  of 

our  Problem  Dr.  Eashdall  has  a  claim  and  rank 

for  the  views  which  he  has  set  forth  concisely 

and  yet  systematically  in  his  Essay  on  '  Per- 

sonaUty,  Human  and  Divine.'  in  the  volume 

entitled  Personal  Idealism.    This  closing  essay 

perhaps  fairly  reflects  the  outlook  upon  ultimate 

problems,  of  the  majority  of  the  contributors 

to   the   volume.    A   very  brief  account   must 

suffice  here. 

I. 

RashdaU  endeavours  to  describe  the  nature 
of  PersonaUty,  and  to  discuss  its  metaphysical 
bearings.  He  assumes  the  position  of  an  Idealist, 
and  he  does  not  aim  at  a  full  exposition  of  his 
arguments  in  so  short  a  paper. 

In  answer  to  the  question.-What  is  a  person  ? 
— he  arrives  at  the  following  conclusions.     In 


DR.  HASTINGS  RASHDALL 


123 


■ 


'. 


addition  to  the  obvious  possession  of  conscious- 
ness,  a  person  thinks,   and  not  merely  feels. 
Involved  in  this  power  to  think  is  the  per- 
manence of  the  personal  consciousness,   for  it 
must  be  able  to  transcend  the  succession  of 
mere  feeUngs.    And  for  the  same  reason  the 
person  must  be  a  self-distinguishing  conscious- 
ness, defining  himseK  both  from  objects  regarded 
as  things,  and  from  other  selves.    Individuality 
is  recognized  as  essential  in  the  idea  of  Per- 
sonaUty.   Further,  the  person  can  originate  acts, 
or,  in  other  words,  is  will  as  well  as  thought 
and  feeling.    Personality  is  not  confined  to  man, 
but  in  some  degree  characterizes  all  forms  of 
conscious  life.    Even  on  grounds  of  moraUty, 
we  are  not  compelled  to   exclude  the  lowest 
animal  from  possessing  a  rudimentary  sort  of 
personaUty,  for  some  kind  of  conflict  of  impulses 
is    conceivably    present    in    even    the    lowest 

organisms. 

Yet  even  man  is  not  fully  possessed  of  the 
essentials  of  Personality.  For  the  best  of  men 
fail  to  reaUze  fully  the  permanent  elements  of 
personal  experience.  And  in  moral  achievement 
they  fail  more  or  less,  to  reahze  what  PersonaUty 
fully  means.    Accordingly,  Rashdall  follows  Lotze 


I 


124  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

in  regarding  Personality  as  an  Ideal  pertaining 
to  God.    He  gives  a  proof  of  God  along  Idealistic 
Hnes,  rising  above  a  Universal  Thought  or  Self- 
Consciousness  to  the  Thinker  and  Will  demanded 
by    rational    consistency.    He    then    discusses 
objections    to    the    Divine    Personality.    It    is 
said  that  an  object  is  required  for  the  Divine 
Subject.     Rashdall    rephes    that    the    objects 
thought  by  the  Divine  Thinker  are  not  to  be 
regarded  as  existing  independently  of  the  Knower, 
but  we  must  hold  that  the  Subject  may  dis- 
tinguish itself  from  its  own  changing  states, 
which  are  willed  as  well  as  thought.     In  this 
way  the  DuaUsm  is  avoided  which  would  make 
the  world  an  ahen  Other  to  God— '  a  sort  of 
Siamese   twin  to   which  He  is   eternally  and 
inseparably   annexed   but   which   is   something 
other  than  the  content  of  his  Will."  ^    No  im- 
mediate whole  of  experience,  no  '  higher  unity  ' 
than  that  given  by  Subject  and  Object  can  be 
accepted — despite  Bradley's  claim — ^and  so  no 
alternative  to  the  Personality  of  God  is  possible. 
The  objections  to  Will  are  based  on  mistaken 
conceptions  of  causahty,  and  are  met  by  the 
extension  of  the  latter  to  include  Final  Cause. 

^  Personal  Idealism,  p.  378. 


DR.  HASTINGS  RASHDALL  125 

If  also  we  view  thought  as  itself  a  manifestation 
of  Self-activity  we  need  not  hesitate  to  ascribe 

WiUtoGod. 

What  then  is  the  relation  between  the  Divine 
Will    and    the    human    wills?     Is    the    moral 
universe    in    reality    a    Pluralistic    Society    of 
independent  Souls  ?     RashdaU  does  not  regard 
this  consequence  as  necessary.    For  not  only  is 
the  original  unity  of  the  world  sacrificed,  but 
the  dependence  upon  God  involved  in  theoretical 
considerations,  e.g,  in  the  relation  of   soul  to 
body,  is  not  to  be  ignored.    But  when  Rashdall 
passes  from  the  question  of  origins,  he  incUnes 
to  a  Plurahstic  view  of  the  relation  between  the 
Souls  as  existing  beings,  and  God,  rather  than 
to  the  Monistic  conception  of  God  as  including 
finite  Spirits.    He  criticizes  Royce  and  the  Neo- 
HegeUan   School.    These   thinkers   commit  the 
'  supreme  fallacy '  of  identifying  existence  for 
others  with  existence  for  self,  the  knowledge  of 
persons  with  a  person's  private  experience  of 
himself.    This  is  the  outcome  of  intellectualism. 
The  social  relations  which  help  to  constitute  the 
individual  furnish  only  one  aspect  of  the  truth, 
and  miss  the  essential  side  of  the  Self's  reality. 
From  this  source  also  spring  Bradley's  objections 


126    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

to  the  Self  as  real.    A  distinction  must  be  made 
between  the  reality  of  persons  as  they  exist  for 
the  Absolute,  and  the  reality  peculiar  to  Selves 
alone — of  which  they  are  immediately  aware  as 
conscious  persons.    God  must  know  the  Self  as 
a  being  which  is  not  identical  with  His  know- 
ledge of  it.     The  Universal  Consciousness,  sup- 
posed to  include  all  Selves,  does  not  as  a  matter 
of  fact  explain  the  possibiUty  of  the  knowledge 
of  one  finite  Self  by  another  finite  Self.    The 
conception  of  the  Self  as  included  within  a  larger 
Self,  is  met  by  the  objection  that  the  appearance 
of  externality  and  independence  must  impera- 
tively be   made   clear.    Then  again   even  the 
content    of   our    individual    experience    is    not 
shared  by  another.    As  to  our  knowledge   of 
other  Selves,  Rashdall  thinks  that  the  difficulty 
has  been  over-estimated,  and  he  regards  it  as 
the  duty  of  philosophy  to  treat  such  elementary 
cases  of  inference  as  fact,  and  part  of  our  manner 
of  thought.    The  distinction  between  the  imi- 
versal    content    of   thought,    and    the    private 
thinking,  feeling,  and  willing  consciousness,  is 
one  of  most  fundamental  importance  in  philo- 
sophy. 

Rashdall  holds  therefore  to  a  view  intermediate 


DR.  HASTINGS  RASHDALL  127 

between  Monism  and  Pluralism.    According  to 
this  conception,   the  One  Mind  gives  rise  to 
Many.    We  may  call  this  whole  collection  One 
ReaUty,  but  after  all  it  consists  of  a  community 
of  Persons.    Rashdall  cares  Uttle  if  this  view 
is  regarded  as  incompatible  with  the  infinity 
of  God.    In  regard  to  Time,  his  opinions  are 
not  fuUy  exhibited,  but  he  aims  at  preserving 
the  time-consciousness  of  the  human  individual 
with  the  supra-temporal  reality  of  God.    Be- 
tween God  and  the  Absolute  he  draws  a  dis- 
tinction necessary  for  common-sense,  philosophy 
and  religion.    God  is  personal.    The  Absolute 
as  the  Infinite  Being  cannot  possess  personality. 
The    Absolute   then    means   the    collection    of 
Persons  including  God,   not  as  an  aggregate, 
but  as  an  organic  Society. 

n. 

Rashdall's  Essay  gives  a  good  presentation  of 
the  side  of  our  subject  which  lies  closer  to  the 
standpoint  of  Theism  than  the  views  previously 
discussed.  He  has  improved  upon  the  work  of 
another  author,  J.  R.  IlUngworth,  whose  Per- 
smdily,  Human  and  Divine}  is  gracefully  wntten, 

» Bampton  Lectures,  1894. 


128  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

but  might  well  be  stronger  on  the  metaphysical 
side. 

To  criticize  Rashdall  is  unnecessary  here, 
since  positive  views  will  be  set  forth  in  the 
Second  Part,  and  respective  differences  in 
method  and  conclusions  will  then  become 
apparent.  I  may  say,  however,  that  the  need 
of  a  discrimination  between  the  terms  used 
almost  at  random  as  synonyms  for  Personality 
is  plainly  shown  by  RashdalFs  treatment.  The 
employment  of  Personahty  as  a  metaphysical, 
practical  and  social  concept  is  fraught  with 
ambiguity  and  error,  and  makes  more  imperative 
the  task  of  distinguishing  the  various  terms  used 
to  designate  the  Self.  This  looseness  may  partly 
account  for  the  omission  on  Rashdall's  part  of 
a  clear  statement  of  the  Moral  side  of  Per- 
sonahty, and  of  the  relation  between  the  ethical 
and  the  existential  theories  of  the  Self. 

Rashdall  comes  between  Royce  and  Howison 
in  Ms  ultimate  statements.  He  holds  to  a 
partial  dependence  of  Souls  upon  God,  including 
their  origination  from  Him.  Yet  he  decUnes  to 
be  a  party  to  the  identification  of  the  purposes 
of  finite  Selves  with  those  of  God.  He  holds  to 
an  ultimate  Society  of  Souls,  but,  unlike  Howison, 


I 


DR.  HASTINGS  RASHDALL 


129 


» 


i 


. 


views  aU  as  Reality,  as  the  Absolute,  as  originated 
by  God's  Will,  and  as  Objects  for  the  Divine 
Knower,  but  still  preserving  their  initiative  and 
private  consciousness.  The  Souls  are  not  viewed 
as  co-eternal  with  God.  Nor  does  Rashdall 
foUow  M'Taggarti  who  holds  to  Reahty  as  a 
'  System  '  of  eternal  souls  without  God.  Rash- 
dall maintains  that  the  '  System '  requires  a 
Mind  to  know  it.  For  him  the  Absolute  consists 
in  God  and  the  Selves  who  are  present  to  the 
divine  Mind,  but  who  have  a  beginning  in  time. 
His  system  is  incomplete  ;  but  even  as  it  stands 
it  is  valuable  as  a  vindication  of  the  claims  of 
Personahty. 

*  Studies  in  Hegelian  Cosmology,  p.  60  ff. 


CHAPTER  VII, 

PROFESSOR   ANDREW   SETH   PRINGLE- 

PATTISON. 

Hitherto  we  have  been  dealing  with  authors 
whose  treatment  of  the  Self  has  formed  part  of 
a  constructive  system  of  metaphysics.  Now  we 
turn  to  one  whose  works  are  well  worthy  of 
study  in  connection  with  our  Problem,  not  on 
account  of  any  system  which  he  has  propounded, 
but  because  of  his  insistence  upon  certain  truths 
pertaining  to  this  subject,  in  his  expositions  and 
criticisms  of  various  philosophical  systems.  In 
this  duty  he  has  wielded  a  very  important 
influence  upon  recent  thought,  and  has  com- 
mended his  views  to  many  minds  by  his  vindi- 
cation of  certain  basic  principles  of  common- 
sense  and  sound  reason.  Accordingly  we  have 
here  a  different  task.  While  running  with  the 
hare  we  must  hunt  with  the  hounds.  While 
Professor  Pringle-Pattison  is  criticizing  others  we 
must  seek  to  take  stock  of  the  critic  himself. 


PROFESSOR  A.  S.  PRINGLE-PATTISON  131 

Most  of  Pringle-Pattison's  work  has  been 
devoted  to  the  IdeaUstic  Philosophy  of  Germany 
and  England,  since  Kant.  In  this  field  he  ranks 
among  the  best  living  commentators,  and  for 
this  reason  his  criticisms  of  Modern  IdeaUsm 
have  had  great  weight.  His  epoch-making  book, 
Hegelianism  and  Personality,  has  probably  tended 
more  than  any  other  recent  work,  to  shake  the 
foundations  of  the  '  block  universe  '  of  a  rigid 
Absolutism,  and  to  quicken  the  recent  growth 
of  philosophies  of  Personality.^  In  his  other 
writings  2  also  we  find  able  criticisms  of  con- 
temporary tendencies.  I  shall  endeavour  in  a 
brief  space  to  set  forth  his  views  upon  our  topic, 
so  far  as  they  have  been  published. 

In  his  criticisms  of  the  doctrines  of  Kant  and 
the  Neo-Kantians,  especially  Green,  and  of  Hegel 
and  the  Neo-Hegehans,  notably  Bradley,  the 
main  outhnes  of  Pringle-Pattison's  standpoint 
may  b^  briefly  represented  as  follows  : — 

1.  He  is  hostile  to  every  attempt  to  substitute 

^  Hegelianism  and  Personality ^  Balfour  Philosophical  Lectures, 
Second  Edition ;  Blackwood,  Edinburgh,  1893. 

«The  foUowing  will  be  sufficient  for  our  purposes:  Man's 
Place  in  the  Cosmos^  and  other  Essays ;  Blackwood,  Edinburgh, 
1897.  Two  Lectures  on  Theism  delivered  at  Princeton,  N.Y.; 
Scribner,  1897. 


132    THE   PROBLEM  OP  PERSONALITY 

abstractions  for  real  existence  as  given  in  our 
immediate  experience.  The  chief  examples  of 
this  error  he  finds  in  Hegel's  transition  from 
Logic  to  Nature/  and  in  Bradley's  sacrifice  of 
phenomena  for  the  logic  of  abstract  identity .^ 
This  attitude  characterizes  Pringle-Pattison's 
whole  position,  and  the  next  point  is  one  among 
many  instances  of  his  im willingness  to  accept  a 
logic  for  a  metaphysic. 

2.  The  Self  is  real,  our  bed-rock  of  fact,  our 
foundation  of  Truth,  and  our  highest  category 
of  explanation.  Unless  we  have  this  basic 
affirmation  of  the  real  existence  of  the  Self,  we 
cannot,  in  strictness,  go  on  to  positive  state- 
ments about  the  universe  of  Being  at  all.  '  We 
must  touch  reaUty  somewhere;  otherwise  our 
whole  construction  is  in  the  air.'^  This  given 
element  which  is  necessary  must  primarily  be 
correlated  with  the  reality  of  our  personal  ex- 
perience. For  him,  experience  involves  the 
essential  subject-object  relation,  and  all  exist- 
ence ultimately  depends  upon  the  immediate 
experience  and  the  undeniable  conviction  of  our 

^  Hegelianism  and  Personality ,  pp.  110-13,  124-7. 
■  Man* 8  Place  in  the  Cosmos,  pp.  155-160. 
"  Hegelianism,  etc,  p.  124  ff. 


PROFESSOR  A.  S.  PRINGLE-PATTISON  133 

own  existence.  Accordingly,  Pringle-Pattison 
vigorously  criticizes  Bradley's  negative  treat- 
ment of  the  Self^  which  we  have  previously 
dealt  with,  and  maintains  that  the  clue  to  his 
mysterious  transformation  of  existence  into 
*  appearance '  is  to  be  found  in  his  polemic 
against  the  Self,  which  is  our  saving  instance, 
and  Uving  experience,  of  unity  in  diversity.  We 
need  not  follow  this  argument  any  further  after 
what  has  been  said  in  our  Chapter  on  Mr.  Bradley. 
3.  Pringle-Pattison  regards  the  Self  as  mani- 
festing its  reality  in  its  activity ,  with  the  feeling 
that  accompanies  it,  as  well  as  in  thought. 
Accordingly  his  version  of  Descartes'  formula 
would  be  not  cogito,  but  ago  ergo  sum.  The 
phenomenaUstic  theories  of  Will,  such  as  Pro- 
fessor Munsterberg's,2  seem  to  Pringle-Pattison 
to  leave  out  the  essential  element  of  '  feeling- 
directed  activity '  as  distinct  from  the  content 
with  which  it  deals.^  The  act  of  attention  is 
itself  an  act  of  Will.  He  joins  with  Professor 
James  Ward  in  maintaining  that  no  pheno- 
menaUstic account  can  give  a  true  theory  of 

^  Man's  Place,  etc.  p.  160  flf. 

«  Die  Willenshandlung,  Hugo  Munsterberg,  1888. 

■  Man's  Place,  etc,  p.  99  ff. 


134    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Will,  for  Will  essentially  implies  tte  self-activity 
of  a  unitary  conscious  being. ^  However,  it  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  for  Pringle-Pattison  a 
better  assurance  of  the  Self's  reality  than  that 
given  by  knowledge  is  imparted  by  the  Will, 
which  in  its  purposive  activity  refuses  to  be 
dissolved  away  into  a  passing  succession  of 
phenomena.  So  while  thought,  feeling,  and  will 
are  not  separable  from  the  Self,  yet  it  is  the  self- 
existence  impHed  most  clearly  in  the  felt  activity 
of  the  Subject  that  we  must  give  as  a  reason 
of  the  conviction  that  is  in  us.^  This  is  borne 
out  by  considering  the  voluntaristic  basis  of  all 
mental  life,  including  thought,  to  which  theory 
Pringle-Pattison  inchnes.^ 

4.  Perhaps  the  most  prominent  feature  in  our 
author's  critical  work  is  his  polemic  against  the 
doctrine  of  a  Universal  Self  or  Self-consciousness 
which  thinks  in  all  of  us.  This  is  his  central 
objection  to  HegeUanism  and  Neo-Kantianism. 
He  claims  that  such  a  view  is  destructive  to  the 
Personality  of  man  and  of  God.    Green's  Spiritual 

^Professor  Miinsterberg  replies  that  he  does  not  profess  to 
give  an  account  of  the  true  Will,  which  belongs  to  Life,  to  the 
world  of  appreciation,  no<  to  descriptive  psychology,  Psych. 
Review,  1898,  p.  640. 

*a.  Two  Lectures  on  Theism,  p.  46.     *  Man's  Place,  etc,  pp.  123-  6. 


«> 


I  1^ 


PROFESSOR  A.  S.  PRINGLE-PATTISON  135 

Principle  1  he  regards  as  a  mere  extension  of  Kant's 
Transcendental   Unity  of  Self-consciousness  to 
the  place   of  Absolute   or  Universal  SeK-con- 
sciousness,  constituting  the  universe  of  relations, 
our  knowledge  of  it,  and  the  source  of  morality  .^ 
We   are   reproductions   of  this   eternal   Spirit, 
which  uses  as  its  vehicle  in  time  our  bodily 
organisms.    Pringle-Pattison  regards  this  as  an 
extension  which  Kant  would  have  repudiated ; 
and— what  is  far  more  important— a  doctrine 
which  denies  true  Personality,  to  both  God  and 
man.    The  merely  formal  principle  of  conscious- 
ness-in-general is  very  different  from  the  Uni- 
versal Consciousness.    The  former  is  based  upon 
an  abstraction  from  the  actual  human  Selves— 
the  latter  is  supposed  to  be  endowed  with  Per- 
sonality  unto   perfection.    He  regards  this  as 
akin  to  the  hypostasization  of  universals— which 
thus  include  individuals  as  accidents— by  the 
Scholastic  Realists.    It  is  the  method,  however, 
of  epistemology,  which  is  particularly  obnoxious 
to  Pringle-Pattison ;    for  questions  of  ontology 
must  be  settled  by  a  metaphysic  of  real  exist- 

1  Prolegcmena  to  Ethics,  T.  H.  Green,  Oxford,  Chap.  I.  p.  15  ft. 
Fourth  Edition,  1899. 

« Sidgwick  denies  this— mistakenly,  in  my  opinion. 


136    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

ence.     In  short,  his  attitude  of  hostility  towards 
the  '  Ontological  Proof '  of  Theism  is  manifest 
throughout  his  works,  and  may  be  the  briefest 
way  of  expressing  his  aversion  to  all  forms  of 
conceptuahsm    which    hypostasize    abstractions 
and  then  convert  an  identity  of  type  into  a 
numerical  existence.^    He  finds  in  Hegel,  and 
Fichte— in  his  later  works— the  tendency  which 
has  been  criticized  in  the  case  of  Green.    De- 
spite  the   most  valuable   emphasis  placed   by 
Hegel   upon   self-consciousness   as   the   highest 
manifestation  of  reality,  he  finds  that  in  regard 
to  both  the  Absolute  Idea  and  the  human  Self, 
the  HegeUans  of  the  Left  were  nearer  the  logical 
truth  in  their  interpretation,  than  were  those 
who  advocated  PersonaUty  and  defended  the 
harmony  of  their  master's  thought  with  Chris- 
tianity.   The  same  is  true  of  Neo-Hegehanism, 
with  its  universal  Self  that  thinks  in  all  of  us. 
Such  a  '  Self '  is  devoid  of  all  true  Personahty, 
and  it  deprives  us  also  of  our  inheritance.     It 
is  opposed  to  our  own  assurance  of  '  impervious- 
ness'  as  individual  Selves.     'I  have  a  centre 
of  my  own— a  will  of  my  own— which  no  one 
shares  with  me  or  can  share— a  centre  which 

*  Hegdianism,  etc.  pp.  69,  124. 


I 


/4 


PROFESSOR  A.  S.  PRINGLE-PATTISON  137 

I  maintain  even  in  my  dealings  with  God  Him- 
self.' 1  Religion  requires  this,  and  so  its  testi- 
mony is  against  such  identification  of  the  human 
and  divine  Self.  MoraUty  protests  also.  Ex- 
perience, and  even  a  true  metaphysic  of  know- 
ledge will  have  none  of  it.  At  the  same  time, 
the  PersonaUty  of  God  must  be  advocated,  if 
we  are  to  be  faithful  to  our  highest  category. 
With  this  position  stand  human  worth  and 
immortality,  as  against  a  universal  consciousness 
which  denies  both.  And  without  PersonaUty 
IdeaUsm  strictly  speaking  ceases,  for  all  ideals 
are  bound  up  with  the  person,  including  intel- 
UgibiUty,  the  inspiration  of  philosophy. 

n. 

The  value  of  this  work  of  Pringle-Pattison  is 
seen  in  the  Ught  of  our  previous  survey.  Be- 
tween Radical  Empiricists  Uke  James,  and 
Humanists  Uke  Schiller,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Absolute  IdeaUsts  Uke  Green,  Bradley  and 
Royce  on  the  other,  he  stands  midway.  Rash- 
dall  is  close  beside  him,  and  Howison  has  many 
points  of  aflSnity,  except  for  his  PluraUsm, 
which   Pringle-Pattison   wiU   not   accept.    But 

» Ibid.  p.  228. 


138    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

what  is  his  solution  of  these  difficulties  ?  It  is 
not  given.  He  falls  back  upon  a  reverent 
agnosticism — reasonable  enough,  no  doubt — in 
regard  to  the  Absolut*.  Beligion,  morality,  and 
piry  can  teach  „B  more  on  theae  iimate 
matters  than  philosophy  ;  and  a  revelation  of 
the  Absolute  is  ever  given  us  in  our  experienced 
At  the  same  time  he  repudiates  the  historical 
Agnosticism  of  an  earher  decade.  But  philo- 
sophy  cannot  rest  in  either  of  these  attitudes. 
While  we  can  never  know  Reality  as  it  is  for 
the  Absolute,  as  Pringle-Pattison  truly  says,  yet 
we  can  try  to  reach  a  better  conception  than 
that  which  merely  affirms  Monism  and  yet  insists 
upon  the  sacred  privacy  of  our  Personahty. 
The  problem  is  hard,  but  our  calling  is  high 
as  lovers  of  truth,  and  we  must,  as  WiUiam 
James  said,  refrain  from  adopting  as  our  motto, 
'  hypotheses  nan  finqo,'  until  the  end  is  in  sight. 
Z  Pringle-Pa^l  apparently  g,vc,  no  pL- 
tive  system.  He  does  not  furnish  a  clear  doc- 
trine  i  the  Self,  in  who.  reality  and  importance 
he  so  strongly  beUeves.^    Nor  does  he  clear  up 

*  Theisnit  p.  67. 

■  Professor  Dewey  criticizes  his  use  of  the  term  Self  in  Hegelian' 
ism  and  Personality  as  ambiguous.    MiTid,  xv.  p.  68. 


PROFESSOR  A.  S.  PRINGLE-PATTISON  139 

the  ambiguity  and  confusion  of  terms  connected 
with  Personahty.  He  does  not  definitely  state 
his  theory  of  God  and  the  Absolute,  nor  the 
extent  of  his  objection  to  an  Absolute  Self, 
when  reached  by  a  Hne  of  argument  different 
from  those  which  he  condemns  as  epistemo- 
logical,  merely  logical  or  abstract.  His  view  of 
time  as  ultimate  is  near  to  common-sense,  but 
by  no  means  free  from  difficulties. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  acknowledged 
that  Pringle-Pattison  has  given  the  greatest  pos- 
sible stimulus  towards  the  formulation  of  a 
revised  philosophy  of  common-sense.  The  pre- 
sent tendencies  are  largely  the  outcome  of  his 
strong  and  sound  work  in  metaphysics,  and  the 
Scottish  philosophy  is  in  safe  keeping  while 
following  the  Knes  of  scholarly  exposition  and 
criticism.  His  insistence  upon  the  rights  of 
ReaUty  in  Ufe  and  experience,  as  against  abstract 
generalities,  is  vitally  related  to  the  growth  of 
such  systems  as  those  of  WiUiam  James,  Bergson, 
and  James  Ward.  The  place  of  Personahty  in 
present-day  philosophy  has  been  made  secure 
by  just  such  critical  work  as  this. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

LATER   TENDENCIES. 

The  valuable  movement  of  reaction  which  has 
set  in  recently  against  a  hard  and  fast  Abso- 
lutism, in  favour  of  hfe  and  experience,  chiefly 
through  the  medium  of  James  and  Schiller  in 
their  own  respective  ways,  probably  dates  from 
Pringle-Pattison's  attack  on  Hegehanism  and 
his  plea  for  Personahty.  This  is  a  fitting  place 
therefore  to  add  a  very  brief  survey  of  present 
tendencies  in  regard  to  the  Self. 

We  see  that  those  who  deny  the  Self  a  reahty 
of  its  own  are  drawn  from  different  schools  of 
thought.  The  'Pure  Experience'  Philosophy, 
or  the  '  Immanence  Movement,'  closely  aUied  to 
a  form  of  ReaHsm,  has  grown  from  such  views 
as  those  of  Avenarius,i  Mach,  Petzoldt,^  on  the 
Continent,  S.  H.  Hodgson,  G.  E.  Moore,  and 

^  Der  Mensckliche  Wdtbegriff, 

» Die  Philosophie  der  Eeinen  Erfahrung, 


LATER  TENDENCIES 


141 


the    Cambridge    School    in    England,    William 
James  in  his  '  Radical  Empiricism,'  Dr.  R,  B. 
Perry,  Dr.  E.  B.  Holt,  and  others  in  America. 
These  seek  to  approach  the  Self  and  Personality, 
and  even  Consciousness,  from  a  universal  point 
of  view,  called  '  pure  experience  ' ;   and  end  by 
practically  denying  to  them  any  veritable  reality. 
Consciousness  is  but  a  selection  of  objects  from 
the  world  of  '  experience.'    On  the  other  hand, 
we  have  Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley  and  his  disciple, 
Professor  A.  E.  Taylor,  on  the  side  of  Absolute 
Idealism,  viewing  the  Self  negatively,  as  com- 
pared with  '  experience  '  also.     Hence  my  thesis 
against  this  vague  use  of  experience  so  preva- 
lent to-day.    Royce  is  capable  of  being  classified 
with  these,  when  we  treat  the  existential  aspect 
of  reality  as  important,  as  I  do  here.    A.  E. 
Taylor's  doctrine  of  the  Self  is  set  down  in  his 
recent  book.^    It  presents  a  union  of  the  negative 
views  of  Bradley,  Royce  and  James  compressed 
into   one   clearly  written  chapter.    The  social 
side  is  very  prominent  in  his  interpretation  of 
experience  to  the  detriment  of  all  real  selfhood. 
The  attacks  of  Mr.  Taylor  upon  the  idea,  concept, 
or  even  consciousness  of  Self  do  not  disprove  the 

^  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  1904,  Book  iv.  Chap.  III.  p.  335. 


i*: 


142  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

Reality  of  the  Self  as  the  essential  factor  in  all 
experience,  except  upon  the  basis  that  ReaUty 
is  reducible  to  ideas,— a  position  which  is  dis- 
missed by  the  whole  anti-intellectual  school  of 
to-day. 

Professor  Hugo  Miinsterberg  views  the  psychi- 
cal and  physical  as  constructions  by  the  Will,  that 
takes  attitudes,  and  is  itself  in  the  realm  of  life, 
of  values,  of  Reality ;  this  Personality,  however, 
is  but  a  part  in  the  supra-temporal  Reahty 
which  is  constituted  by  Values.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  many  advocates 
of  the  Self,  such  as  the  Oxford  Personal  Idealists, 
including  Professor  G.  F.  Stout,  Dr.  Rashdall, 
W.  R.  Boyce  Gibson  (now  of  Melbourne,  Aus- 
traha),  G.  E.  UnderhiU  and  H.  Sturt ;  in  addition 
to  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  who  has  now  come  out  as 
a  Humanist.  Then  Professors  Pringle-Pattison, 
James  Ward,  SuUy,  BakeweU,  Ladd,  G.  h! 
Palmer,  C.  M.  Tyler,  J.  Le  Conte,  Howison,  and 
the  late  Thomas  Davidson  and  Borden  P.  Bowne, 
defend  PersonaHty,  and  make  it  prominent  in 

»  Professor  Miinsterberg's  main  works  in  English  are  Psychology 
and  Uft  and  TU  Eternal  Values  (1909).  ffis  principal  work  in 
German  is  his  Orundzuge  der  Psychologic.  His  emphasis  upon 
Will  places  him  in  considerable  aflSnity  with  philosophies  of 
Feisonality. 


I 


LATER  TENDENCIES 


143 


their  views,  the  three  last-named  building  their 
metaphysical  systems  upon  PersonaUty  as  an 
ethical  concept.    Thomas  Davidson  held  to  a 
PersonaUstic  PluraUsm  of  a  very  individuaUstic 
type,— he  called  it  Apeirothism— in  which  the 
human  Egos  are  themselves  sufficient  to  con- 
stitute the  world  of  reality.    Professors  Dewey 
and  Baldwin  would  perhaps  belong  to  the  main 
group  of  believers  in  the  Self,  although  they  are 
more  difficult  to  classify.    Charles  Renouvier 
recently  published  his  system  imder  the  title  of 
Le   Personnalisme,  in  which   the   doctrines   of 
Absolutism  and  Infinity  are  opposed,  and  an 
empirical  theory  is  held. 

A  mighty  contribution  to  the  psychological 
and  metaphysical  treatment  of  the  subject  is 
furnished  by  Dr.  Wm.  M'Dougall  of  Oxford  in 
his  book  on  Body  and  Mind.^  His  patient  exami- 
nation of  the  animistic  hypothesis  in  the  light 
of  physiology  and  the  mechanistic  tendencies  of 
present-day  science  is  worthy  of  all  praise. 
After  giving  full  value  to  the  hostile  views.  Dr. 
M'Dougall  gives  conclusive  reasons  for  preferring 
the  old  belief  in  the  soul  as  an  entity  to  the 

•  Body  and  Mind,  A  History  and  Defence  of  Animism  (Methuen, 
1911). 


I 


lAA      rpTTT?     •DT>r\T> 


X  Arr-ciT*  r^^?x^^iT^'l^crr!T^ns 


146 


144  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

pseudo-scientific  hypotheses   of  a   materialistic 
or  empirical  kind. 

The  works  of  Bergson  and  of  Eucken  on  the 
Continent  have  provided  recent  philosophy  with 
much  material  for  fresh  advances,  but  in  neither 
instance  has  an  exphcit  doctrine  of  the  Self  been 
as  yet  fully  formulated.  Bergson  certainly  holds 
to  the  reality  of  conscious  life  with  the  efficacy 
which  we  associate  with  will. 

Bergson's  Philosophy  of  Change  expresses  a 
revolt  against  concepts  and  the  construction  of 
Reahty  by  means  of  the  intellect.    Deeper  hes 
the  stream  of  Reahty,  which  is  consciousness  in 
ceaseless,   creative   activity.     Reahty  is   to   be 
apprehended  by  Intuition  rather  than  by  Intel- 
lect.   This  stream  of  consciousness,  with  which 
Duration  is  identified,  is  more  than  the  indi- 
vidual  experiences.    Hence   for   Bergson,    per- 
sonaHties  are  but  means  to  the  end  of  supra- 
personal  spirit.     We  await  further  light  from 
this  inspiring  thinker  regarding  the  Problem  of 
Personahty.    Meanwhile,  it  appears  that  he  has 
not  provided  in  his  Monistic  Activism,  as  we 
may  call  his  system,  for  the  rights  and  reahty  of 
the  Personal  Will. 
Eucken  provides  a  spiritual  interpretation  of 


LATER  TENDENCIES 


145 


hfe,  society  and  history,  based  upon  a  union 
of  ideahsm  and  activism ;  but  does  not  the 
student  of  Eucken  look  in  vain  for  a  satisfying 
dialectic,  a  critical  philosophy  of  conscious- 
ness ?  One  is  constantly  in  the  world  of 
values  whUe  in  the  company  of  this  stimu- 
lating German  thinker,  but  there  is  no  cogent 
answer  given  to  the  questions  that  rise  regarding 
the  reality  of  the  distinctions  which  mark  off 
God,  man  and  the  world. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say,  however,  that  Berg- 
son and  Eucken  have  rendered  invaluable  service 
to  the  cause  of  rehgion,  ethics  and  philosophy 
by  their  strong  vindication  of  hfe  as   against 
mere    conceptuahsm.     Whether    the    Intuitive 
method  of  Bergson  or  the  Interpretative  method 
of  Eucken  afford  us  an  alternative  pathway  to 
Reality,  better  than  that   of  rational  investi- 
gation and  induction,  is  a  question  too   large 
for  discussion  here,  but  the  insistence  of  both 
these  thinkers  upon  the  final  reahty  of  conscious 
life  and  Personahty,  in   some   sense   or   other, 
expresses   the   genuine   conviction    of  aU   who 
base    reflection   upon  hfe,   and  concepts  upon 

experience. 

As  to  the  Divine  Personahty,  except  for  the 


I 


146    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

*  Supra-Personal  *  Absolute  of  Bradley  and  Taylor 
most  of  the  leading  thinkers  of  to-day  hold  that 
the   reasonable   attitude   to   take   towards   the 
nature  of  the  highest  Being,  whether  regarded 
as  the  Absolute,  or  pluralistically,  is  to  postulate 
Personality  in  some  form  or  other.    The  problem 
of  the  relation  of  the  Absolute  to  human  Per- 
sonality divides  Bradley,  Royce,  Taylor,  and, — 
according  to  Pringle-Pattison — all  Neo-Hegelians, 
such  as  Green,  the  Cairds  and  Watson — ^from 
the  champions  of  human  Personality,  such  as 
Howison,  Davidson,  Rashdall,  Schiller,  Bergson, 
Eucken,  and  others,  including  Pringle-Pattison 
himself.     Royce,  at  any  rate,  comes  nearer  to 
providing  for  a  solution  of  the  problem  from  the 
Absolutist's  side  than  do  the  others.    If  we  can 
accept  his  view  of  the  Self  as  satisfactory,  Royce 
is  certainly  a  defender  of  the  use  of  the  concept. 
James  seemed  to  be  anxious  to  regard  Personality 
most  favourably,  but  the  psychological  '  passing 
Thought '  is  accepted  by  him ;    and  the  Pure 
Experience  theory  of  his  Radical  Empiricism  has 
to    be    accommodated.    Other    tendencies    are 
siunmed  up  in  the  Panpsychism  of  Fechner, 
Paulsen,  and  C.  A.  Strong. 
That  there  is  much  confusion  current  upon 


LATER  TENDENCIES 


147 


the  question  of  the  Self  is  plain.    It  is  partly 
due,  I  believe,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  Self  from 
much  of  the  '  new '  physiological  psychology  ; 
partly  to  the  hesitation  of  metaphysicians  as  to 
the  treatment  of  the  empirical  side  of  the  Self ; 
partly  to  the  intellectualistic  bias  of  science  and 
philosophy   which   waits  for  definitions  before 
acknowledging   reality   in   hfe   or   spirit ;— and 
chiefly  to  the  vagueness  of  the  concept  of  Ex- 
perience, which  has  to  play  the  most  important 
r61e  in  the  majority  of  prevalent  systems  of 
philosophy.    But  over  and  above  all,  it  is  evident 
that  the  tendency  is  very  strong  to  restore  Per- 
sonality and  Life  to  their  place  as  fundamental 
to  a  theory  of  Reality. 


PART  II. 
CONSTRUCTIVE. 


{  \ 


CHAPTER  I. 


EXPERIENCE    AS   A   METAPHYSICAL 

CONCEPT. 

If  there  is  one  concept  about  which  it  would 
seem  that  philosophers  are  agreed,  it  is  surely 
that  of  Experience.    For  it  is  in  all  the  systems 
of  metaphysicians,   the   great  and  the   small. 
One  has  only  to  gasp  out  '  Experience '  to  pass 
the  sentinels  of  philosophical  orthodoxy ;    and 
the  constant  repetition  of  the  password  seems 
to  have  a  value  which  has  long  ago  been  recog- 
nized outside  of  the  ranks  of  the  mystics.    '  Ex- 
perience '  is  thrust  forward  by  every  one  as  a 
guarantee  of  inteUigence  and  good  faith.    It  is 
pronounced  with  great  unction  as  the  starting- 
point  of  all  extant  systems,— not  excluding  the 
TranscendentaUsts.    The   announcement  is   re- 
ceived with  nodding  heads  and  smiles  of  approval 
by  the  circle  of  philosophers  and  critics.    So 
long   as   the   tyro   in   philosophy    adheres   to 


'1 


162    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

experience  and  *  rings  the  changes '  on  ideas,  and 
things,  and  what  not,  as  *  experience,'  there  is 
no  obvious  reason  why  he  should  not  draw  an 
admiring  crowd.  The  only  apparent  check  to 
his  career  would  arise  if  some  one  inquired  as 
to  the  significance  of  the  term.  The  rude 
question,  What  do  you  mean  by  it  ?  might 
suggest  a  dim  world  of  reahties  Ijdng  beneath 
the  fog  that  has  settled  so  heavily  upon  philo- 
sophy. It  might  then  and  there  appear  that 
the  very  widespread  use  of  this  concept  should 
itself  cause  uneasiness.  Popularity  does  not 
conduce  to  definition.  It  might  also  occur  that 
in  spite  of  this  agreement  as  to  premises  by  very 
diverse  schools  of  thought,  the  conclusions  are 
as  wide  asunder  as  the  poles.  Surely  what  has 
happened  is  this :  the  several  schools  have 
taken  everything  for  granted,  have,  in  fact, 
*  begged '  the  universe,  with  the  most  compre- 
hensive term  in  existence ;  and  have  then  pro- 
ceeded to  develop  some  one  or  more  of  the 
multitude  of  distinctions  which  palpably  lie 
within  experience. 

Like  a  great  snowstorm,  this  vague  concept 
has  buried  beneath  a  colourless  and  uniform 
surface  the  various  grades  of  reahty,  and  the 


i 


\ 


EXPERIENCE  AS  A  CONCEPT        163 

chief  problems  of  philosophy.    But  the  much- 
needed   thaw   that   can   restore   the   vanished 
world  to  light  has  already  begim.    Schiller  has 
insisted  upon  the  questions  which  cause  such 
concern  to  the  Absolutists  like  Bradley,  and  to 
the  '  Pure  Experience,'  and  Realistic  School,— 
'  Whose  experience  is  it ;   and  of  what  is  it  the 
experience  ? '    Ward  has  ably  maintained  ^  that 
this  concept  conceals  the  duality  of  subject  and 
object  impHed   in   experience.    And  the   fore- 
going criticisms  of  Part  I.,  on  James  and  Bradley 
in  particular,  have  already  made  manifest  the 
error  and  ambiguity  latent  in  this  term,  the 
contradictions  of  which  are  really  worked  out 
into  such  divergent  results.    The  unanimity  of 
a  Kant,  a  Mill,  a  Bradley,  a  James  ;  of  Idealist, 
Mystic,  and  Realist;    of  Absolutist,  Pluralist, 
and  Radical  Empiricist  in  adopting  Experience 
as  the  starting-point  is  not  really  an  evidence 
of  the  value  of  the  concept  as  used ;  but  it  is 
rather  an  incentive  to  the  critic  to  point  out  the 

1  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  vol.  ii.  p.  131  et  passim.  Dr. 
Ward's  new  book,  The  Realm  of  Ends,  or  Pluralism  and  Theism 
(1912)  gives  an  impressive  presentation  of  Idealism  with  special 
reference  to  the  category  of  Personality.  I  take  this  opportunity 
of  expressing  many  obhgations  to  this  thinker  for  the  clarifying 
influence  of  his  works  upon  the  problems  connected  with  thia 
subject. 


I 


164    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

vagueness  and  ambiguity  of  the  term,  and  to  see 
in  it  one  cause  of  the  present-day  confusion  in 
metaphysics. 

This  is  most  marked  in  the  case  of  the  Self, 
which  is  the  chief  victim  in  this  usage.  It  has 
ever  been  the  most  difficult  concept  for  meta- 
physics, and  the  most  recalcitrant  fact  for 
science.  The  concept  of  experience  is  a  *  neutral 
and  non-committal  term,'  as  WiUiam  James 
said ;  and  so  it  seems  to  offer  an  opportunity 
of  constructing  a  system  free  from  the  embar- 
rassment of  a  Self. 

(1)  But  one  of  my  main  theses  has  been  to 
contend  that  Experience  essentially  impUes  the 
Subject  of  experience,  and  that  apart  from  such 
a  reference,  it  has  no  meaning.  It  is  erroneous 
to  identify  the  objects  in  the  '  stream  of  con- 
sciousness '  with  '  experiences '  which  become 
thereby  capable  of  personal  activity.  Yet  the 
term  does  not  give  us  the  shock  that  '  entities,' 
or  *  things,'  or  even  *  ideas  '  would.  We  noted 
this  incongruity  in  James'  Radical  Empiricism, 
where  *  experiences  report  themselves  to  one 
another ' !  I  maintain  that  there  is  a  change 
of  meaning  here  from  that  which  Experience 
bears  as  the  states  of  a  conscious  Subject,  to 


EXPERIENCE  AS  A  CONCEPT        155 

that  of  a  mere  portion  of  the  stream  of  objects 
when  treated  as  unreferred  to  a  Subject.^ 

(2)  In    addition    to    this    error,    the    hidden 
duality  of  the  concept  really  carries  with  it  a 
reference  to  the  Self  which  is  supposed  to  be 
explained,  or  even  explained  away,  by  it.    The 
substitution  of  universal  experience  for  that  of 
finite  Selves  is  really  meaningless,  unless  the 
self-reference  which  experience  implies,  can  be 
fastened  upon  some  Self.    To  fix  it  upon  the 
Absolute  Self  is  not  the  first,  but  the  last  step 
in  metaphysics.    Or  again,  to  make  all  things 
conscious  is  either  a  gratuitous  assumption,  or 
else  should  come  at  the  close  of  a  Panpsychistic 
course   of  reasoning.    Hence   the   unfitness   of 
Experience  without  qualification  to  be  a  starting- 
point  in  a  metaphysic  is  plain.    It  is  either  used 
uncritically ;    or  else  it  presupposes  the  whole 
theory  constructed  upon  it.    And  in  either  case 
we  have  error  and  fallacy. 

(3)  The  genuine  problems  of  experience— in 
the  true  sense  as  implying  Subjects  of  experience 
—are  not  solved  by  adopting  a  merely  universal 
point  of  view,  apart  altogether  from  the  erroneous 
use  of  the  term.    The  problems  of  the  relation 

1  Cf.  Ward,  Art.  '  Psychology,'  Ency.  Briit.  (9),  vol.  xx.  p.  39. 


i 


156    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

of  Subject  and  Object,  of  Self  and  the  World, 
of  Self  and  Self,  of  Self  and  God,  persist,  and 
demand  solution  as  the  outstanding  questions 
for  any  theory  that  claims  to  be  ultimate.  But 
these  are  the  very  problems  supposed  to  be  solved 
by  adopting  the  starting-point  of  Experience! 
How  gratuitous  that  assurance  is  becomes  evident 
upon  examination. 

(4)  A  breach  with  genuine  reality  is  made  by 
ignoring  the  condition  of  knowledge,  and  the 
pre-supposition   of  experience.     The   most   im- 
portant factor  is  left  out  of  account,  that  which 
makes  the  series  of  presentations  into  a  unity, 
and    which    renders    knowledge    and    rational 
activity  possible.     In  the  emotional  and  voli- 
tional   processes    this    element    is    even    more 
obvious.     The  centre  of  susceptibihty  and  the 
agent  of  purposes  which  are  conceived  intel- 
lectually also  by  the  same  Subject,  are  not  to 
be  labelled  with  the  same  term  as  the  objects 
which  exist  for  the  Subject.    This  ignoring  of 
the  prime  factors  in  experience  is  equivalent  to 
turning  our  backs  upon  our  citadel  of  reahty.^ 

1  The  Will  is  the  great  divider  and  judge  of  systems  of  Monism. 
Perhaps  the  chief  value  and  final  impressiveness  of  systems  of 
Voluntarism  and  Activism,  for  instance,  as  given  in  such  diverse 
forms  as  by  Fichte,  Schopenhauer,  Miinsterberg,  Bergson,  and 


EXPERIENCE  AS  A  CONCEPT        167 

(5)  The  patent  distinction  between  my  ex- 
perience and  the  experience  of  others  is  not 
provided  for  in  this  method.  A  fact,  e.g,  a 
pain,  has  to  be  reported  to  be  known.  But  it 
is  not  the  genuine  fact  which  is  reported,  and 
multitudes  of  other  facts  never  get  reported ! 
And  yet,  who  can  deny  that  they  are  genuine 
experiences  for  me  ?  In  a  word,  this  notion 
of  experience  as  an  absolute,  universal  and 
impersonal  medium  is  altogether  false  to  ex- 
perience in  the  true  sense  of  the  word.  And 
observe  the  ambiguity  in  the  term.  It  is  high 
time  to  stand  by  immediate  experience  against 
the  assumptions  of  a  priori  systems  of  philo- 
sophy. And  that  '  stand  '  must  begin,  as  Ward, 
Pringle-Pattison,  and  Schiller  have  maintained, 
with  the  bed-rock  of  reality,  our  own  existence 
as  conscious  Selves. 

(6)  The  making  of  a  class  of  '  special  diffi- 
culties '  in  works  of  Psychology  and  Metaphysics, 
of  our  most  intimate,  real  and  significant 
experiences,  is  itself  an  indication  of  the  fallacy 
of  the   method   of  '  experience '   as  '  pure '  or 

Eucken,  are  to  be  found  in  the  fact  of  the  indubitable  reality  of 
WiU  as  an  experience,  and  as  efficacious  in  disturbing  the  flow 
of  intellectual  presentations  of  objects. 


158    THE   PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


'  transcendental.'  I  refer  to  feeling,  volition  and 
the  higher  processes  of  mind.  That  any  doubt 
should  arise  as  to  the  central  place  of  these  funda- 
mental facts  in  a  theory  of  reality  is  an  instance 
of  the  inadequacy  and  futiUty  of  the  whole 
method.  It  is  false  to  epistemology,  to  meta- 
physics, and  to  Ufe. 

(7)  The  ambiguities  of  the  term  '  experience  ' 
may  be  further  brought  out  by  considering  some 
of  its  meanings. 

(a)  Originally,  a  trial  or  experiment  by  someone. 

(6)  A  striking  event  or  series  of  events  in  the 
life  of  a  person. 

(c)  The  content  of  consciousness,  the  stream  of 
objects  as  present  to  the  Subject,  or  Subjects, 
whose  experience  it  is.  This  is  the  correct 
meaning  in  my  opinion. 

(d)  The  series  of  all  possible  conscious  facts, 
including  among  them  the  Self  or  Subject,  and 
even  the  hypothetical  '  Pure  Ego.'  This  use  is 
misleading. 

(e)  The  '  things,'  colours,  motions,  causes,  and 
so  forth,  belonging  to  the  world  at  large ;  and 
all  thoughts,  feelings,  volitions,  and  the  con- 
sciousness of  Selfhood  so  far  as  known.  In  fact, 
anything  and  everything  that  can  find  a  place 


EXPERIENCE  AS  A  CONCEPT         159 

in  the  '  universe  of  discourse '  is  called  by  this 
term,  as  equivalent  to  'actual  and  possible 
experience,'  with  a  singular  and  a  plural.  This 
usage  is  vague  and  dangerous. 

(/)  Experience  as  something  universal  or 
'  Pure,'  cutting  beneath  the  distinctions  of  Self 
and  the  world  ;  only  nominally  distinguishable 
from  independent  Being,  in  the  Realistic  sense. 
This  is  perfectly  fallacious. 

(g)  Absolute  Experience,  as  Reality  more  tran- 
scendental and  idealistic  than  the  previous  usage. 
Here  the  meaning  of  Experience  may  vary,  as  on 
the  lower  plane  ;  but  when  used  out  of  relation 
to  an  Absolute  Self  or  a  plurality  of  Selves,  it  is 
really  quite  meaningless. 

(h)  Experience  in  the  phylogenetic  sense,  as 
used  by  Evolutionists  in  opposition  to  a  priori  or 
transcendental  theories  of  origin  or  development. 

In  the  face  of  these  numerous  varieties  of 
meaning,  the  term  is  hopelessly  ambiguous,  unless 
qualified  by  the  implication  of  Selfhood,  as 
stated  in  (c)  above.  As  a  starting-point  in 
Metaphysic  the  Concept  is  fraught  with  error 
and  confusion,  and  is  liable  to  objection, 
except  as  expressing  what  is  implied  in  the 
relationship  of  subject  and  object. 


CHAPTER  II, 


THE  MEANING  OF  PERSONALITY  AND 
RELATED  CONCEPTS. 

In  the  First  Part  we  have  had  abundant  evidence 
of  the  criticisms  directed  against  PersonaUty  for 
the  various  meanings  which  may  be  attached  to 
it,  and  to  the  other  terms  expressive  of  diverse 
phases  of  Selfhood.  We  have  also  seen  for  our- 
selves the  need  of  clearly  distinguishing  these 
meanings.  Accordingly  we  shall  devote  ourselves 
to  the  following  purposes  in  this  Chapter  :  first, 
to  the  examination  of  the  concepts  pertaining  to 
PersonaUty,  including  the  Not-Self  as  well  as  the 
Self ;  and  then  we  shall  proceed  to  the  considera- 
tion of  some  difficulties,  or  paradoxes,  connected 
with  the  Self. 

A  complete  list  of  these  related  concepts  would 
include  person,  personality,  individual,  indi- 
viduaUty,  self,  selfhood,  consciousness,  self-con- 
sciousness, subject,  soul,  ego,  spirit,  mind,  *  I,' 


PERSONALITY-RELATED  CONCEPTS    161 

and  the  '  me '  ;    also  the  correlatives,  not-self, 
object,  non-ego,  and  not-me.     Then  there  are 
concepts  in  the  form  of  phrases  which  have 
become  current,  such  as  Kant's  '  synthetic  unity 
of  apperception,'   or   'transcendental  unity   of 
self-consciousness,'  the  '  noumenal '  as  distinct 
from  the  '  phenomenal '  ego,  and  the  '  empirical 
self';    the    'material,'   the   'social'    and   the 
*  spiritual '  self,  the  '  stream  of  consciousness,' 
and    the    'Passing    Thought,'    employed    by 
William  James ;    the  PersonaUty  of  God ;    the 
'  Perfect  Personality  '  advocated  by  Lotze  ;  the 
'Absolute   Self'   in  Koyce's   system,   and  the 
'  Absolute  Experience '  in  Bradley's,— and  so  on. 
The  mere  mention  of  these  current  phrases  is 
aU  that  is  possible  here.     Most  of  them  are 
treated  and  made  clear  in  the  course  of  the 
Thesis.    From  the  first  list  we  shall  select  the 
principal  terms  for  specification. 

Let  us  start  with  the  true  basis  of  mental  life, 
as  we  have  seen  it  in  our  discussion  of  the  con- 
cept of  Experience.  That  resolves  itself,  as  we 
saw,  into  the  relationship  of  Subject  and  Object. 
Let  us  take  this  ground,  and  begin  with  the 
Subject.  We  do  not  stop  to  ask  now  whether 
we  can  distinguish  the  Subject  by  itself.    Bradley 


162    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

we  know  suffers  pangs  at  the  bare  suggestion  of 
such  an  abstraction,  although  he  is  more  hardened 
when  deahng  with  experience.  But  that  question 
will  recur  in  the  next  Chapter.  Meanwhile,  if 
anyone  has  qualms  similar  to  Bradley's,  he  can 
display  his  mental  agility  by  correlating  the  idea 
of  Object  with  that  of  Subject,  while  the  latter 
is  under  discussion. 

The  Subject  signifies  the  one /or  whom  any  set 
of  experiences  is,  the  centre  to  which  various 
objects  are  consciously  present,  and  from  which 
they  derive  a  special  relationship  to  one  another, 
as  facts  of  one  felt  whole.  It  is  usually  employed 
to  denote  the  knower  as  related  to  the  known ; 
but  it  may  also  imply  the  one  who  feels,  who  is 
susceptible  to  pleasure  and  pain.  It  does  not 
generally  signify,  however,  the  one  who  is  active, 
who  wills,  who  strives,  who  conceives,  plans  and 
executes  them.  We  may  for  the  present  speak, 
in  reference  to  this  self -activity,  of  '  the  Agent,' 
or  more  simply,  of  Will.  The  Subject  then  has 
primarily  this  epistemological  and  affective  refer- 
ence, and  may  be  regarded  as  signifying  the 
knower,  the  experiencer,  as  distinct  from  the 
objects  known,  and  from  the  content  of 
experience. 


PERSONALITY— RELATED  CONCEPTS    163 

Now  let  us  pass  to  the  terms  closely  connected 
with  the  Subject,   yet  possessed  of  important 
shades  of  meaning.    Such  are   *  I,'   Ego,   and 
the   Soul.    Now  we  have  the  identity  of  the 
Subject  in  time  brought  out,  its  character  of 
permanence  through  change,  of  unity  in  diver- 
sity.   This   is   not   necessarily   imphed   in   the 
Subject  itself.    It  appears  as  the  correlative  of 
the  series  of  Objects  which  are  essentially  in 
time,  and  as  such  does  not  express  the  character 
of  identity,  which,  whether  philosophically  accept- 
able or  not,  is  at  least  the  postulate  of  reflective 
common-sense,  and  as  such  is  sufficient  for  our 
present  purpose,  viz.  the  determination  of  mean- 
ings.   The  philosophical  question  of  identity  will 
come  up  later.    But  there  is  another  change 
made  by  the  terms  '  I '  and  '  Ego.'    Now  the 
recognition  of  the  agent  in  volition  is  brought 
in ;   the  pale  fact  of  mere  subjectivity  is  trans- 
formed by  the  organic  presence  of  Will.    The 
terms  *  I '  and  Ego  express  a  unitary  conscious 
Subject  which  is  also  active,  as  the  Agent.    The 
Soul  signifies  the  Ego  as  a  permanent  entity 
or   Substance   which   endures  through   all  the 
temporal    manifestations,    and    is    related    to 
the  affective,  emotional  and  moral  aspects  of 


164  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


experience  rather  than  to  the  side  of  volition. 
Spirit  is  closely  allied  to  the  Soul,  in  antithesis 
to  the  bodily  and  material,  and  as  inclusive  of 
self-activity.  Mind  is  used  to  denote  the  Subject 
as  Thinker,  plus  the  objects  of  thought.  Simi- 
larly the  concept  of  the  Self  in  metaphysics 
involves  the  relation  of  Subject  and  Object,  not 
in  intellectual  terms  merely,  as  is  the  case  with 
the  Mind,  but  in  the  organic  totaUty  of  feeling 
and  will.  While  this  relation  is  present  in  the 
constitution  of  the  Self,  however,  a  distinction 
is  made  upon  the  objective  side  between  what 
is  Self  and  what  is  Not-Self.  I  will  return  to 
this  presently. 

The  medium  of  awareness,  in  which  experience, 
so  to  speak,  comes  to  light,  is  Consciousness, 
and  in  Self-consciousness  there  is  a  recognition 
of  the  rational,  constitutive  and  moral  part  per- 
formed by  the  Self  in  our  highest  experiences.^ 
The  positively  social  and  ethical  character  of 
Selfhood  is  expressed   by  the   concept   of  the 

*  Abnormal  forms  of  self-consciousness  which  are  related  to 
moral  or  pathological  conditions,  usually  in  a  more  or  less  morbid 
way,  are  not  included  in  this  treatment  of  Self- consciousness. 
Recent  advocates  of  Realism  are  apt  to  lay  undue  stress  upon 
this  aspect,  as  vitiating  the  Idealistic  claims  of  Self-consciousness. 
It  is  perhaps  advisable  to  point  out  that  all  morbid  forma  of 
Self-feeling  are  distinct  from  the  rational  Self- consciousness. 


PERSONALITY—RELATED  CONCEPTS    166 

Person.!    Although  in  popular  usage  the  Self  is 
employed  in  this  sense,  it  is  much  better  in 
Metaphysics    to    confine   that   concept   to   the 
meaning  given  above.    Individuality  expresses 
the  aspect  of  uniqueness  in  the  various  Selves, 
as  Persons.    And  Personality  includes  all  the 
foregoing  meanings  of  Ego,  Self,  Individual  and 
Person,  with  the  full  circle  of  relationships  to 
other  Selves,  the  world  and  God.    Moral  char- 
acter, rights  and  duties  are  provided  for  by 
this  concept.    Esthetic,  social,  intellectual  and 
rehgious  ideals  are  the  portion  of  man  as  the 
possessor  of  Personality.    But  God  is  regarded 
as  the  Source  and  Inspiration  of  all  such  aspira- 
tions, and  is  the  Ideal  and  Perfect  Personality. 
In  regard  to  the  Object  which  is  in  relation 
to  the  Subject,  we  may  distinguish  between  the 
Non-Ego  and  the  Not-Self.    The  Non-Ego  is 
equivalent  to  the  '  Me,'  that  is,  the  empirical 
content  of  the  consciousness  of  Self ;  but  it  may 

1  The  Theological  usage  of  *  Person  *  in  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  is  quite  distinctive,  and  is  associated  with  historical 
and  metaphysical  considerations  which,  if  fully  treated,  would 
lead  us  into  another  region  than  that  contemplated  in  the  present 
work.  The  Legal  connotation  of  Person,  to  which  some  writers 
have  given  special  prominence  (as  WiUiam  Temple,  in  his  Nature 
of  Personality,  1911),  is  but  one  among  many  of  the  aspects  of 
social  value,  which  belong  to  Personality. 


166    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


be  distinguished  from  the  Not-Self,  or  the  Not-Me, 
by  which  we  signify  that  which  is  distinct  and 
separable  from  the  Self.  The  Not-Self  is  a  part 
of  the  objective  series,  which  is  marked  off  on 
the  basis  of  the  Will.  Certain  presentations  are 
capable  of  being  dissociated  as  unnecessary  to  our 
immediate  consciousness.  They  are  branded  as 
the  Not-Self.  The  limit  of  the  body  is  a  fair 
indication  of  the  demarcation  ;  but  it  is  a  mis- 
take to  take  it  as  an  absolute  test,  or  as  the 
explanation,  of  the  Not-Self,  for  certain  psychical 
processes  may  also  be  regarded  as  the  Not-Self. 
The  Non-Ego,  on  the  other  hand,  consists  in  the 
states  of  consciousness,  the  processes  iu  building 
up  our  experience,  which  may  be  introspectively 
presented  and  branded  as  not  the  Ego.  The  Self 
as  Subject-Object  includes  the  Ego  and  the 
Non-Ego,  but  not  the  content  of  experience 
which  has  rightly  been  termed  the  Not-Self. 
Yet  it  is  quite  misleading  to  separate  the  Not- 
Self,  as  a  part  of  experience,  from  the  Subject 
of  experience. 

We  will  now  discuss  very  briefly  some  diffi- 
culties and  seeming  paradoxes  in  connection  with 
the  general  question  of  Personality.  The  first — 
Hegel's  problem  of  '  negativity '—arises  from 


PERSONALITY-RELATED  CONCEPTS    167 

the  effort  to  define  the  SeK.    Every  such  effort 
involves  the  presentation  of  the  Self  as  object, 
and  therefore  it  cannot  be  the  true  Self.    So 
Hegel,  to  characterize  subjectivity,  defined  it  as 
the  refusal  to  recognize  the  Self  in  any  one 
object.    But  that  refusal  itself  is  related  to  the 
Self.    Hence  the  SeK  must  express  itself  in  that 
which  is  objective,  and  therefore  not  the  Self. 
The  paradox  is  obvious.    But  our  doctrme  of 
the  Self  does  not  seek  for  such  a  defimtion. 
Verily  the  paradox  is  the  outcome  of  seeking  to 
present  existence  in  the  forms  of  logic,  which 
we  have  had  occasion  to  criticize  in  the  First 
Part.    And  in  our  view  of  the  SeK  the  place 
of  the  Subject  is  assured  ;  while  in  aU  attempts 
to  substitute  definitions  for  genuine  experience, 
a    breach    with    existence    and    reaUty    is— as 
Pringle-Pattison  maintains  i— inevitable. 

A  second  difficulty  is  allied  to  the  former  one. 
The  essence  of  SeKhood  is  subjectivity  and 
particularity,  and  yet  the  striving  and  develop- 
ment of  the  SeK  is  toward  objectivity  and 
universality.  To  be  conscious  of  a  limit  impUes 
the  transcendence  of  it.  Our  life,  as  Fichte  felt 
and  taught,  is  one  continual  striving,  longing 

1  Supra,  Chapter  Vll. 


168    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


and   seeking.    What  constitutes  selfhood  thus 
seems  to  be  denied  by  rational  selfhood.    We 
pursue  the  universal  and  objective.    This  diffi- 
culty is  really  due  to  our  taking  the  Self  in  one 
aspect  as  existential — a  limited  subjective  world 
— ^and  in  the  other  as  ethical — as  a  seeker  after 
ideals.     The  Subject-Object  relation  persists  just 
as  much  in  the  latter,  as  in  the  former  case,  if 
we  view  them  both  as  existences.    And  full  of 
meaning  is  the  ethical  aspect  presented  in  this 
seeming  paradox.    The  transcendence  of  limits 
may  be  said,  with  equal  truth,  to  imply  the 
previous   consciousness   of   those   Umits.^     This 
rendering  of  PersonaUty  is  but  an  extension  of 
the  truth  that  we  must  lose  our  life  to  find  it. 
Finally  there  is  the  paradox  stated  by  Pro- 
fessor Palmer  in  his  Nature  of  Goodness}    In 
the  progress  towards  true  PersonaUty,  how  can 
I  really  develop  myself?     That  would  require 
that  '  I  make  myself '  \    Truly  significant  is  the 
distinction  involved  in  this  difficulty.    From  the 
standpoint  of  the  Self,  as  the  Subject  of  certain 
experiences,  I  am  now  as  real  a  being  as  ever  I 
can  be.    But  from  the  standpoint  of  values,  I 

*  Cf.  Art.  '  Cartesianism,*  Edward  Caird,  Ency.  BriU*  9th  Edit. 

*  Chapter  V.  on  Self- Development. 


PERSONALITY-RELATED  CONCEPTS    169 

am  not  yet  my  true  Personality.  These  are 
insuperable  paradoxes  only  to  those  who  deny 
the  right  of  the  SeK  to  exist  apart  from  the 
Ideal  Ego  ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  to  those  who 
fail  to  recognize  the  valid  place  of  ideals  and 
their  significance  in  Reality.  For  the  difficulty 
expresses  twin  truths,  which  must  not  be  con- 
fused, but  which,  in  a  complete  view,  are  '  never 
to  be  sundered  without  tears.' 


THE  REALITY  OF  SELF 


171 


l>±lAx  IJLIV    ill, 

THE   REALITY   OF   SELF. 

In  the  present  chapter  I  shall  defend  the  thesis 
that  the  Self  is  real,  and  the  true  basis  for  any 
theory  of  Reality.  In  this  part  of  the  discussion 
I  am  not  using  ReaUty  in  any  absolute  or  final 
sense,  but  as  implying  genuine  beings  or  real 
existence.  What  Reality  may  be  in  the  last 
analysis  is  a  problem  which  will  come  up  later. 
Our  previous  discussions  have  cleared  the 
ground,  and  now  we  may  get  our  material 
together  and  begin  to  build.  We  have  seen 
that  Experience  is  unfitted  to  serve  as  a  starting- 
point  in  metaphysics.  It  is  a  vague  and  am- 
biguous concept.  It  is  too  wide.  It  cannot 
serve  as  a  criterion  for  reality,  because  every- 
thing shares  in  the  universal  promotion.  But 
when  Experience  is  taken  in  connection  with 
the  Subject  of  experience,  we  are  nearer  the 
truth.    It  is  natural  to  go  a  step  further  and 


' 


ask-what  if  this  Self  as  Subject  in  relation  to 
Object  be  our  criterion  of  reaUty  1    Is  not  tbe 
reverse  contention  an  impossible  position  1    The 
very  denial  of  the  Self  implies  the  affirmation. 
There  can  be  no  surer  test  of  reahty  than  that. 
And    all    experience,   thought,    and    reasonmg 
imply  the  reaUty  of  the  Subject  or  Knower. 
There  is  not  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  does 
not  impUcitly  depend  upon  the  reahty  of  the 
Self     We   have   noted   how   Pragmatism   and 
Humanism  are  forced  to  throw  the  whole  burden 
of  proof  upon  the  Self's  reahty,  whose  satisfaction 
is  the  key  to  what  is  accepted  as  truth.    AU 
theories  of  knowledge  as  '  practical  value '  have 
the  same  axiomatic-and  therefore  often  ne- 
glected-basis.    Even  the  RationaUstic  theones 
imply  the  cogito  in  which  Descartes,  himself  a 
Rationalist,  detected  the  prime  certainty  of  the 
Self's  reahty.    But  we  do  not  need  to  stay  upon 
the  narrow  track  that  has  been  worn  by  the 
feet  of  the  Rationalists.    The  universe  is  ours ; 
abundance  of  Me  is  ours ;    the  experiences  of 
emotion,  activity,  imagination,  memory,  aspira- 
tion and  purpose,  as  well  as  thought,  are  all 
ours  1    Why  should  we  narrow  our  world  to  a 
mere  cogito  1    Such  a  Umitation  was  the  source 


172    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

of  Kant's  refinements  of  the  Self.  Feeling  and 
will  give  evidence  of  stronger  convictions  than 
thought,  and  furnish  many  infalUble  proofs. 

In  short,  the  reality  of  Self  cannot  be  denied 
without  at  the  same  time  being  affirmed.    It 
is  imphed  in  every  theory  of  reahty,  and  forms 
the  secret  source  of  whatever  plausibility  such 
a  theory  may  have.    It  is  not  proved  merely 
from  the  side  of  thought ;    it  is  also  felt  and 
realized  in  our  pursuit  of  ends,  and  in  the  execu- 
tion of  our  purposes.    In  addition  to  these  very 
cogent  considerations,  we  have  the  metaphysical 
necessity  that  if  we  cannot  trust  the  reality  of 
ourselves,  then  we  are  in  the  darkness  of  agnos- 
ticism, and  the  deep  darkness  of  scepticism.    And 
further,  it  is  evident  that  if  there  be  no  such 
reahty  as  ourself,  then  there  is  no  link  between 
the  mere  constructions  of  a  world  in  thought  on 
the  one  side,— perhaps  as  arbitrary  as  the  'moves' 
allotted  to  the  various  pieces  in  chess— and,  on 
the  other,  the  world  of  genuine  existence  and 
experience  with  which  we  have  actually  to  deal. 
Bradley  admits  off-hand  that  the  Self  is  of 
course  a  fact  in  some  sense  and  to  some  extent, 
but  the  question  is,  how^^    He  never  seem^ 

'  Appearance,  etc.  p.  103. 


THE  REALITY  OF  SELF  173 

very  concerned  about  the  positive  problem. 
He  shares  with  Cleon  the  glory  of  an  accomplish- 
ment in  which  philosophers  have  been  somewhat 
proficient, — 

'  And  I  have  written  three  books  on  the  soul, 
Proving  absurd  all  written  hitherto, 
And  putting  us  to  ignorance  again.' » 

We  saw,  however,  that  he  could  not  really  dis- 
pose of  two  meanings  of  SeK,  viz.  the  Essential 
Self  as  feeling,  and  the  Self  as  the  Subject  in 
relation  to  the  Object.*  Now  these  are  precisely 
the  two  meanings  most  accordant  with  our  view 
of  the  SeK.  Accordingly  we  may  proceed  with 
fuller  confidence  to  our  constructive  exposition. 

What  is  here  meant  by  the  Self  will  become 
clearer  upon  closer  examination.  When  it  is 
said  that  the  essential  relation  of  Subject  and 
Object  precludes  us  from  treating  of  the  Subject 
in  itself,  I  demur.  Such  a  complete  prohibition 
of  aU  distinctions  would  destroy  all  knowledge. 
We  would  be  unable  to  speak  of  anything  at  all 
as  distinct  from  the  whole  system  of  relations ; 
that  is,  we  would  need  to  keep  absolute  silence. 
We  may  certainly  distinguish,  but  not  separate, 

»  The  Poetical  Works  of  Robert  Browning,  voL  L  p.  542. 
« Supra,  Part  I.,  Chapter  II, 


174    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

the  Subject  from  the  Object.  This  is  all  I 
desire  to  do  in  bringing  out  what  is  implied  in 
the  Self,  as  Subject. 

(1)  Consider   then,    in    the    first   place,    the 
different  plane  occupied  by  the  Subject  to  that 
which  is  occupied  by  the  Object.    Further  light 
will  come  by  reflecting  that  the  'Object'  of 
which   we  speak,   in  relation  to  the  Subject, 
denotes  nothing  in  particular,  while  the  Subject 
does.    The   objective   side   of  inner   life   may 
contain   any   kind    of  presentation,    from   the 
perception  of  a  varied  landscape  to  the  thought 
of  oneself !    In  this  way  then  the  Subject  is 
the  one  centre  of  a  shifting  circumference,  in 
addition  to  its  being  the  condition  of  the  ex- 
perience of  such  a  world  of  objects,  as  I  have 
previously  shown. 

•  I  am  a  part  of  all  that  I  have  met ; 
Yet  all  experience  is  an  arch  wherethro' 
Gleams  that  untravell'd  world,  whose  margin  fades 
For  ever  and  for  ever  when  I  move.'  » 

(2)  But  secondly,  this  one  Subject  is  also 
realized  to  be  the  same  '  I '  as  that  which  feels, 
and  that  which  wills.  Hence  the  Subject  is 
already  consolidated  by  fusing  with  the  centre 

'Tennysoa's  'Ulysses,'  Works,  etc.  p.  95. 


THE  REALITY  OF  SELF  176 

of  all  our  experiences.    The  old '  faculty '  psycho- 
logy has  been  abolished ;   all  subjective  pheno- 
mena are  now  seen  to  be  related  to  the  Self  as 
a  unitary  being.    But,  behold,  no  sooner  is  this 
position    accepted    than    we    have    threats    of 
execution  of  the  Self,  as  a  capd  mmtuum  of 
metaphysics!    And    we   hear    of   'psychology 
without  a  Self ' !    Well,  our  concern  is  not  with 
psychology  here ;  but  it  seems  the  height  of 
perversity  to  repudiate  faculties,  and  then  deal 
treacherously  with  the  conscious  unity  which 
must  take  their  place. 

(3)  Now  thirdly,  this  Self  must  be  iieraical ; 
must  include  the  Ego.    For  the  mere  series  of 
states  could  not  know  itself  as  a  unity  unless 
the  Subject  were  the  common  centre  of  refer- 
ence to  the  different  presentations.    To  deny 
this  identity  of  the  knower  would  mean  that 
we  are  shut  up  to  merely  instantaneous  experi- 
ences.   The  rejection  of  this  latter  absurdity  is 
also  involved  by  our  Self-activity,  which  con- 
sciously passes  over  the  elements  of  the  time- 
series  in  the  steadiness  of  purpose  and  in  the 
fulfilment  of  the  plan  of  a  life.    And  feelmg 
speaks  out  for  the  Ego,  not  only  by  its  immed^ate 
testimony,  but  from  the  place  which  it  pleases 


176    THE  PROBLEM  OP  PERSONALITY 

the  Ego  to  assign  it  in  Ms  life.  The  emotion 
may  be  controlled  ;  the  appetites  may  be  related 
to  a  Self,  which  is  conceived  as  permanent; 
and  which  defers  its  gratification  till  the  time 
required  in  its  own  plans  as  a  rational  harmony. 
Let  us  not  be  ashamed  of  this  belief  in  personal 
identity;  but  rather  let  us  regard  its  ancient 
vogue  as  confirmatory  of  the  conclusions  of 
philosophy,  experience  and  common-sense.  I 
shall  touch  on  some  objections  presently. 

(4)  Fourthly,  the  objective  series  is  subordi- 
nate to  the  WiU  of  the  Ego.    The  object  is  a 
changing  manifold.    The  objects  get  related  by 
being  apperceived  by  a  Subject,  which  gives  to 
them  a  certain  permanence  reflected  from  its 
own.    They   are   unified   and   related   to   past 
objects.    They  are  constructed  into  an  identical 
world,  that  lasts  from  moment  to  moment,  and 
is  subject  to  the  laws  postulated  by  the  reason. 
This  is  posited  as  the  Not-Self.    But  there  is 
a  much  more  manifest  evidence  of  the  Will  than 
this,  which  is  somewhat  subtle,  and  is  obscured 
by  epistemological  questions.     This  is  the  direct 
evidence,  and  absolute  conviction  that  by  the 
exercise  of  my  will  I  can  make  changes  in  the 
world  of  objects.    It  is  manifest  therefore  that 


THE   REALITY  OF  SELF 


177 


we  have  here,  in  the  Self,  an  emphasis  upon 
the  subjective  and  self-active  element  which 
predominates  over  the  objective,  as  the  potter 
over  the  clay  in  his  hand.  And  to  refuse  to 
form  an  estimate  of  the  Subject,  because  it  is 
related  to  the  Object,  is  like  refusing  to  credit 
the  potter  with  anything  more  than  the  abstract 
relation  to  clay. 

(5)  Fifthly,  what  are  we  to  say  of  the  alter- 
native, adopted  by  some  psychologists  and  the 
Radical  Empiricists,  of  seeking  in  the  stream 
of  consciousness  for  the  Self,  as  the  'passing 
thought,'  or  as  'the  mere  idea  of  the  Ego' 
which  is  constructed  in  the  course  of  experience, 
and  plays  its  part  with  other  conscious  elements  ? 
Well,  in  addition  to  our  previous  criticism  of 
James,^  I  may  add  that  this  device  really  in- 
volves the  Self  which  is  supposed  to  be  dis- 
integrated. For  the  accusations  that  the  SeK 
is  an  intellectual  construction  involve  also  in 
the  same  charge  the  theories  of  the  '  stream  of 
consciousness '  and  the  '  passing  thought '  and 
'  the  Self  as  a  mere  idea.'  For  they,  too,  are 
constructions.  Experience  gives  none  of  these 
hypothetical  moments  of  consciousness  in  which 

1  Supra,  Part  I.,  Chapter  I. 
M 


178    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


the  flow  consists  !  On  the  contrary,  it  gives  us 
longer  or  shorter  glimpses,  or  synthetic  apper- 
ceptions, of  things,  which  are  as  cogent  evidences 
of  identity  as  the  '  allotted  span  '  of  human  life  ! 
And  further,  such  constructions  as  Empiricists 
put  forward  are  incapable  of  being  made,  except 
by  the  active  mind  of  a  Self,  enduring  through 
time,  and  able  to  transcend  the  terms  of  the 
series,  and  connect  them  into  a  system.  Nor 
does  the  endowment  of  the  *  passing  thought ' 
with  spiritual  privileges  help  us.  It  is  false  to 
experience  ;  it  is  a  mere  device  ;  and  it  is  a  less 
simple  theory  than  that  which  it  seeks  to  sup- 
plant. Such  atomistic  theories  of  mental  life 
and  of  Selfhood  either  involve  the  error  and 
scepticism  of  Hume  ;  or  else  they  '  beg '  per- 
sonal identity,  and  reproduce  it  in  the  mysterious 
capacities  of  the  *  passing  thought,'  while  pro- 
fessing to  have  explained  it  away. 

(6)  Sixthly,  the  psychological  difficulties  of 
multi-personality  and  secondary  selves  do  not 
affect  the  Self  as  we  have  viewed  it,  from  the 
metaphysical  standpoint.  The  old  sets  of  habits, 
or  the  strange  modes  of  behaviour,  which  appear 
in  such  abnormal  cases,  affect  only  the  ethical 
personaUty,  and  not  the  existential  Self.    It  is 


THE   REALITY  OF  SELF 


179 


the   same   Subject   still,   in  an  epistemological 
sense  ;  but  the  habits  and  meanings  are  different. 
Much  of  the  emphasis  placed  upon  the  pheno- 
mena of  so-called  '  multi-personality '  causes  a 
departure  from  scientific  views  of  mental  pro- 
cesses to  such  an  extent  as  to  imply  the  miracu- 
lous, without  any  intention  of  such  a  concession. 
If  it  be  true,  as  every  psychologist  holds,  that 
perception,  habit,  memory,  and  the  other  mental 
conditions  are  built  upon  the  data  of  previous 
experience,  then  there  cannot  be  an  absolute 
break  in  the  continuity  of  the  mental  life,  or 
there  would  be  no  materials  for  the  new  experi- 
ences.   If  the  old  material  is  drawn  upon,  it 
must  be  by  the  same  epistemological  Subject 
as  existed  before.    I  believe  that  these  pheno- 
mena are  abnormalities  of  habit,  and  certainly 
belong  to  the  realm  of  values,  and  not  of  exist- 
ence, in  so  far  as  the  Self  is  concerned.    Pro- 
fessor Royce  says  that  there  are  many  so-called 
Selves  which  are  not  true  Selves,  on  his  theory  ; 
and  under  this  head  he  would  no  doubt  dismiss 
such  abnormahties.    Were  it  not  for  this  proviso, 
he  would  find  this  side  of  empirical  psychology 
most  damaging  for  his  view  of  the  Self  as  ideal ; 
and  he  would  then  be  unable  to  claim  that  his 


180    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


theory  avoids  the  empirical  difficulties.  The 
theory  here  set  forth  misses  these,  in  maintain- 
ing that  the  Self  as  really  existing  is  not  con- 
cerned with  the  attainment  or  non-attainment 
of  certain  purposes,  meanings,  or  ideals.  And 
it  is  evident  that  the  purely  social  character 
of  selfhood  on  Royce's  theory  and  its  nature 
as  a  mere  contrast-effect  is  quite  remote  from 
my  view,  which  insists  that  the  Self  must  be 
a  real  being.  We  do  not  need  to  employ  the 
misleading  term  Substance,  of  which  no  one 
knows  anything,  except  that  in  the  material 
worid  ,uaLs'we«  supposed  to  iolere  in  it. 
It  is  an  entirely  different  point  to  maintain 
that  this  'I,'  this  Self,  which  thinks,  feels, 
and  wills,  which  is  the  centre  of  experience  for 
me  ;  which  is  capable  of  making  judgments  and 
of  conceiving  purposes,  is  a  real  being.  Viewing 
the  Self  as  the  identical,  constitutive  and  active 
centre  of  reference  in  consciousness,  as  the  Sub- 
ject in  relation  to  the  spiritually  conditioned 
Object,  can  it  be  denied  that  the  Self  exists,  is 
real,  and  is  our  first  criterion  of  ReaUty  at  the 
immn  pomt  of  view  ! 


CHAPTER  IV. 
METAPHYSIC   OF   EXISTENCE. 

The  reality  of  the  Self  constitutes  the  reality 
and  trustworthiness  of  our  experience.  This 
furnishes  the  motif  of  the  profound  efforts  of 
Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel,  and  more  recently,  of 
Green,  Munsterberg,  Schiller  and  others,  to 
evolve  the  world  of  experience  from  the  Ego, 
whether  it  be  conceived  as  in  some  way  a  tran- 
scendental, noumenal,  absolute,  or  universal 
principle ;  or  as  the  will  that  takes  attitudes ; 
or  as  the  active  Self  which  seeks  satisfaction. 
In  diverse  ways  these  theories  express  the 
central  importance  of  the  spirit  in  a  theory  of 

reality. 

Now  we  are  in  a  position  to  accept  experience 
as  it  burns  in  the  focus  of  subjectivity.    WheD^ 
these  rays  of  light  come,  we  do  not  yet  V        ; 
but  meanwhile  we  have  guarded  agaim     the 


\ 


182  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

acceptance  of  the  rays  apart  from  the  focus ; 
and  have  provided  against  the  substitution  of 
merely  conceptual  for  actually  existing  rays, 
burning  in  a  real  focus.  And  we  have  seen 
that  whatever  reahty  the  rays  may  have,  they 
derive  it  from  their  appearance  in  the  focus. 
In  other  words,  we  find  two  truths  about  the 
Object ;  first,  that  it  is  conditioned  by  spirit, 
that  is,  by  being  known,  and  otherwise  related 
to  the  Ego ;  and  second,  that  the  Self  which 
provides  the  imity  of  Objects  in  relation  to  a 
Subject,  imparts  to  them  also  of  its  own 
reality. 

A  word  or  two  more  on  these  points  will  lead 
us  beyond  them.  I  say  firstly  that  what  the 
Object  is  apart  from  a  Subject  we  can  never  know. 
It  cannot  be  said  to  exist  independently  of  Spirit. 
Nor  could  it  be  constituted  in  its  nature  as  it  is 
but  for  the  synthetic  activity  of  Spirit.  I  do 
not  surely  need,  at  this  time  of  day,  to  inveigh 
any  further  against  the  Ding-an-sich  or  any  such 
'  rudimentary  organ '  of  Realism.  As  to  this* 
point,  namely,  the  constructive  part  played  by 
the  irdnd  in  experience,  we  do  not  require  merely 
logical  and  abstract  categories,  which  are  drawn 
up  post  rem,  and  are  reminiscent  of  Scholas- 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE 


183 


ticism.i  but  we  may  emphasize  the  case  of  ideali- 
zation.   There   the   contribution   of  the   Mind 
appears  as  an  agreeable  exaggeration  of  the  part 
played  by  it  in  perception.    In  Art,  '  a  portion 
of  fife,'  as  Zola  said,  is  '  seen  through  the  medium 
of  a  temperament.'    In  common  Hfe,  do  we  not 
often  consciously  read  into  things  our  memories 
and  imaginings,  and  so  transform  them  to  our 
wish  by  our  Self-activity  ?    For  my  own  part, 
I  do  not  beUeve  that  we  really  Icnow  any  subject 
till  we  have  thus  fused  it  with  our  memories, 
interests  and  associations  in  the  heat  of  feeling 
and  will,— a  process  closely  akin  to  ideahzation. 
And  I  Im  perfectly  convinced  that  experience 
and   knowledge    are    so    constructed   by    Self- 
activity.    Voluntarism  best  expresses  this  truth, 
and  hints  at  the  essential  attempts  of  the  Subject 
to  reduce  the  Object  to  identity  with  itself.    But 
I  must  pass  on  to  the  second  point. 

The  reality  which  we  have  seen  to  belong  to 
the  Self  cannot  be  withheld  from  the  Object 
which  is  essentially  related  to  the  Subject,  and 

I  Kanfs  Deduction  of  the  Categories  from  the  Transcendental 

TTni^^f  Apperception  is.  however,  the  classical  mstaace  of    he 

^    IwTthe  spiritual  or  noimienal  ReaUty  constitutes  the 

rSbtiS^f  eCrience.  and  even  the  world  of  phenomena 

as  manifesting  the  order  of  Nature. 


184    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

thus  expresses  the  nature  of  the  Self.  So  we 
have  now  a  valid  claim  to  regard  the  experience 
of  the  world  as  real. 

Now  this  raises  the  question  which  has  not 
prominently    appeared    as    yet.     What    is    the 
relation  between  different  Selves  ?     How  do  we 
pass  from  one  to  another  ?     I  answer :   (a)  in 
the  first  place,  that  the  question  is  really  less 
difficult  for  us  than  for  the  man  who  takes  '  Ex- 
perience '  as  his  starting-point.    He  thinks  that 
he  escapes  the  problem  by  assuming  the  stand- 
point of  a  communal  experience  !    But  the  pro- 
blem is  there  all  the  time,  with  others  which  are 
apt  to  be  ignored  !     (b)  In  the  second  place,  the 
bodily  presence  of  others  is  guaranteed  as  real 
by  our  foregoing  argument  proceeding  from  the 
reaHty  of  Self  to  that  of  experience,  in  which 
other  Selves  play  a  part,     (c)  But  thirdly,  the 
recognition  of  other  personaUties  as  located  in 
human  bodies  springs  up  with  the  earliest  con- 
victions,   in   point   of  temporal   development; 
prior  in  fact  to  the  consciousness  of  Self.     The 
child  depends  upon  his  mother  and  nurse,  and 
in  his  dawning  consciousness  Uves  through  them. 
The  point  of  metaphysical  interest  in  this,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  temporal  and  genetic  priority 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE         185 

of  the  consciousness  of  other  Selves  ;  what  con- 
cerns us  is  the  logical  truth  that  emerges,  viz. 
that  experience  is  essentially  of  such  a  natme 
that  other  personalities  exist  and  share  in  it. 
In  other  words,  it  does  not  lead  us  to  regard 
Selfhood  as  a  mere  contrast-effect  and  a  purely 
social  relationship,  as  Professor  Royce  holds,  but 
it  leads  us  to  view  experience  as  partaking  of  this 
social  character  just  as  surely  as  it  involves  the 
representation  of  things  as  separate  in  Space  and 
Time.     This  conviction  is  also  dependent  upon 
the  reality  of  the  body,  in  which  our  own  Selfhood 
as  volimtarily  active  meets  with  other  Selves 
under  objective  conditions;    and  so  the  body 
plays  a  unique  part  in  our  experience  not  only 
of  other  Selves,  but  of  the  World,  and  of  the 
essential  relation  existing  between  Selves  and 
the  World,     (d)  But  fiiiaUy,  this  community  of 
experience  is  not  sufficiently  explained  without 
seeking  to  account  for  the  agreement  and  har- 
mony of  Self  with  Self,  and  of  the  World  with 
Selves  in  certain  respects.    What  imparts  to  us 
this  similarity  in  knowledge  and  experience? 
How  can  the  common  intelUgence  in  Selves,  and 
in  the  World,— which  Selves  explore  and  reduce 
to  rationaUty,— be  explained  ?    Not  by  the  mere 


186  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

effulgence  of  light  from  the  particular  Subject  for 
which  it  exists  epistemologically  ;  for  as  we  have 
seen  the  Object  is  broken  up  and  part  is  postu- 
lated as  Not-Self !    And  this  is  the  part  which 
unexpectedly  manifests  that  striking  identity, 
rationality,  and  intelligibihty  which  is  so  awe- 
inspiring,  and  which  must  spring  from  a  spiritual 
source.    The  conviction  of  the  absoluteness  and 
objectivity  of  the  World,  this  Not-Self,  cannot 
be  given  up.    Nor  can  the  wondrous  harmony 
of  Spirit  and  the  Universe  be  ignored.    This 
antinomy  Ideahsm  recognizes  and  solves.     The 
universality  and  pervasiveness  of  Intelligence, 
Order,  and  Law  point  to  a  Spiritual  Principle 
which  constitutes  existence  as  rational  and  har- 
monious.   The  conditions  of  experience  point  to 
the  same  conclusion.    The  world  of  relations 
can  be  synthesized  and  known  only  by  a  Mind, 
and  so  it  is  required  that  the  Universe  be  con- 
ceived as  constituted,  as  surely  as  it  exists,  by 
the  Supreme  Mind  for  whom  all  things  are.    So 
conceived,  the  Spiritual  Principle  must  be  of  the 
form  of  Subject  and  Object ;  for  that  is  precisely 
the  relationship  which  must  obtain  between  the 
Universe  as  existing  Jm  such  a  Spiritual  Prin- 
ciple and  the  Spiritual  Principle  as  knowing  and 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE 


187 


80  constituting  the  Universe.  But  this  answers 
to  our  description  of  a  Self.  Therefore,  the 
Spiritual  Principle,  whatever  else  it  may  be, 

must  be  a  Self. 

Let  us  now  look  once  more  at  the  relation 
between   Selves.    We   saw   that  their   mutual 
relationship,  and  their  relation  to  the  World 
demanded  a  Spiritual  Principle  to  explam  their 
community    of    agreement    and    intelligibihty. 
This  appears  as  an  immanent  principle  m  regard 
to  the  content  of  their  experience,  but  it  leaves 
their  particularity  and  private  Selfhood  mtact 
The  failure  to  provide  for  this  on  the  part  of 
'  Pure  Experience  '  phUosophy  breaks  down  its 
argument.    The  respects  in  which  this  imrmn- 
ence  may  be  found  to  consist,  may  be  here 
specified  as  follows : 

(1)  First,  it  gives  us  subjectivity  of  such  a 
kind  that  its  objective  content  harmonizes  with 
the  worlds  of  all  rational  Selves.  This  is  the 
so-caUed  a  priori  Self-activity  of  minds. 

(2)  Second,  it  provides  the  daia  of  our  expen- 
ence  with  their  capacity  for  being  known,  because 
they  are  themselves  the  Objects  of  a  Supreme 
Mind.  This  saves  us  from  aU  the  perils  of  a 
merely  Subjective  Ideahsm. 


188  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

(3)  Third,  our  '  universe  of  discourse '  and 
common  rationality  may  be  said  to  manifest  the 
same  immanent  Principle.  Hence  Science  and 
Jiducation  owe  their  existence  to  the  presence 
of  the  same  principle  of  inteUigence  and  ration- 
ality in  the  Selves. 

(4)  And  fourth,  the  objectivity  of  view  which 
Selves  seek,  the  desire  to  see  the  universe  siib 
specie  a^nitatis,  and  aU  ideals  of  truth,  as  weU 
as  those  of  beauty  and  goodness,  with  which  we 
shall  be  concerned  in  the  next  Chapter,  are 
manifestations  of  this  immanent  and  universal 
Principle. 

A  deep  conviction  which  gives  rise  to  many 
of  the  subjoined  criticisms  and  theses  may  be 
here  stated.  There  is  a  profounder  meaning  in 
existence  than  metaphysicians  have  usually  been 
ready  to  discover.  Their  training  in  the  world 
of  conceptions  and  methods  of  logic  has  tended 
to  make  them  restricted  in  their  vision.  Is  not 
this  the  Uving  message  of  James  and  Bergson 
for  our  day  ?  Everything  that  actually  is,  is 
bearing  witness,  clear  and  infaUible,  so  far  as  it 
goes,  to  the  nature  of  Reality.  The  mere  theory 
that  you  or  I  may  mean  by  our  manipulation  of 
conc^tions  may  or  may  not  be  true  :  and  con- 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE 


189 


sidering  the  wide  diversity  of  opinions,  we  have 
to  say,  cannot  be  quite  true.    But  everything 
that  actually  has  come  to  be  in  the  universe,  that 
really  exists  is  a  messenger  and  a  revelation  from 
the  Unseen !    It  does  not  mean  that  we  should 
study  the  mere  form.    That  would  lead  us  into 
the  conceptual  realm  again.    But  it  means  that 
we  should  regard  the  interpretation  of  these  thmgs 
as  organized  capacities  showing  that  the  Unseen 
must  be  such  that  it  is  so  manifested.    And  as 
interpretation,  this  is  not  so  mysterious  and 
productive  of  difference  of  opinion  as  the  objector 
might  think.    For  it  is  patent  to  all  reflective 
minds  that  in  life,  growth,  animal  organism,  con- 
sciousness,   and    Selfhood    we    have    stages    of 
development,  in  which,  even  without  gomg  into 
teleology  and  the  world  of  values,   we  have 
different  kinds  of  being,  representing  various 
modes  or  functions  of  Existence.    Sufficient  is 
it  to  say  that  in  Selfhood  we  have  evidence 
of  a  completer  being  than  any  so-called  lower 
kind  can  give.    Hence  we  view  the  Umverse 
and  the  Reality  which  it  represents  as  bemg 
such  that  Selfhood,  ultimately  stated  in  terms 
of  value  as  Personality,  expresses  its  highest  form 
of  Existence. 


190    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


So,  when  we  are  honestly  and  critically  anthro- 
pomorphic in  our  construction  of  Reality,  we 
may  feel  a  conviction  which  no  shallow  arguments 
can  disturb.    And  when  we  see  in  Personality  our 
highest  category  of  explanation,  and  apply  it 
in  order  to  imderstand  the  Universe  and  the 
ultimate  Reahty,  we  have  two  infaUible  proofs. 
First,  we  have  the  testimony,  and  now  so  rapidly 
growing  conviction  that  this  is  almost  the  last 
word  of  present-day  philosophy,  that  Reality 
must  be  conceived  in  terms  of  Thought,  Spirit, 
and    Personahty.    And    secondly,    we    have    a 
reflection,  which  we  do  not  need  to  suppress 
when  we  leave  our  study  and  class-room,  and 
have  the  budding  trees  of  spring,  the  singing 
birds  and  the  gay  butterflies  as  our  companions  ! 
We  may  feel  with  the  poet — 

'  To  me  the  meanest  flower  that  blows  can  give 
Thoughts  that  do  often  lie  too  deep  for  tears.' 

For  the  conviction  may  well  sweep  over  us  that 
there  is  nothing  incongruous  in  PersonaUty's 
claim  of  a  relationship  with  this  world  of  Nature, 
nothing  unsound  in  our  apphcation  of  Per- 
sonality as  our  category  of  explanation,  not 
merely  because  all  things  are  ours  as  knowing 
Subjects, — that  thought  we  have  banished  mean- 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE         191 

while  in  place  of  another.  The  fresh  thought 
is  this— the  Universe  is  so  related  to  Personahty 
that  Personality  Ms  really  appeared  as  the  child 
of  All!  It  exists;  it  is  real ;  it  has  being,  how- 
ever  it  may  be  interpreted ;  and  it  cannot  be 
gainsaid.  And  not  only  so  ;  but  aU  things  else 
appear  as  stages  in  its  growth  to  produce  for 
Nature,  '  Man,  her  last  work,'  who  seems  so  fair  ! 
And  he,  as  Personahty,  can  know  nature  and 
rethink  her  laws,  which  so  far  from  being  dead 
and  impersonal  have  actually  produced  Life  and 

Personautv  • 

Now  it  seems  to  me  that  this  is  so  much 
better  than  the  halting  forms  of  logic,  that  it 
is  in  reahty  the  source  of  what  is  valuable  m 
formal  logic  itself.    Bradley  comes  too  late  to 
tell  us  what  the  world  should  be  hke  to  har- 
monize with  his  riddles  ;  for,  in  however  abstract 
a  fashion,  logic  has  had  only  this  basis  of  ex- 
perience to  go  upon  in  spite  of  itself.    And  from 
the  life  of  the  Ego  have  come  its  forms  of  Identity, 
and  the  like,  and  the  categories  of  Causality, 
Substance,  and  so  on.    That  is  part  of  the  hen- 
tage  left  us  by  Kant.    Fichte  expounded  the 
great  thought  in  his  own  wonderful  way.    And 
when  Hegel  turned  to  the  world  of  experience 


192    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

with  his  abstract  forms,  and  sought  to  recon- 
struct it  in  Schelling's  phrase  as  '  a  petrified 
logic/  he  was  really  building  better  than  he  knew. 
For  the  deepest  motives  for  such  attempts,  and 
their  secret  source  of  profound  rationahty  are 
not  to  be  found  in  their  conceptualizing  a  living 
universe,  but  in  their  re-vivifying  of  logic  by 
laying  the  quick,  breathing  body  of  Experience 
upon  its  corpse.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
see  how  Hegel  was  driven  to  urge  the  revision  of 
logic  ;  and  he  built  his  great  dialectical  process 
upon  forms  which  ran  counter  to  the  rules  of  the 
scholastic  logic.  And  so  rationality  is  more  than 
a  mere  name,  not  because  it  is  understood  to  be 
postulated  in  the  text-books  of  logic,  but  because 
it  is  immanent  in  us,  and  in  the  Rock  of  ReaUty 
from  whence  we  are  hewn.  Or,  to  drop  the 
figure,  the  stages  of  real  existence  which  cul- 
minate in  Personahty  give  us  our  best  and 
surest  hints,  inkHngs,  and  even  revelations  of 
the  nature  of  the  Unseen,  and  teach  us  that 
Reality  indubitably  manifests  Rationality  and 
Personahty,  that  the  Living  God  is  at  the  heart 
of  things. 

Accordingly  we  must  characterize  Reality  as 
essentially  of  the  nature  of  an  Absolute  Self. 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE         193 

This  result  may  be  reached  by  another  line  of 
argument,  in  addition  to  those  which  I  have 
employed  on  the  grounds  of  Existence.  Such, 
for  example,  is  that  which  seeks  to  provide  for 
the  ultimate  principle  of  Unity.  No  final 
pluraUty  of  reals  can  stand  the  onslaught  of 
the  argument  from  relations.  In  the  last  resort 
existence  must  be  a  Unity.  But  in  characteriz- 
ing this  Unity,  philosophers  have  had  recourse 
to  various  abstractions,  such  as  Being,  Sub- 
stance, the  Absolute  Idea,  Energy,  and  so  forth. 
But  no  conception  of  the  Unity  will  suffice 
which  does  not  provide  for  the  disconnectedness 
of  things  and  the  plurality  of  Selves.  And  the 
only  type  of  Unity  which  can  meet  these  demands 
is  that  which  also  provides  us  with  our  solution 
of  the  puzzle  of  the  One  and  the  Many,  and  is 
by  its  very  nature  a  Unity  in  diversity.  The 
manifold  of  experience  is  given  to  us  in  the 
unity  of  one  conscious  Subject.  That  is  the 
prototype  of  the  relation  between  monism  and 
pluralism.  And  so  Personality  not  only  proves 
to  be  the  prime  unit  of  reality,  the  criterion  of 
existence,  the  synthetic  principle,  the  condition  of 
experience,  the  best  mode  of  existence,  and  the 
highest  category  of  explanation,  but  it  is  also  the 

N 


194  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

supreme  type  of  Unity,  and  the  only  solution  of 
the  Sceptic's  problem  of  the  One  and  the  Many. 
And  now  I  will  briefly  state,  from  the  stand- 
point of  a  Metaphysic  of  Existence,  a  theory  of 
the  Absolute,  reserving  a  more  detailed  ex- 
position of  it  till  the  concluding  Chapter,  after 
an  examination  of  the  influences  derivable  from 
a  Metaphysic  of  Values.  I  hold  that  we  are  led 
to  view  ReaUty  as  the  Absolute  Self  who  is  also 
the  Unity  of  all.  So  far  we  have  seen  that  the 
Self  is  at  least  Subject  in  relation  to  Object. 
Such  too,  we  find,  not  from  analogy  alone,  but 
from  the  nature  of  the  conditions  of  Being,  must 
the  Absolute  Self  be.  As  Subject  and  Object 
He  embraces  all  existence,  and  in  fact  consti- 
tutes it  so.  We  can  further  say  that  as  we — 
although  in  an  imperfect  manner — constitute  our 
Object,  so  does  He,  as  Subject,  but  imto  per- 
fection. As  the  distinction  of  Subject  and  Object, 
however,  implies  an  inevitable  difference  between 
them,  as  well  as  an  essential  relation,  so  the 
Absolute  as  Subject  is  necessarily  different  from 
the  Absolute  as  Object.  This  is  essential  to  the 
Divine  Self-consciousness.  It  implies  also  the 
existence  of  a  world  of  conscious  beings,  who 
constitute  the  *  Other  '  to  God.    But  while  with 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE         195 

us  the  difference  between  Subject  and  Object 
is  beyond  our  complete  control,  with  Him  the 
Object  is  Self-determined  to  be  distinct  from 
Himself  as  Subject.  This  delivers  the  universe 
from  the  mere  identity,  the  blank  undifferentiated 
Unity  of  Pantheism,  and  most  forms  of  Abso- 
lutism. Self-Hmitation  is  a  most  important  cate- 
gory  as   Hegel   showed — and   is   the   essential 

attribute  of  the  Absolute  as  Subject ;  and  this 
Self-determination  posits  relative  independence 
to    the    Object.    Three    logical    stages    in    the 
Divine  Life  may  be  stated,  and  subsequently 
explained  on  the  basis  of  our  own  Selfhood. 
(1)  The  first  is  His  Subjectivity,   Onmiscient, 
Eternal  and  Self-determining.     (2)  The  Second 
is  His  Objectivity,  posited  in  relation  to  Himself 
as  Subject,  and  consisting  of  the  real  universe 
in  time,  including  our  experience,  and  being  thus 
itself  of  the  same  type  of  Subject-Object.    (3) 
And  the  third  stage  is  included  m  the  second, 
as  Object,  but  is  given  the  special  character  of 
Not-Self,  by  the  Divine  Self-limitation.    It  is 
posited  as  autonomous,  apart  from  essential  and 
constitutive  conditions.^    His  highest  glory.  His 

1  Cf.  the  poUtical  relationship  of  the  British  Empire  and  the 
self-governing  Colonies. 


196    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


essence  of  rationality,  and  His  sign  of  Personality 
is  revealed  in  this  Self-determination.  This 
Divine  positing  of  an  Other  in  Himself  as  Not- 
Himself  is  equivalent  to  the  so-called  '  creation  ' 
of  an  infinity  of  Selves  with  their  own  point  of 
view,  as  finite  Subjects,  with  their  own  moral 
autonomy  and  individual  freedom,  with  their 
own  privilege  of  the  voluntary  choice  of  good- 
ness, and  participation  in  the  life  of  God.  Now 
the  essence  of  this  Not-Self  as  posited,  is  the 
likeness  of  the  human  Selves  to  God  Himself. 
These  Selves  are  microcosms  of  the  Macrocosm, 
the  Divine  Self.  In  spite  of  finitude  and  imper- 
fection,  they  may  realize  their  spiritual  privi- 
leges  of  progress  towards  likeness  to  God.  And 
a/theyLfthe  Ideals  which  ..the  earnest 
of  their  inheritance  they  become  imbued  with 
the  Immanent  Principle,  or  the  Logos  which, 
as  we  saw,  gives  to  the  Selves  community  of 
experience,  rationaUty,  order,  and  objectivity  of 
vision,  besides  the  moral,  aesthetic  and  reUgious 
evidences  of  Divinity  in  humanity.  This  Pro- 
gress or  Development,  whether  in  the  individual 
or  the  race,  is  the  striving  of  the  Objective  side 
of  the  Absolute  back  to  Subjectivity.  And  all 
the  concrete  forms  which  the  Object  has  mani- 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE         197 

fested  in  the  course  of  historical  Evolution  are 
but  growing  revelations  of  the  Absolute  Spirit 
as  living,  organized,  conscious,  and  finally  self- 
conscious    and    self-determining,    as    it   is   the 
essence    of  Divinity   to    be,    unto    perfection. 
When  we  say  that  these  forms,  produced  in  the 
course  of  development,  are  stages  in  the  pro- 
gress to  Divine  Subjectivity,  and  are  also  stages 
towards   the   Not-Self,   or   in  the   direction   of 
alienation    from    Divine    Subjectivity,    we    are 
stating  a  paradox  which  contains  a  great  truth, 
as  an  illustration  will  make  clear.    In  Nature 
every    such    manifestation    is    a    step    towards 
independence  and  self-activity.    The  simple  unity 
of  a  passive  material  universe  is  broken  up  by 
each  sprout  of  Ufe,  organism,  or  personality,  that 
sets  itself  up  to  be  something  on  its  own  account. 
The  essence  of  human  subjectivity,  for  example, 
is  exclusiveness  and  isolation, — '  I  am  I ' ;  but, 
as  Hegel  showed  in  his  dialectical  treatment  of 
the  Person,!  this  is  but  the  first  step  to  larger 
organization  and  ultimate  unity  of  the  Indi- 
vidual with  Society,  with  the  Universe,  and  with 
the  Absolute  Spirit.^    So  the  progress  of  Divine 

1  Philosophy  of  Right,  Introduction. 

•Professor  Muirhead  expounds  this  principle  in  relation  to 


198  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


Objectivity  to  Divine  Subjectivity  is  through 
negation  and  alienation,  by  becoming  part  of 
the  Divine  Not-Self,  and  finding  in  this  life  of 
otherness  the  immanence  of  the  Logos  which 
shall  make  possible  a  life  of  Godlikeness,  akin 
to  the  full  organization  and  Self-determination 
of  the  Divine  Subjectivity. 

Before  closing  this  Chapter,  some  illustrations 
may  be  given  of  the  relation  of  the  Divine  Self 
and  Not-Self.  If  it  be  said  that  it  is  unreason- 
able to  speak  of  the  Divine  Object,  and  of  the 
Divine  Not-Self,  as  in  any  real  sense  God,  I 
reply  by  refening  to  instances  in  human  life. 
(a)  In  ourselves  we  find  the  world  of  experience 
within  a  unity  of  Self,  part  of  which  is  yet  posited 
as  Not-Self.  God  needs  no  such  external  World 
to  constitute  His  Personality — ^as  Lotze  convinc- 
ingly showed  in  answer  to  objections  ^ — as  if  the 
Absolute  were  dependent  upon  the  conditions  of 

IdeaUsm  (Art.,  Ency.  Brit^'\  vol.  xiv.  p.  286).  The  momerUa 
of  Idealism  are  found  in  the  successive  and  correlative  prin- 
ciples, *  Without  mind  no  orderly  world  ' :  '  Without  the  world 
no  mind.'  He  concludes  by  saying,  *  Subject  and  object 
grow  together.  The  power  and  vitality  of  the  one  is  the 
power  and  vitality  of  the  other,  and  this  is  so  because  they 
Z  not  two  things  with  separate  roots,  but  are  both  rooted 
in  a  common  reality  which,  while  it  includes,  is  more  than 
either.' 

^  Microcosmus,  Bk.  II.  Chap.  IV. 


METAPHYSIC  OF  EXISTENCE         199 

development  pecuUar  to  finite  beings !    But  the 
Universe  of  the  Self-existent  Absolute  Experi- 
ence is  posited  as  'the  Other'  by  His  Self- 
determination,  while  He  is  also  in  a  certain  sense 
the  Unity  of  all.    (b)  Again,  we  are  able  to 
present  to  ourselves  the  objects  of  desire  and 
aspiration,  although,  in  spite  of  the  aesthetic 
pleasures  of  idealization  and  anticipation,  we 
have  to  confess  them  unreahzed  and  unattained, 
and  to  admit  their  character  as  Not-Self,    (c) 
And,  as  another  illustration  of  the  same  prin- 
ciple, we  have  habits  and  modes  of  activity 
which  manifest  the  Self  and  which  yet  have  sunk 
from  the  level  of  consciousness  and  will.    These 
are  a  Not-Self  to  us,  although  produced  by  our 
volitions  in  the  past,  and  they  are  still  part  of 
our  wider  Self.    A  certain  autonomy  is  shown 
in  habit,     (d)  And  finally,  in  self-sacrifice  and 
self-determination,  that  which  is  ours  is  at  once 
owned  and  disowned,  and  we  have  the  glory 
of  the  Cross,  a  reflection  of  the  Divine  Nature, 
and  a  cumulative  proof  of  the  reasonableness 
of  the  view  sketched    so  imperfectly  in   this 
chapter. 


CHAPTER  V. 


METAPHYSIC   OF   VALUES. 

Different  from  the  point  of  view  of  Existence 
is  that  of  Meanings,  of  Ideals,  of  Values.  For  a 
full  exposition  of  this  difference  between  that 
which  merely  is  and  that  which  is  appreciated, 
apprized  and  approved,  we  would  need  to  refer 
to  Kant,  Royce,  Ward,  Miinsterberg,  and  Eucken. 
It  is  only  possible  here  to  insist  upon  the  im- 
portance of  this  distinction  between  the  realm 
of  mere  Fact,  and  the  reahn  of  Value.  To  the 
latter  sphere  we  now  pass.  Here  we  may  sub- 
stitute the  Concept  of  Personality  for  that  of 
the  Self.  Personality,  as  we  have  seen,  refers 
to  aU  the  relations  which  pertain  to  Selfhood, 
the  social,  ethical,  aesthetic,  intellectual,  and 
rehgious  ideals  which  give  life  its  worth  and 
meaning.  In  the  past  Chapters  this  aspect  has 
not  been  always  completely  excluded,  owing  to 
the  limitations  of  the  method  of  abstraction. 


METAPHYSIC  OF  VALUES  201 

If  we  have  not  suffered  the  brightness  of  the 
Ideal  to  shine  forth  like  the  full-orbed  moon  in 
the  heavens,  we  have  not  always  been  able  to 
hide  the  irridescence  of  its  silver  glory  through 
the  cloud  of  Existence. 

Beginning  again  at  our  finite  point  of  view,  we 
must  consider  what  constitutes  us  as  real  Persons. 
And  I  may  be  very  brief,  as  I  am  in  substantial 
agreement  here  with  the  conclusions  of  Professor 
Royce,  in  regard  to  the  Ideal  Ego.^    But  I  con- 
sider that  in  the  world  of  Existence  the  Self  is  a 
real  being.    In  the  world  of  Values,  however,  I 
agree  that  the  Personality  is  constituted  as  real 
by  the  meaning,  purpose,  or  ideal,  which  pro- 
duces order  and  unity  out  of  the  chaotic  confusion 
of  mere  impulse  and  caprice.    And  it  is  just  in 
proportion  as  this  plan  is  organic  to  all  the  true 
interests  of  the  life  of  the  individual  and  of  the 
*  over-individual,'  that  Personality  is  attained. 

The  question  arises  then,  to  what  do  these 
values,  meanings,  and  ideals  refer  as  their  stan- 
dard and  end  ?  We  find  certain  moral,  intel- 
lectual, aesthetic  and  religious  appreciations, 
which  are  considered  as  constitutive  of  Personal- 
ity, on  account  of  their  place  in  a  normative 

1  See  Supra,  Part  I.,  Chapter  III. 


202    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

system.  For  these  we  all  live,  for  these  some 
would  even  dare  to  die.  Is  the  norm  a  matter  of 
individual  and  subjective  taste,  or  has  it  a  certain 
universal  validity  and  objective  character  ?  In 
ordinary  life  we  find  that  what  we  do  has  a 
reference  to  some  end,  which  gives  to  the  action 
a  purposive  character.  But  further,  out  of  these 
volimtary  acts  certain  are  approved  and  certain 
are  condemned.  Now  I  maintain  that  this  critical 
reference  of  purposes  to  a  standard  is  but  a 
higher  form  of  the  relation  of  aU  action  to  an 
end.  In  other  words,  all  judgments  are  cases  of 
teleological  or  purposive  reference. 

We  shall  select  the  moral  aspect  as  that  which 
may  best  present  the  argimient.  The  elementary 
fact  here  is  that  of  voluntary  or  purposive  activ- 
ity, upon  which,  as  I  hold,  the  explanation  of 
the  highest  development  of  vaUdity  depends.  It 
is  brought  out  by  the  simple  question, — Why 
did  I  act  so  ?  The  answer  is— I  had  some  end 
in  view.  Now  what  is  this  end  ?  The  Hedonist 
rashly  answers  in  terms  of  personal  sensibility. 
But  if  I  always  act  so  from  my  own  pleasure,  no 
solution  of  the  problem  of  the  subsequent  approval 
and  disapproval  is  forthcoming,  and  we  are  left 
with  merely  a  universal  principle,  by  which  to 


METAPHYSIC  OF  VALUES  203 

interpret  all  human  actions !     Accordingly  the 
Hedonist  has  to  set  out  on  his  long  voyage  for 
the  End  in  terms  of  pleasure,  and  yet  as  pro- 
viding for  the  problem  of  approval  and  dis- 
approval.  We  do  not  need  to  follow  him  into  the 
deeps  of  metaphysics  where  his  Universalistic 
needs  compel  him  to  steer  his  course.    It  is  suffi- 
cient to  know  that  he  is  afloat  on  this  ocean  of 
speculation,  which  allows  a  course  for  all  kinds 
of  craft.    So,  setting  out  again  for  ourselves,  we 
observe  in  the  first  place  that  the  end  to  which 
all  purposive  conduct  must  be  relative  is  centred 
in  the  Personahty  which  conceives,  appreciates 
and  executes  it.    Apart  from  this  no  ground  for 
values  can  be  found,  any  more  than  a  theory  of 
reahty  can  be  held  by  an  unreal  Self  .^    The  result 
is  that  Personahty  is  in  some  way  an  end  in  itself. 
But  evidently  this  end  is  not  mere  sensibihty. 

For  if  so,  we  must  either  deny  the  distinctions 
of  worth  in  conduct ;  or  else  we  must  regard 
these  moral  distinctions  as  unproductive  of  any 
genuine  act,  and  merely  an  empty  phrasing  of 

'  ThU  is  manifestly  one  of  the  main  contentions  of  Pragmatist 
and  Humanist.  These  theories  of  truth  depend  upon  the 
existence  of  a  Self,  whose  satisfactions  or  dissatisfactions  are 
impUed  in  the  estimate  of  the  results  of  conduct,  by  which  Truth 
is,  in  their  view,  to  be  explained  in  the  long  run. 


204    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

thought,  after  the  fact.  Both  alternatives  are 
absurd.  Therefore,  whatever  part  pleasure  may 
play  in  the  End,  it  is  not  the  sole  constituent  of 
it.  The  conclusion  is,  then,  that  every  purposive 
act  is  expressive  of  some  phase  or  other  of  Per- 
sonahty,  which  is  alone  capable  of  being  con- 
ceived as  an  end  in  itself.  This  contention  is 
vastly  strengthened  by  the  consideration  of 
Obhgation.  But  in  the  second  place,  the  merely 
individual  Person  cannot  be  viewed  as  the  End. 
His  Hfe,  his  meanings,  his  ideals  are  unrealizable 
in  isolation.  He  is  a  member  of  society,  and 
is  dependent  upon  others  for  the  expression  of 
himself,  and  for  the  realization  of  values  which 
make  his  life.  He  has  relations,  also,  to  the 
World,  and  to  God,  which  form  an  integral  part 
of  his  true  Personality.  Hence  the  End  is  Per- 
sonahty,  not  in  isolation,  but  in  its  complete 
circle  of  relations.  As  Professor  Palmer  says, 
the  *  conjimct '  character  of  Personahty  must 
essentially  be  present  in  the  End.^  In  Self- 
realization,  then,  as  the  development  of  the 
whole  Personality  in  all  its  relations,  is  to  be 
foimd  the  End. 

1  The  Field  of  Ethics.    Kant's  Categorical  Imperative  involves 
the  worth  of  the  good  will  in  relation  to  the  Kingdom  of  Ends. 


METAPHYSIC  OF  VALUES 


205 


The  central  fact  of  ethics  is  Conscience.  Upon 
the  interpretation  of  that  psychological  datum 
the  general  ethical  doctrine  largely  depends.  The 
theory  of  Conscience  which  I  here  present  has 
close  affinities  with  the  view  of  the  End  as  Self- 
reaUzation,  and  with  a  theory  of  the  ground  of 
Moral  Obhgation.  In  my  view  Conscience  is  the 
consciousness  of  the  Ideal  Self,  not  as  a  conception 
of  it  in  perfection — which  is  unthinkable, — ^but 
as  the  impUcation  of  the  bettered  SeK  of  the 
succeeding  stage  of  life.  This  Ideal,  which  con- 
stitutes the  moral  Person  as  the  Unity  of  impulses 
that  are  in  themselves  discordant  and  fragmen- 
tary, is  presented  to  consciousness,  and  the 
reactions  of  the  actual  to  the  Ideal  Self  in  terms 
of  feehng,  thought,  and  will,  produce  the  pheno- 
mena of  Conscience.  As  feehng,  it  expresses  the 
congruity  or  incongruity  of  the  actual  Self  with 
the  ideal  Personality.  As  will,  it  represents  the 
response  of  activity  called  forth  in  us.  As 
thought,  it  has  the  prerogative  of  taking  into 
account  the  full  set  of  circumstances,  and  also 
the  rational  law  which  is  behind  the  contrast. 
So  Conscience  is  always  adapted  to  the  con- 
ditions of  the  individual  and  the  race.  And  what 
is  the  Law  itself  ?    It  is  the  fundamental  principle 


206    THE   PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

of  Progress  upon  which  the  universe  and  Per- 
sonaUty  rest,  as  the  Objective  of  the  Divine  Sub- 
ject.   The  differentiations  of  the  real  world,  its 
stages  of  development,  the  values  of  Ufe,  the 
reaUty  of  Selfliood,  and  PersonaUty  as  an  End, 
all  depend  upon  this  fundamental  law  of  Progress 
on  the  part  of  the  Divine  Object  towards  the 
Divine  Subject.    Or  to  state  the  matter  in  less 
controversial  terms,  the  law  which  makes  the 
'Categorical   Imperative,'   the   'Ought,'   is  the 
fundamental  one  of  all  experience,  namely,  that 
in  the  process  of  change,  which  is  ever  going  on  in 
the  universe,  the  moments  should  add  the  present 
conditions  to  the  past.     It  is  unthinkable  that 
decay  and  subtraction  could  have  constituted 
the  temporal  universe.     On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  the  essence  of  rationaUty  to  synthesize  ;   it  is 
the  essence  of  hfe  to  grow,  of  organism  to  become 
more  completely  organized,   of  PersonaUty  to 
realize  more  and  more  fully  the  capacity  and 
harmony  of  its  nature.     But  even  this  cannot 
give  the  weight  of  moral  responsibiUty  to  the 
Law  which  experience  and  reason  attest.   Neither 
the  ObUgation,  nor  the  law  of  Progress  on  which 
it  rests,  nor  Conscience  as  we  have  explained  it, 
nor  the  meaning  of  PersonaUty  itself,  can  be 


METAPHYSIC   OF  VALUES 


207 


adequately  explained  without  reference  to  the 
Objective  and  Perfect  PersonaUty,  through  whom 
alone  the  Law  and  the  process  are  explicable,  and 
without  whom  the  community  of  interests  in  the 
Good  would  be  beyond  our  understanding.  Once 
more  we  are  led  to  Personality  as  the  Supreme 
Principle,  in  this  case  from  the  side  of  moral 
values.^ 

And  the  argument  from  inteUectual  and  aes- 
thetic values  is  somewhat  similar.  I  beUeve  that 
the  theories  of  knowledge  as  practical  value, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  demand  the  reaUty  of 
Personality,  to  confirm  or  reject — according  to 
the  reaction  upon  experience, — will  find  their 
true  warrant  in  terms  of  the  satisfaction  of  the 
whole  man  in  reference  to  his  Ideal.  So  truth 
will  be  regarded  not  merely  as  that  which '  works,' 
but  as  that  which  accords  with  the  impUcated 
Ideal  of  a  progressing  Self  and  a  wider  experience, 
in  a  paraUel  manner  to  the  case  of  Conscience  ; 
and  the  Laws  of  Reason  will  be  found  rooted  and 
grounded  in  the  same  principle  of  Progress.  And 
only  by  the  postulation  of  a  Perfect  PersonaUty 

^  Lotze  reserved  the  term  Personality  for  Grod.  This  usage, 
however,  is  apt  to  deny  to  man  genuine,  albeit  imperfect.  Per- 
sonality {i.e.  the  Self,  as  it  is  termed  in  this  work),  as  Royce 
appears  to  do,  so  far  as  the  world  of  Existence  is  concerned. 


208  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

can  the  ideals  of  truth,  beauty  and  goodness  be 
explained.  For  aesthetically  also,  our  sense  of 
the  beautiful  is  similar  to  the  fact  of  Conscience, 
in  which  the  coming  event  casts  its  shadow 
before, — a  reversal  of  the  psychological  fact  of 
after-images,  being  rather  the  content  of  a  kind 
of  sense  of  expectancy.  And  the  compatibility  of 
the  Ideal,  so  far  as  it  is  conceived,  with  the  Actual 
presentation  to  consciousness,  gives  pleasure, 
intellectual  stimidation  and  artistic  activity ; 
while  incompatibility  offends  our  taste.  But 
such  things  are  only  for  a  being  who  '  looks  before 
and  after,'  who  can  appreciate,  and  harmonize 
the  various  claims  of  the  Ideals  which  are  sought. 
Therefore,  whether  the  artist  knows  it  or  not,  the 
passion  for  a  perfect  form  which  fills  his  soul,  and 
the  longing  for  a  deeper  harmony  than  any 
known  before,  are  akin  to  the  hunger  and  thirst 
after  righteousness,  and  point  to  an  Ideal  Unity 
in  which  our  aspirations  shall  be  satisfied.  All 
ideals  are  glimpses  of  the  Perfect  Spirit,  who,  as 
reMgion  also  testifies,  has  formed  us  for  Himself. 
And  our  heart  is  restless  until  it  finds  rest  in  Him. 
The  positive  definition  given  to  PersonaUty  in 
Chapter  II.  of  the  Second  Part,  as  the  Self  in 
the  full  circle  of  its  relationships,  not  only  helps 


METAPHYSIC   OF   VALUES 


209 


US  to  understand  the  various  qualities  that  mark 
off  one  human  personality  from  another,  in  regard 
to  individuaUty  ;  but  also  gives  us  a  clue  to  the 
interpretation  of  Divine  Personahty  in  other  than 
negative  terms,  and  thus  removes  the  favourite 
objection  to  the  Personality  of  God  as  implying 
limitation.  God,  we  may  say,  is  fully  Personal 
in  the  infinity  of  His  relations  (compare  Spinoza's 
*  Substance '),  and  is  only  limited  in  the  world 
of  Values  as  of  Existence  by  His  Self-Determina- 

tion. 

The  remaining  questions  may  be  left  over  to 
the  closing  Chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


METAPHYSIC   OF   REALITY. 

We  have  now  seen  that  the  trend  of  the  argument 
from  the  side  of  Values  is  as  strongly  in  favour 
of  Perfect  Personality  as  the  argument  from  the 
side  of  Existence  was  in  favour  of  the  Absolute 
Self.  The  result  is  the  fusion  of  the  two  ideas. 
As  in  ourselves  we  find  one  Personahty,  although 
conceivable  either  as  an  existing  Self  or  as  appre- 
ciative Personahty,  so  we  reach  the  conclusion 
that  there  is  an  Absolute  Personahty,  who  exists, 
and  whose  nature  is  the  perfect  fulfilment  of  all 
meanings,  values,  and  ideals. 

And  further,  as  we  saw  that  the  stages  of  suc- 
cessive existence  in  the  World-Order  represent 
under  the  form  of  Time  the  Uving  and  Personal 
Reason  immanent  in  Reahty  ;  now  we  supple- 
ment that  view  by  the  recognition  of  the  meaning 
and  significance  of  these  stages  in  the  develop- 
ment.   These  stages  are  seen  to  be  explicable  only 


METAPHYSIC  OP  REALITY 


211 


teleologically,  as  involving  a  reference  to  a  stan- 
dard, an  End,  which  is  hid  in  the  Absolute, — 

*  That  one  far-off  Divine  event, 
To  which  the  whole  creation  moves.* 

And  in  our  view  of  Reality  as  Personality,  these 
stages  are  gradations  in  which  the  Divine  Subject 
is  immanent  in  proportion  to  their  manifestation 
of  His  own  transcendent  life.  And  so  there  are 
degrees  of  Reality — ^in  the  full  sense  of  the  term, 
— ^according  to  the  *  aU-inclusiveness  and  har- 
mony ' — to  borrow  Bradley's  phrase — of  these 
several  orders  of  Existence,  in  relation  to  the 
Absolute  Life.  But  this  progress  to  Divine  Sub- 
jectivity involves  on  the  part  of  the  Divine  Objec- 
tive, a  kind  of  alienation  as  the  condition  of  the 
reahzation  of  ultimate  harmony  with  His  tran- 
scendent nature.  And  the  forfeiture  of  that 
independence  on  the  part  of  the  human  person 
under  any  condition  implies  the  loss  of  the 
promised  inheritance,  and  the  retrogression  to 
the  merely  Objective  plane.  Whereas,  the  im- 
mortal distinctness  of  our  life  as  a  fully  organized, 
complex  and  progressive  Personality  is  essential 
to  the  reahzation  of  a  reflection  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  of  which  we  are  '  broken  lights.'  And 
the  autonomy  of  moral  persons  as  free   and 


212    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

responsible  is  so  necessary  to  a  theory  of  ultimate 
Reality  that  we  are  prepared  to  side  with  those 
who  maintain  the  rights  of  Personality,  even  to 
the  detriment  of  the  final  Unity  or  Absoluteness, 
if  such  an  alternative  is  the  only  one  possible. 
But  this  view  seeks  to  provide  a  place  in  the 
Absolute  for  independent  persons,  by  the  dis- 
tinctions which  we  have  seen  to  be  necessitated 
not  only  by  the  analogy  of  human  Personality, 
but  also  by  the  rational  conditions  of  existence 
and  by  the  truest  harmony  of  meanings.  In  our 
view,  the  Absolute  is  not  the  All,  in  any  sense  of 
an  immediate  and  resistless  Unity  ;  hut  He  is  so 
only  through  ^profound  distinctions,  not  imposed 
upon  Him  from  without,  nor  the  jyroduct  of  chance ; 
hut  as  Self-determined  hy  His  own  Personal  Nature, 
Instead  of  a  blank  Monism,  we  have  a  Unity 
capable  not  merely  of  relative  independence  of 
the  various  parts,  implied  in  the  category  of 
organism,  but  capable  of  the  positive  otherness 
clearly  required  by  the  only  available  and  com- 
petent category  to  apply  to  the  conception  of  the 
Absolute,  namely,  that  of  PersonaHty.  And  as 
we  have  seen,  the  universe  of  separate  things,  of 
living  beings,  of  organisms,  of  consciousness,  of 
PersonaUty,  with   its   Self-distinguishing,    Self- 


METAPHYSIC  OF  REALITY 


213 


N 


determining,  Self-sacrificing  nature,  can  be  truly 
nnififid    only   in   an   Absolute   which   produces 
these  distinctions,  and  provides  for  this  inde- 
pendence,—that  is.   Perfect  Personality.     And 
the  reduction  of  form  to  matter,  the  annulling 
of  distinctions,  the  negation  of  autonomy  which 
are  characteristic  of  every  form  of  Pantheism  and 
of  Absolutism,  except  of  some  such  Personalistic 
type  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  present,  must  be 
regarded  as  radically  defective,  however  successful 
such  systems  may  be  in  displaying  a  smooth 
logical  surface  to  the  conceptuahst.^    The  in- 
spiration of  the  poet  and  the  mystic  in  their 
pantheistic  moods  we  shall  regard  as  empha- 
sizing one  side  of  a  never-faihng  truth,  namely 
the  fundamental  Unity  of  all,  but  as  neglecting 
what  is  perhaps  an  even  greater  aspect,  that 
of  Difference,  of  Meaning,  of  Value,  and  of  Per- 
sonaUty.   We  shall  therefore  supplement  their 
Absolutism  with  the  recognition  of  the  vaUdity 
drawn  from  Personahty  and  Life,  and  confirmed 
by  our  highest  reasoning,  even  when  it  finds 
captivating  expression  as  in  WilUam  Watson's 

^Cf.  Art.  *  Cartesianism,'  by  Edward  Caird,  Em:.y.  Brit{^), 
vol.  v.,  on  the  defects  of  the  Infinite  of  Spinoza,  and  of  all 
Pantheists. 


214    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


Ode  in  May,  in  whicli  he  says,  addressing  the 
sun  : — 

'  Thou  art  but  as  a  word  of  his  speech, 

Thou  art  but  as  a  wave  of  his  hand  ; 

Thou  art  brief  as  a  glitter  of  sand 
'Twixt  tide  and  tide  on  his  beach  ; 

Thou  art  less  than  a  spark  of  his  fire, 
Or  a  moment's  mood  of  his  soul ; 

Thou  art  lost  in  the  notes  on  the  lips  of  his  choir 
That  chant  the  chant  of  the  Whole.' 

The  immanence  of  God  in  the  world  is  a  hope- 
less doctrine  unless  counterbalanced  by  and  har- 
monized with  that  of  His  transcendence.  Our 
view  seeks  to  reconcile  immanence  and  tran- 
scendence, and  to  include  a  theory  of  gradations 
in  the  manifestation  of  the  Reahty  appropriately 
regarded  as  Divine.  In  the  imiverse,  God  is  im- 
manent as  Object  merely,  in  regard  to  the  matter, 
which  serves  as  the  passive  condition  for  develop- 
ment towards  Subjectivity.  In  the  stages  of 
Development,  there  is  a  movement  towards  Other- 
ness, and  through  that  independence  a  fuller 
manifestation  of  Subjectivity,  which  becomes 
more  immanent  as  the  organism  becomes  more 
like  the  Self-existent,  Self-determining,  Divine 
Subject.  In  man's  higher  spiritual  Hfe  and  pro- 
gress in  the  search  for  truth,  goodness  and  beauty, 


METAPHYSIC  OF  REALITY 


216 


the  microcosm  expresses  itself  in  the  highest 
form,  and  these  ideals,— now  become  so  precious 
and  significant, — are  evidences  of  the  immanence 
of  the  Divine  as  Subject— not,  however,  to  the 
negation  of  individuaUty ,  of  the  real  being  of  man 
as  a  part  of  the  Divine  Not-Self. 

As  Professor  Howison  would  say,  God  is  attract- 
ing the  Society  of  Spirits  unto  likeness  to  Himself 
by  Final  Causation  and  through  the  immanence 
of  Ideals.  In  my  view,  however,  PluraUsm  is 
only  a  phase  of  the  Divine  Unity  which  is  ration- 
ally necessary.  The  problem  of  the  One  and 
Many  is  capable  of  solution  only  under  the  form 
of  Personality.  But  this  question  of  Monism  and 
Pluralism  and  the  questions  of  Infinity,  and 
Supra-PersonaUty,  I  have  dealt  with  in  my  criti- 
cisms in  the  First  Part,  and  may  refer  the  reader 
to  those  pages  for  my  views.^ 

As  to  Time,  I  hold  that  it  has  its  place  in  the 
Divine  Objective  as  the  mode  of  the  manifestation 
of  the  Divine  Subject.  The  existent  is  temporal 
because  Time  is  one  of  the  meanings  of  the  Abso- 
lute, who  is  not  in  Time,  any  more  than  judgments 
of  value  are  in  time,  but  who  knows  all  as  in  '  an 
indivisible  instant,'  and  who  manifests  Himself 

1  Supra,  Chaps.  III. -VI. 


216  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

under  the  form  of  Time,  which  therefore  may 
never  be  done  away,  miless  a  state  of  blank 
identity  is  to  supervene  upon  the  order  of  ration- 
ality. Such  a  condition,  even  in  Eternity,  is 
unthinkable.^ 

In  regard  to  Supra-Personahty,  we  may  admit 
that  the  Absolute  is  above  our  highest  conception 
of  Personality,  without  detriment  to  those  essen- 
tials of  Personahty  in  which  we  have  seen  reason 
to  beHeve.  And  it  is  therefore  more  than  a  risk  of 
depersonalization  to  speak  of  Supra-Personahty 
of  the  Absolute  as  prohibitory  of  the  ascription 
of  Personahty  to  Him.  The  result  of  such  a 
position  is  the  postulation  of  a  Supreme  Thing- 
in-Itself  or  Unknowable.  This  was  far  from 
Pfleiderer's  thought  when  he  used  the  term 
'super-personal,'  and  urged  Theists  to  follow 
suit.2  The  danger  of  such  a  com^se  ensues  upon 
placing  the  emphasis  on  the  prefix,  thus  changing 
Theism  into  Agnosticism,  as  Bradley  practically 
does.    But  Perfect  and  Absolute  Personahty  are 

^  Bergson's  idea  of  the  identity  of  Duration  and  Consciousness 
appears  to  me  to  be  an  instance  of  hypostatization,  which  is 
foreign  to  much  in  his  system  that  makes  for  a  concrete  view  of 
Man  and  Nature. 

« Philosophy  and  Development  of  Religion,  by  Otto  Pfleiderer, 
GifEord  Lectures,  vol.  i.  p.  168. 


METAPHYSIC  OF  REALITY 


217 


\ 


terms  which  will  meet  the  requirements  of  meta- 
physics, which,  as  we  have  seen,  both  on  the  side 
of  Existence  and  of  Values,  demands  that  the 
Supreme  Unity  be  viewed  as  Personal.^ 

In  conclusion,  what  then  is  the  relation  of 
Existence  and  Value  ?  From  the  synthetic  and 
Absolute  standpoint,  so  far  as  we  can  conceive 
it,  of  what  does  ReaUty  consist — of  Existence,  or 
of  Value,  or  of  a  xmion  of  both  ?  What  are  the 
mutual  relations  of  these  fundamental  principles  ? 
Such  questions  would  demand  in  reply  a  Meta- 
physic  of  ReaHty  in  the  final  sense. 

From  the  human  point  of  view,  the  matrix  of 
the  outer  reaUty  of  existing  things  cannot  be 
explained  in  terms  of  value.  The  given  element 
exists,  not  because  of  my  attitude  towards  it, 
but  as  a  dcUum  of  experience  which  I  must  accept 
as  material  of  experience,  and  make  the  best  of. 
And  if  we  view  *  things '  in  this  light  as  con- 
ditions of  spiritual  progress,  we  are  not  really 

^  The  objections  to  Divine  or  Absolute  Personality  on  the 
score  of  its  limiting  the  Divine  Infinity  have  been  stated  over  and 
over  again  from  the  time  of  Spinoza  to  the  present  day,  but  do 
not  find  so  much  currency  now  that  Intellectualism  and  Absolu- 
tism are  being  challenged  in  so  many  directions.  They  have 
been  well  answered  by  Lotze,  Microcosmus,  Bk.  11.,  Chap.  IV. ; 
Martineau,  A  Study  of  Religion,  voL  ii.  p.  181 ;  Royce,  The 
World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  ii.  pp.  418-425. 


218    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 


at  the  human  standpoint  any  longer.     And  I 
repeat  that  Existence  is  inexplicable  in  terms  of 
my  meaning,  for  it  goes  beyond  my  meaning, 
and  presupposes  my  values,  inasmuch  as  my  own 
existence  as  a  Self  is  something  which,  of  course, 
I  could  not  accomplish  or  effect.    But  when  we 
take  the  hint  as  to  the  teleological  explanation 
of  Existence,  that  is,  when  we  pass  to  the  Abso- 
lute standpoint,  so  far  as  we  can,  we  are  impelled 
to  beheve  that  Existence  is  expressive  of  the 
Meaning   of  the   Perfect   Personahty.     As   the 
existing  details  of  a  picture  may  be  pointed  out 
by  a  critic,  with  only  a  partial  conception  of  the 
meaning  of  these  details,  so  we  as  human  beings 
are  able  to  say  what  is,  from  the  standpoint  of 
Existence,  without  resolving  its  existence  into 
what  we  mean,  or  to  terms  of  practical  value. 
But  every  stroke  of  the  brush  had  a  meaning  for 
the  Artist,  and  the  existence  of  every  detail  is 
but  an  incident  in  the  complete  meaning  which  is 
expressed  in  the  existence  of  the  picture.    So  the 
universe  as  Existence  is  explicable  in  terms  of  the 
Absolute  Meaning,  and  at  that  ultimate  point  of 
view,  the  worlds  of  Existence  and  of  Value  upon 
which,  in  distinction  from  each  other,  I  have  laid 
so  much  stress,  coalesce  as  the  complete  Expres- 


METAPHYSIC  OF  REALITY 


219 


sion  of  Divine  Purpose  and  of  Absolute  Value. 
Or,  as  Professor  Koyce  would  say,  the  External 
is  ultimately  reducible  to  the  Internal  Meaning. 
In  this  final  synthesis  of  the  logical  stages  of 
the  Divine  Life  and  Purpose,  we  pass  from  the 
finite  and  human  standpoint  in  which  the  real 
and  the  rational,  the  '  is '  and  the  '  ought,'  the 
Existent  and  the  Ideal,  the  Self  and  the  immortal 
Personahty,  are  in  irreconcilable  duaUsm, — ^to 
the  view  '  under  a  form  of  eternity  '  in  which  all 
is  known  as  the  manifestation  of  Meaning  and 
Purpose.  And  the  Plan  of  the  Divine  Subject 
'  which  brought  us  hither,'  and  has  revealed  Him- 
self to  mankind  by  the  Logos,  ever  present  with 
the  race  in  Spirit,  and  historically  manifested  in 
Jesus  Christ,  the  Incarnate  Word,  and  the  '  ex- 
press image '  of  the  Person  of  God,  will  not  be 
defeated  by  the  dissolution  of  our  personahties  ; 
but  will  be  more  completely  fulfilled  in  our 
immortahty  as  individuals.  For,  as  we  b^ve 
seen,  this  distinctness  from  the  Divine  Subject 
is  the  condition  of  the  Universe  as  significant 
and  ordered,  the  path  to  its  truest  unity  and 
fullest  organization,  and  the  expression  of  His 
Eternal  Will  and  Purpose  in  bringing  many  sons 
unto  glory.     And  while  now  we  know  only  in 


220    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PERSONALITY 

part,  when  that  which  is  perfect  is  come,  we 
shall  know  even  as  also  we  are  known.  In 
that  fuller  light  all  Being  will  be  seen  as  Value — 
our  own  Personalities  will  be  known  as  expres- 
sions of  the  Complete  Ideal.  We  shall  behold 
God's  face  in  righteousness,  and  we  shall  be 
satisfied,  when  we  awake,  with  His  Ukeness. 


INDEX. 


Abnormalities,  16,  23,  71,  164  n., 

178,  179. 
Absolute,  3,  28,  29,  31,  33,  44,  46, 

48,  61-54,  58,  62  ff.,  70  ff., 

75,84,100,104,  110  £E.,  118, 

119,   126  £E.,   138,   139,   146, 

194-199,  210-220. 
Absolutism,  84,  85,  114,  131, 195, 

213,  217  n. 
Activism,  Monistic,  144,  156  n. 
Activity,    14  n.,    20,    27,    36  ff  , 

78  ff.,    116,    125,    133,    134, 

144,   171,   175,   180  ff.,   197, 

202,  205,  208. 
.Esthetic  aspect,  165, 196, 199  ff., 

207  ff. 
After-images,  208. 
Agent,  162  ff. 
Agnosticism,  28,  90,  93,  138,  172, 

216. 
America,  3,  141. 
Anthropomorphism,  90,  91,  97, 

108,  116,  117. 
Apeirothism,  143. 
Appearance,  27  ff.,  37  ff.,  40  ff., 

46,  62,  90,  113,  133. 
Apriorism,  106. 
Aristotelianism,  86,  92,  106. 

Art,  183. 

Aspiration,  23,  171,  199. 

Association,  73. 

Associationism,  15,  16. 

Atheism,  102. 

Atomistic  units  of  consciousness, 

m  10. 

Atonement,  67. 


Autonomy,    Moral,     66,     78  ff., 

195  ff.,  211,  213. 
Avenarius,  24,  140. 
Axioms  as  Postulates,  104,  107, 

108,  116,  120. 

Bakewell,  142. 
Baldwin,  J.  T.,  143. 
Beauty,  188,  208,  214. 
Becoming,  91,  101,  102,  119. 
Being,  62,  72,  73,  132,  146,  169, 

189,  193,  194,  220 ;   Theory 

of,  66,  60  ff. 
Bergson,  47  n.,  81  n.,  139,  144, 

146,  156  n.,  188,  216. 
Berkeley,  19. 
Biology,  98. 
Body,  11, 14  n.,  19,  21,  22,  35,  39, 

40,  57,  125,  166,  184  ff. 
Bowne,  B.  P.,  142. 
Bradley,  F.  H.,  4,  Part  I.  Chap. 

II.,  64,  69,  73,  99,  112,  113, 

115,  124,  125,  131,  132,  133, 

137,  141,  146,  153,  161,  162, 

172,  191,  211.  216. 
Brain,  10,  25. 
British  Empire,  195  n. 
Browning  quoted,  173. 

Caird,  Edward,  15,  146,  168  n., 

213  n. 
Caird,  John,  146. 
Calkins,  Miss,  5  n. 
Cambridge  School,  141. 
Categories,  80,  85,  94,  99,  132, 

182,   183  n.,   190,   191,   193, 

195,  212. 


222 


INDEX 


INDEX 


223 


Causality.  124,  191. 

CausatioD,  27,  82.  101,  108 
Efficient,  19,  78,  79,  82,  85. 
Final,  78,  79,  82,  86,  97,  124, 
215. 

Cause,  80,  85,  91,  99,  100. 
First,  101. 

Chance,  20,  41,  120,  212. 

Change,  10    11,  27,  38,  49,  102, 
110,  144,  163,206. 

Choice,  82,  105. 

Christianity,  55  n.,  74  n.,  86,  136. 

aty  of  God,  79,  82,  86. 

Cleon,  173. 

Coenesthesia,  35,  49,  173 

Communion,  20. 

Community,    74  n.,   79  ff.,     127, 
207. 

Comparison.  23,  38,  57. 

Conscience,  78,  205  flf. 

Consciousness,   10  ff.,  15,  17,  22, 
61,    68,     60,    65,    71,     78, 
80  ff.,  91,  92,  95,  96   107  ff., 
123,  126,  129,  141,  144,  145, 
154,  158,  160,  164,  166,  177, 
180,  184,  185,  189,  199,  208, 
212,  216  n. 
Atomistic  units  of,  10. 
Field  of,  23,  111. 
Stream  of,  158,  161,  177. 

Continuity,  19,  35,  39,  49,  107. 
Felt,  11. 

Contradiction,  108. 

Contrast-effect,  57,  69,  180,  185. 

Cosmogony,  1. 

Cosmological  Proof,  101. 

Creation,  79-82,  87  n.,  98,   196, 
211. 

Criterion,  28,  111,  180. 

Cross,  The,  199. 

Davidson,  Thomas,  142, 143, 146. 
Definition,  35,  49,  65,  167. 
Degrees  of  Truth  and  Reality, 


Descartes,  81,  90,  92,  133,  171. 
Desire,  35,  199. 
Determinism,  20,  82. 
Development,  196,  197,  199,  206, 

211,  214. 
Dewey,  John,  138  n.,  143. 
Difference,  24,  193,  194,  213. 
Dilemma  of  Determinism ,.82. 
Ding-an-sich,    182.    {See    Thing- 

in-itself.) 
Distinctions,  67,  145,   152,   157, 

173,  203,  212,  213,  218. 
Diversity,  37  ff.,  47,  48,  52,  133, 

163,   193.     {See  Unity  and 

Diversity. ) 
DuaUsm,  22, 23.  95, 102, 115, 124, 

219 
DuaHty,  69,  73,  153,  155. 
Duration,  144,  216  n. 
Duty,  3. 

Ego,  12,  15,  40.  66,  68.  69,  73. 

99,    120,    143,    158,    160  ff., 

165  ff.,   175,   176,   181,   182, 

191.  201. 
Transcendental,   95,    96,    115, 

116,  181. 
Eleatics,  102. 
Emotion,  89.  171,  176. 
Empiricism,  21,  61,  106,  114, 116, 

178. 
Radical  9,  17    18,  22-25,  89. 

137,  141,  146.  153,  154,  177. 
End,  201-204,  206,  211. 
Energy,  80,  193. 
England,  131,  141. 
Epistemology,  1  23,  89,  116,  135, 

158,  179. 
Error,  39.  92. 

Eternity,  66.  68,  82,  216,  219. 
Ethical  aspect,  62,  63,  71  ff.,  86, 

163,  168,  200  ff. 
Ethics,  1,  4,  98,  145,  205  ff. 
Eucken,  144  ff.,  156  n.,  200. 
Evil,  67,  82,  92,  101,  111. 


Evolution,  80,  92,  98,  99,  119, 
197. 

Existence,  5,  32,  37,  86,  92, 
98,  101,  125,  132  ff.,  167, 
179  ff.,  Part  II.  Chap.  IV., 
200,  201,  207  n.,  209  ff., 
217-220. 

Expectancy,  208. 

Experience,  vii.,  18,  23,  25-34, 
35  ff.,  42-48,  51,  52,  56,  58, 
69  ff..  75.  78  ff.,  83,  87,  89, 
91,  95,  104,  106,  108.  109, 
112  ff.,  123  ff.,  132,  137  ff., 
141,  145,  147,  Part  II.  Chap. 
I.,  161,  164,  166,  170,  174, 
176ff..  180ff.,187,  191,193, 

195,  198,  199,  206,  207,  217. 
Absolute,     28  ff.,     43  ff.,     48, 

50  ff.,  159,  161. 
Ambiguity  of  term,  43,   152- 

169. 
Phylogenetic.  159. 
Pure,  17,  18,  22,  24,  104,  114, 

140,  141,  146,  153,  157,  159, 

184,  187. 
Experiences.  11, 17,  23,  31,  43,  57, 

62,  71,  73, 144,  154,  162,  175. 

Fechner,  146. 

Feeling,  22,  29  ff.,  36  ff.,  49,  50, 

51,54,94,110,112,123,133, 

134,  158,  162,  164,  172,  173, 

175,  183,  205. 
Feeling  of  Self,  12,  14,  19,  31.  32, 

36,  38,  49,  50  ff.,  173. 
Fichte,  136,  156  n.,  167,  181,  191. 
"  Fighter  for  Ends,"  13,  22. 
Finitude,  91,  100,  102,  117,  118, 

196,  201. 
Force,  96,  100. 

Freedom,  3,  66,  67,  79,  82,  196  ff. 
Free-will,  20,  111. 

Germany,  131. 

Gibson,  W.  R.  Boyce.  6n.,  142. 


God,  3,  20,  34,  66,  67,  72,  76,  78- 
84,  86,  89,  91,  92,  96,  98-103, 
110,  111,  115,  117-121,  124- 
129,  134,  135,  137,  139,  145. 
156,  165,  192,  194,  196,  198, 
204,  207  n,  209,  214,  215, 
219  220. 

Goodness,  102, 108, 188, 196,  208, 
214. 

Gradations,  211,  214. 

.Green,  T.  H.,  15,  131,  134,  136, 
137,  146,  181. 

Growth,  56,  106,  189,  206. 

Habit,  57,  60,  71,  178,  179,  199. 
Harmony,  29,  103,  113,  176,  186, 

206,  208,  211. 
Hedonism,  202,  203. 
Hegel,  29,  47.  131,  132,  134,  136, 

166,  167,  181,  191,  192,  195, 

197. 
Herbart.,  10. 

Hodgson,  Shadworth,  10,  140. 
Holt,  E.  B.,  141. 
Howison,  G.  H.,  4,  66,  76,  Part 

I.  Chap.  IV.,  89,   117,   128, 

137,  142,  146,  215. 
Humanism,  89,  95,  109,  113  ff., 

137,  171,  203  n. 
Hume,  10,  15,  25,  90,  94,  178. 
Hypnotism,  16,  96,  115. 
Hypostasization,  135,  136,  216  n. 
Hypothesis,  108,  138,  144. 

"I,"  13,  14,  14  n.,  16,61,72,73, 
93,  96,  160,  163,  174,  180, 
197. 

Idea,  36,  68,  81,  152,  154,  177. 
Absolute,  136,  193. 

Ideal,  3,  57,  58,  61,  62,  69,  73,  78, 
82,92,  115  ff.,  124,  137,  165, 
168,  169,  180,  188,  196,  200, 
201,  204,  205,  207,  208,  210, 
215,  220. 

Ideal  construction,  40. 


224 


INDEX 


Idealism,  47  n.,  53,  66,  60,  61,  80, 

122,    124,     131,     137,     145, 

163  n.,  164  n.,  186,  197  n. 
Absolute,  42,  47  n.,  61,  68  ff., 

136,  137,  141. 
Personal  (Howison's),  Part  I. 

Chap.  IV.,  89,  113. 
(Oxford),  72,  77,  89,  122,  142. 
Subjective.  83,  187. 
Idealization,  40,  73,  183,  199. 
Identity,  56,  71,  108,  110,  116. 

132,  136,  163,  175,  178,  183, 

186,  191,  195.  216. 
Personal,  11  ff.,  15,  23,  35,  37, 

38,  49,  62,  71,  94.  108,  163, 

176  flf. 
niingworth,  J.  R.,  127. 
Imagination,  60,  73,  171. 
Immanence,  103,  140,  187,  196, 

198,  214,  215. 
Immortality,  1,  2,  3,  66,  67,  83, 

91,  112.  137,  219. 
Imperative,  Categorical,  204  n., 

206. 
Individualism,  21,  103,  204. 
Individuality,   1,   25,   31,   59  ff., 

66.  67,  83, 123,  160,  165,  196, 

197,  202,  204,  209,  215,  219. 
Infinite,  64, 65, 100, 102, 118, 120, 

121,  213  n. 
Infinity,   19,  65,   101,   102,   109, 

118,  127,  143,215,  217  n. 
Intellectual  aspect,  164,  200,  201, 

207  ff. 
Intellectual     construction,     41, 

45  ff.,  51,  52. 
Intellectualism,    41,    60  ff.,    93, 

106,     109,    116,    125,    147. 

217  n. 
Intelligence,  35,  83,  93,  102,  106. 

117.  185,  186,  188. 
Interaction,  Theory  of,  92,  95  ff., 

103,     110,    111,    115,    117, 

120. 
Interaotionism,  21. 


Introspection,  14,  22. 
Intuition,  144,  145. 
Irrationalism,  109. 

James,  William,  vi.  ff.,  3,  Part  I. 
Chap.  I.,  26,  47  n.,  69,  70, 
137  ff..  140,  141,  153,  164, 
161,  177,  188. 

Jesus  Christ,  219. 

Judgment,  23,  202. 

Kant,  80,  90,  92,  93,  95,  100,  115, 
118,  131,  135,  153,  161,  172, 
181,  183  n.,  191,  200,  204  n. 

Kingdom  of  Ends,  204  n. 

Knowledge,  17,  70,  94,  95,  106, 
107,  109,  114,  125,  126,  134, 
135,  137.  156,  171,  183,  185. 
207. 

Ladd,  G.  T.,  142. 

Law,  186,  205,  206,  207. 

Moral,  206. 
Laws  of  thought,  107. 
Le  Conte,  J.,  142. 
Legal  aspect,  166  n. 
Life,  4,  47,  75,  89,  134  n.,  142, 

144,  145,  147,  168,  171,  183, 

189,  191,  197,  206,  213. 
Life-plan,  67,  58,  66,  69,  73,  176, 

201. 
Limit,  167. 
Locke,  10,  15. 
Logic,  1,  28,  34,  47,  48,  106,  112, 

132.  167.  188,  191,  192,  213. 
Symbolic,  74,  74  n. 
Logos,  196,  198,  219. 
Lotze.  110,  111,  123,  161,  198. 

207  n.,  217  n. 
Love,  23,  86. 

M'Dougall,  W.,  143. 
Mach.  24,  140. 
Macrocosm,  196. 
M'Taggart,  86,  129. 


INDEX 


225 


Man,  91,  99,  113,  123,  134,  135, 
145,  191,  207  n.,  214,  216, 
216  n. 

Martineau,  J.,  217  n. 

Mathematical  concepts,  74,  118, 

119. 
Mathematics,    "New,"    64,    66, 

74  n.,  118. 
"Me"  and  "  Not-Me,"   13,  73, 

161,  165,  166. 
Meaning,  61  ff.,  67  ff.,  72,   163, 
173,     179,     180,     Part    II. 
Chap,  v.,  210,  212,  218,  219. 
Internal  and  External,  61  ff.. 
219. 
Mechanics,  98. 
Mechanism,  98,  143. 
Memory,  35,  49,  60,  171, 179. 
Metaphysics,  1-5,  9,  10,  15,  18, 
26,  39,  58,  70,  85,  97,  98, 104, 
114,  118,  119,  128,  130,  137, 
139,  147,  154,  155,  157,  168, 
164,  165,  170,  172,  175,  178, 
184,  188,  194,  203,  217. 
Microcosm,  196,  216. 
Mill,  John  Stuart,  16,  19,  163. 
Mind,  129,   160,   164,   182,   183, 

186,  187,  197  n. 
Minds,  Society  of,  81,  83,  84. 
Mind  and  Body,  21. 
Monads,  35,  39. 

Monism,  3,  19,  66,  77,  79.  83,  86, 
102,  103,  110,  125,  127,  138, 
166  n.,  193,  212,  216. 
Moore,  G.  E.,  140. 
Moral  aspect,  76,  78,  79,  81,  86, 
128,  163,  164,  196,  201,  202, 
203. 
Morality,    83,    123,     136,    137, 

138. 
Motion,  27. 

Muirhead,  Professor,  197  n. 
Miinsterberg,  H.,  20  n.,  133,  142, 

156  n.,  181,  200. 
Mysticism,  61,  153. 


Naturalism,  78,  83. 
Natural  Science,  106,  108. 
Nature.  29,  80,  83,  86,  115,  132, 

183  n..  190,  197,  216  n. 
Nature,  Uniformity  of,  108. 
Negativity,  166,  167. 
Neo-Hegelians,    126,    131,    136, 

146. 
Neo-Kantians,  15,  131,  134. 
Non-contradiction,  28. 
Non-Ego,  161,  165,  166. 
Not-Self,  36,  60,  69,  61,  62,  102, 

108,  160,  161,  164  ff.,   176, 

186.  190,  195  ff.,  215. 
Novelty,  20. 

Object,  10,  22,  23,  43,  69,  112. 
123,  124,  161,  163,  167,  174, 
177,  182,  183,  186,  187, 
194  ff.,  206,  214.  (£fee  Sub- 
ject and  Object.) 

Objective,  206,  211.  216. 

Objectivity,  83,  96, 167, 186, 188, 
195,  196,  198. 

Obligation,  204  ff. 

One  and  the  Many,  27,  37,  48, 
64,  67,  103,  127,  193,  194, 
216. 

Ontological  Proof,  136. 

Ontology,  135. 

Order,  83,  186,  196,  201,  219. 

Organism,  4,  189,  197,  206,  212. 

"Other,"  124,  194,  196,  199, 
212. 

Pam,  48,  61,  162. 
Palmer,  G.  H.,  142,  168,  204. 
Panpsychism,  146,  155. 
Pantheism,  29, 102, 103,  111,  196, 

213. 
Paulsen,  146. 
Pearson,  Karl,  26. 
Perception,  17,  36,  38. 
Perfection,  67,  68,  82,  92.  96, 103. 

110,  135. 194,  206,  220. 


226 


INI)EX 


Perry,  R.  B.,  141. 

Person,  16.  17,  35,  63,  67,  69, 
79  ff..  99,  122  ff.,  127,  137, 
158,  160,  165,  165  n.,  197, 
201  ff.,  205,  219. 
Society  of  Persons,  80,  83, 
127. 

PeraonaHty,  1,  2,  3,  5,  13,  18,  20, 
21,  46,  53,  54,  65,  71,  76  ff., 
81-91,  96,  99  ff..  104,  107, 
113,  115,  116,  122  ff.,  127- 
129,  131,  134437,  139  147, 
153  n..  Part  II.  Chap.  I., 
165  n.,  185,  189-193,  200, 
201,  203-213,  216-219. 
Maltiplex,  16,  96,  178. 
Paradoxes  of,  160,  166-169. 

Personality  of  God,  3,  20,  64,  67, 
84,86,99,101,108,110,117, 
120,  124,  127,  134,  135,  137, 
146,  161,  192,  196,  198,  207, 
209-219. 

Personal  Idealism.  {See  Ideal- 
ism.) 

Personal  Identity.  {See  Iden- 
tity.) 

Pefisimism,  90,  93. 

Petzoldt,  24,  140. 

Pfleiderer,  Otto,  216,  216  n. 

Philosophy,  4,  84,  89,  93,  94,  104, 
109,  114,  115,  118,  126.  127, 
137  ff.,   144,   145,   147,   153, 
176,  190. 
Religions,  75. 

Physico-theological  Proof,  100. 

Physics,  98. 

Pleasure,  48,  162,  202,  203,  204, 
208. 

Pluralism,  3,  19  ff.,  31,  67,  76,  78, 
80,  83,84,91,  102,  103,  110, 
119,  120.  125,  127,  137,  143, 
153,  193,  215. 

Pragmatism,  72,  89,  94,  105  ff.. 
109  ff.,  113,  116,  171,  203  n. 
Method  of,  20. 


Pringle-Pattison,  Andrew  Seth, 
4,  53,  Part  I.  Chap.  VII., 
140,  142,  146,  157,  167. 

Progress.  196,  197,  206,  207,  217. 

Protagoras,  113. 

Psychologist's  fallacy,  45. 

Psychology.  1,  4,  5  n.,  10,  22,  25, 
35,  45,  56  ff.,  71,  157,  175, 
179. 
The  "New,'*  147.  175. 

Purpose,  57,  62,  66,  67,  69,  73,  99, 
109,  116,  117.  171,  175,  179, 
201.  219. 

Qualities,  Primary  and  Secon- 
dary, 27. 

Raehdall,  H.,  4,  Part  I.  Chap. 
VI.,  137,  142.  146. 

Rationalism,  Critical,  61,  171. 

Rationality,  185,  186,  188,  192, 
196,  206,  216. 

Realism,  19,  60,  61,  67,  70, 
76.  140,  163,  169,  164  n., 
182 

Reality,  1,  5.  21,  26  ff.,  30  ff., 
37  ff.,  42,  44  ff.,  50  ff.,  67, 
62ff.,67,70ff.,74,  76,79ff., 
84,91-96,103,  104.111,  113, 
116,  119,  126,  127,  129, 
132  ff.,  136,  138,  139,  142, 
144,  145,  147,  152,  156  ff.. 
167,  169,  Part  II.  Chap. 
III.,  181,  183,  183  n..  188- 
194.  Part  II.  Chap.  VI. 

Reason,  207,  210. 
Sufficient.  108. 

Relation,  15.  18,  27,  38. 

Relations,  15.  17.  37  ff..  47,  48, 
61,  52,  75,  84,  135,  173,  186, 
193.  200.  204,  209. 
Conjunctive  and  Disjunctive, 
19,  24. 

Religion,  20,  91,  111,  127,  137, 
138,  145,  196.  200,  201,  208. 


INDEX 


227 


Religious  Philosophy,  75. 

Renouvier,  C,  143. 

Royce,  Josiah,  4,  47,  53,  Part  I. 
Chap.  III.,  78,  83,  84,  125, 
128,  137,  141,  146,  161,  179, 
180.  185.  200,  207  n.,  217  n., 
219. 

Scepticism,  46, 72, 90, 93, 172, 178. 

Schelling,  192. 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  4,  72,  Part  I. 
Chap,  v.,  137,  140,  142,  146, 
153,  157,  181. 

Scholasticism,  183. 

Schopenhauer,  156  n. 

Science,  12,  91,  98,  108,  147,  188. 

Scottish  Philosophy,  139. 

Selection,  13,  23. 

Self,  vii,  1-5,  9,  11  ff.,  16  ff.,  22- 
27,  30-39,  42  ff.,  48-63,  56- 
67,  69-76,  78,  81,  85,  90-96, 
102,  104  ff,  111,  112,  114  ff., 
125,  126,  128,  130,  132  ff., 
136  ff.,  140  ff.,  146,  147, 
154  ff.,  158  ff.,  164  ff..  Part 
II.  Chap.  III.,  181  ff.,  187, 
194,  198  ff.,  203,  203  n.,  205, 
207,  208,  210,  218. 
Absolute,  53,  61  ff.,76, 139, 155, 
159,  161,  187,  192  ff.,  210  ff. 
Empirical,  13,  16,  56,  58,  59, 

116,  161. 
Meanings  of,  34,  35,  36,  49,  50, 

Part  II.  Chap.  H.,  179. 
Universal,  24,  134,  135,  180. 

Self-consciousness,  37,  38,  62,  56, 
124,  134,  135,  136,  160.  164, 
194,  197. 

Self-definition,  66,  78,  82,  83. 

Self-determination,  82,  120, 
195  ff.,  199,  209,  212,  214. 

Selfhood,  11,  16,  63,  67,  68,  61, 
63,66,75,105,141,158,160, 
164,  167,  168,  178,  185,  187, 
189,  195,  200,  206. 


Self -identity,  37,  108,  116. 
Self-limitation,  1,  195. 
Self-realization,  204,  206. 
Self-representative    sj^tem,    63, 

64,  65,  69,  74. 
Self-sacrifice,  199. 
Selves,  65  ff..  78,  92,  96, 126,  129. 

166,  179,  186,  187,  188,  193, 

196. 
Secondary  selves,  16,  68,  96, 

178. 
Sentience,  29,  30,  42. 
Sidgwick,  Professor,  136  n. 
Social  aspect,  57,  69,  71,  76,  81, 

86,  126,  128,  164,  165,  180, 

197,  200,  204. 
Sociology,  1,  98. 
Socrates,  90. 
Solipsism,  32. 
Soul,  12,  14,  16,  24,  25,  34,  39, 

43,60,61,70,82,83,87,91, 

94,  125,  128,  143,  160,  163, 

164. 
Society  of  Souls,  125,  128. 
Space,  27,  83,  101,  108,  185. 
Spencer,  H.,  28,  113. 
Spinoza,  28,  209,  213  n.,  217  n. 
Spirit,  29,  82,  92,  99,  135,  147, 

160,  164,  181,  182,  186,  190, 

208  219. 
Spirits,  3,  20,  26,  79,  125,  215.  ^ 
Spiritual  Principle,  136, 186,  187, 

188,  196,  205. 
Stages,  67,  189,  191,   195,   197, 

210,  211,  219. 
Standard,  202  ff. 
Stout,  G.F.,  14  n..  142. 
Strong,  C.  A.,  146. 
Sturt,  H.,  142. 

Subject,  22,  23,  30,  42,  43,  45,  52, 
69,  70  ff.,  76,  78,  80,  93,  124, 
164  ff.,  158,  160  ff.,  166  ff., 
170,  171,  173  ff.,  179  ff,  182, 
183,  186,  190,  193  ff.,  206, 

211,  214,  215,  219. 


228 


INDEX 


Subject  and  Object,  18,  19,  23, 
30,  31,  35,  38,  43,  44,  60,  61, 
69,71,74,112,114,124,  132, 
153,  166,  159,  161,  162, 
164  ff.,    171,    173,    174  flf., 

180,  182,  183,  186,  194,  196, 
197  n.,  206,  214,  215. 

Subjectivity,   23,   30,    163,    167, 

181,  187,   195  ff.,  202,  211. 
214. 

Substance,  60.  61,  70,  163,  180, 

191,  193,  209. 
Substantive  and  Adjective,  27. 
Sully,  Professor,  142. 
Supra-personality,    29,    63,    99, 

100,  146,  215,  216. 

Taylor,  A.  E.,  141,  146. 
Teleological  Proof,  100,  101. 
Teleology,  66,  85,  91,  95,  97,  98, 

108,   116,   120,   189,   196  ff., 

202,  211,  218  ff. 
Temple,  W.,  165  n. 
Tennyson  quoted,  174,  211. 
Theism,  136,  216. 
Theology,  1,  67,  85,  101,  165  n. 
Things,  27,  40,  123,  152,  154, 158, 

185,  192,  217. 
ThiBg.in'.itseif,  27,  53.  216.     (See 

Ding-an-sich.) 
Thought,  10,  12,  14  ff.,  24,  30,  47, 

48,  89,  91,  93,  94,  107,  108, 

113,   116,   123  ff.,   133,   134, 

164,  171,  172,  190,  204,  206. 
'*  Passing,"   vi  ff.,   12,  16,  24, 

61,  146,  161,  177,  178. 
Stream  of,  10  ff.,  21,  177. 
Time,  27,  40,  66,  67,  80,  81,  83. 

91,  98,  101,  103,   108,   119, 

127,  129,  163,  178,  185,  195, 

210,  215,  216. 
Time-series,  40,  175  ff. 
Transcendence,  29,  62,  103,  167, 

168,  214. 
Trinity,  165  n. 


Truth,  28,  29,  46,  86,  89,  110. 

132,    171,     188,    207,    208, 

214. 
Tyler,  C.  M.,  142. 

Underbill,  G.  E.,  142. 

Unity,  30,  36,  57-64,  67,  80,  83, 
94, 102, 103, 110,  111,  119  ff., 
125,  156,  175,  182,  193  ff., 
197  ff.,  201,  205,  208,  212, 

213,  216,  217,  219. 

Unity  and  Diversity,  27,  37  ff., 
47,  48,  52, 133, 163, 193,  212, 
213. 

Personal,  16. 

Transcendental,  15,  136,  161, 
183  n. 
Universality,     107,     167,     186, 

202. 

Universe,  33,  44,  46,  47,  55,  66, 

80,  84,  86,  97,  101,  103,  117, 

119   125,  135,  152,  171,  186- 

192,  195,  197,  198,  206,  212, 

214,  219. 
Unknowable,  28,  53,  100,  216. 
Unseen,  189,  192. 

Value,  67,  72,  109,  111,  215,  217- 

220. 
Values,  3,  5,  63,  142,  145,  168, 

179,     189,     194,    Part     II. 

Chap,  v.,  210,  217,  218. 
VoUtion,  23.  29,  30, 158, 103, 164, 

199. 
Voluntarism,  134,  166  n.,  183. 

Ward,  James,  87  n.,  133,  139, 
142,  153,  153  n..  155  n.,  157, 
200. 

Watson,  John,  146. 

Watson,  William,  quoted,  214. 

Whole,  28,  29,  31,  61,  64,  66,  101, 
214. 


IKDEX 


229 


Will,  35,  38,  67,  65  ff.,  83,  89, 100, 
123  ff.,  129,  133,  134,  142, 
144,  156  n.,  162  ff.,  166,  172, 
174,  176,  180,  181,  183,  199, 
205,  219. 

"  Will-to-believe,"  109. 

Wordsworth  quoted,  190. 

World,  34,  52,  66,  89,  91,  92,  96, 
100,  102,  106,  108,  111,  113, 


119,  124,  126,  145,  156,  165, 
172,  176,  183  n.,  184  ff.,  190. 
191,  194,  198,  204,  206. 

World-Order,  210. 

World-Process,  91,  92,  98,  99. 

Worth,  200,  203.    {See  Value.) 

Wundt,  19. 

Zola,  Emile,  183. 


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CONCERNING  PRAYER  ;  its  Nature,  its  Diffi- 
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R.  G.  Colling  WOOD,  Leonard  Hodgson,  Rufus 
M.  Jones,  W.  F.  Lofthouse,  C.  H.  S.  Matthews, 
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Second  Impression.     8vo.     7s.  6d.  net. 

THE  FAITH  AND  THE  WAR.  A  Series  of 
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Others  on  the  Religious  Difficulties  aroused  by  the 
Present  Condition  of  the  World.  Edited  by  F.  J. 
Foakes- Jackson,  D.D.  Second  Impression.  8vo. 
5  s.  net. 

FAITH  OR  FEAR?    An  Appeal  to  the  Church 

of  England.  By  Donald  Hankey  (A  Student  in 
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ESSAYS  ON  THE  EARLY  HISTORY  OF 
THE   CHURCH   AND   THE   MINISTRY. 

By  various  Writers.  Edited  by  the  Rev.  Henry 
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MENS  CREATRIX:  An  Essay.  By  William 
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Chaplain  to  H.M.  the  King;  Chaplain  to  the  Arch- 
bishop of  Canterbury;  President  of  the  Workers' 
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Repton.     Demy  8vo. 

THE  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE  OF  HEALTH. 

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